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# TRENDS OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

By
Prof. HARI MOHAN JHA
*Formerly University Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Patna University, Patna, Bihar*

General Editor
Dr. SANGAM LAL PANDEY

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# EDITOR'S PREFACE

I have great pleasure in presenting this precious work of Prof. Hari Mohan Jha, *'Trends of Linguistic Analysis in Indian Philosophy'*, as the first volume in the series *'Philosophical Traditions of the World'* which is proposed to be brought out by Chaukhambha Orientalia, Varanasi, in my editorship.

This book of Prof. Jha is intended to acquaint the readers with the analysis of language as done in the different schools of thought in Indian Philosophy. It covers a wide range of subject matter including not only the analysis of word, proposition and meaning as found in Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa and rhetorics but also the Navya Nyāya analysis in terms of *Avacchedakatā* and many other things of value.

Prof. Jha, who was the President of the Allahabad Session of Indian Philosophical Congress in 1974, delivered his presidential address on the Navya Nyāya technique of analysis and demonstrated the language of *avacchedakatā* with all its subtleties in such a manner as evoked a great interest in the learned assembly. I was glad to know that the subject formed a part of his book which was being written at that time.

Later on, I met Prof. Jha at Patna and saw the type-script of the book, which was complete and ready for publication. The variety of contents, the masterly treatment of the subject-matter, the wide range of references from the Vedas to Contemporary philosophy and the apt comparisons between different oriental and occidental approaches, attracted me so much that I wanted to have it for publication in the proposed Chaukhambha Orientalia, Varanasi and Prof. Jha was kind enough to agree for which I am obliged to him.

I hope, this book, which is perhaps the first of its kind, will be hailed by the scholars of the east and the west who want to be more intimately acquainted with the philosophic traditions of India in the field of philosophy of language in its various aspects.

University of Allahabad
Allahabad
Dated 31-3-1981

**S. L. Pandey**

# FOREWORD

This work was prepared by me in course of a U. G. C. project of utilisation of Retired Teachers after I retired from Patna University Service in 1970. I chose this subject, 'Trends of Linguistic Analysis in Indian Philosophy" as advised by my revered Guru Dr. D. M. Datta. In this context, Linguistic Analysis means Analysis of Language ( i. e. analysis of Word, Proposition, Meaning etc.) from the Indian perspective ( i. e from the standpoints of the different schools of thought in Indian Philosophy ). The range of the subject-matter which is sufficiently wide includes Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Nyāya (including Navya Nyāya), Vyākaraṇa Darshana and Alaṅkāra Shāstra. I have also compared the eastern and western view-points whenever I found some scope for comparison. The main problems of Philosophy of Language discussed in this book have been specified in the Introduction.

I have collected materials from various sources as indicated in the Bibliography given at the end of this book. I am indebted to all the books and their authors referred to in this book at proper places.

I am grateful to such learned friends as Pandit Durgadhara Jha ( an eminent Naiyāyika of Mithila ) and Pandit Madan Mohan Jha ( ex–Principal of Govt. Sanskrit College, Patna ) for the valuable suggestions given by them from time to time which have been highly helpful to me in the preparation of this work.

I am sincerely obliged to Dr. Sangam Lal Pandey ( Professer and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Allahabad University ) who has taken a keen interest in the publication of this work and has been so kind as to see the printed proofs of this book during the long period of my illness.

My thanks are also due to Chaukhambha Orientalia, Varanasi and its editor Dr. B. P. Rai for bringing out this work with transliteration marks with such care and attention as a work of this kind deserves.

I shall deem my labour amply rewarded if this humble work serves the needs of scholars for whom it is intended.

Patna
Dated 25. 3. 81

**Author**

# INTRODUCTION

The analysis of language in its various aspects, phonetic, etymological, syntactical, semantic, logical, epistemological, metaphysical etc. has been a favourite subject with the Indian thinkers of very ancient times.

A dominant note of present day philosophy is Linguistic Analysis, which in the context of contemporary Western philosophy broadly includes the conceptual analysis as done by Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Ryle, Wisdom, Strawson, Austin and other analytic philosophers of today.

As Sir Robert Ammerman of Wisconsin University observes, the word 'Analysis' is used as a 'way of grouping together heterogeneous philosophies interested in analysing linguistic or conceptual units.'[1]

Lingusitic Analysis is a conveniently elastic expression which embraces within its fold various lines of investigation about word, its meaning and uses including an analysis of figurative language as done by I.A. Richards[2] and others.

But the modern students of philosophy who are initiated in the western traditions of analysis as taught in English and American Universities, are not quite acquainted with the thinkings that have been done in this direction by Indian philosophers.

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[1] The Classics of Analytical Philosophy, ed. Sir Robert Ammerman, T. M. H. Edition, 1965.

[2] Vide Philosophy of Rhetoric, I. A. Richards, New York, 1965.

The object of this book is to present an account of some important trends of linguistic analysis as found in the various Schools of Indian Thought including Grammar and Rhetorics.

The term 'Linguistic Analysis' is used here in a sufficiently wide sense, covering the philosophy of language as well as the analysis of word and meaning from different perspectives.

The mystery of language or human speech attracted the attention, and stimulated the thinking, of our philosophers from very early times. The Vedas and Upaniṣads are full of intuitive flashes about the nature of *Vāk* ( Eternal Verbum ). The word was regarded as the creative principle of the world and was accorded a divine status ( *Śabda Brahman* ). This deification of Word can remind one of the Biblical saying—"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God".

The above idea has a striking parallel in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* : "*Saḥ Bhūḥ iti Vyāharat Saḥ Bhūmiṃ asṛjat*, i.e., He spoke 'Earth' and the Earth came into being.

The beginnings of linguistic analysis in Indian thought can be traced in the *Nirukta* of Yāska which is perhaps the oldest available specimen of etymological analysis. The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, the *Vārttikas* of Kaiyaṭa offered examples of minute grammatical analysis unparalleled

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1. Vide Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, 2.2.4.2.

in the history of any other language. The *Saṅgraha* of Vyāḍi in one lakh Ślokas (referred to by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his *Udyota Ṭīkā*) is reputed to have been a veritable encyclopaedia of linguistic analysis.

The analysis of language in Indian thought has flown into different channels in divergent directions. Multifarious questions have been raised about the different aspects of language and its parts. What is the inner source of speech ? What are the different stages through which it passes before it becomes a spoken word ? What is the ultimate unit of language ? Letter *( Varṇa )*, Word *( Pada )* or Sentence *( Vākya )* ? How does sense emerge from sound ? What is the relation between Word and Meaning ? Does the word refer to the Universal *( jāti )*, Individual *( vyakti )* or Form *( ākṛti )* ? What makes a sentence ? What are its essential factors and necessary conditions ? What is the most important word in a sentence ? What is the role or function of the verb ? How does verbal cognition *(Śābda Bodha)* arise ? Does synthesis *(Anvaya)* precede expression *( Abhidhāna )* or follow it ? In what ways can a sentence be construed ? How is the intended meaning known ? What is the distinction between literal, figurative and implied meanings ? What are their different kinds ? How can the exact meaning be specified ?

These are some of the issues that have been discussed by the different schools of Indian thought, particularly Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and Alaṅkāra Śāstra. One who was well-versed in such disciplines, e.g., Grammar, Logic, Epistemology etc. was known as *Pada-*

*Vākya Pramāṇājña*, i.e., a specialist in determining the validity of words and propositions and functioned as an expert in interpreting the meaning and significance of statements like the analysis of today.

The sourses from which materials for the study of linguistic analysis in Indian philosphical literature can be collected are many and varied.

The most important source is *Vyākaraṇa Darśana* ( Grammarical Philosophy ) as propounded by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākya-Padīyaṃ* and his commentators Puṇyarāja and Helārāja. The approach of this school is explained clearly by Mādhavācārya in his *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha* in the chapter on *Pāṇini Darśana.* Such works as the *Laghu Mañjūṣā* and *Sphoṭavāda* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa and the *Vyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa Sāra* of Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa also contain precious elements of linguistic analysis.

The Nyāya views on the subject can be had from such works as *Gautama sūtra*, *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya*, *Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya ṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Nyāya Mañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya. Such texts as *Tarka Saṅgraha* of Annaṃ Bhaṭṭa ( along with *Tarka Dīpikā* ), *Bhāṣā Pariccheda* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana ( along with *Siddhānta Muktāvalī* ), *Tarka Bhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, *Tarka Prakāśa* of Śrīkaṇṭha and *Tārkika Rakṣā* of Varadācārya are highly helpful in this connection.

The Navya Nyāya approach can be studied with the help of the pioneer work, *Tattva Cintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, along with its various commentaries and subcommentaries such as *Tattvāloka* of Pakṣadhara Miśra, *Tattvadīdhiti* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, *Jāgadīśī*, *Gādā-*

*dharī* and *Mathurānāthī ṭikās.* The *Śaktivāda* and *Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara and the *Śabda Śakti Prakāśikā* and *Avacchedakatva nirukti* of Jagadīśa contain subtle discussions on the word and meaning. The Mimāṁsā views on linguistic issues can be culled from such works as *Jaiminī Sūtra, Śābara Bhāṣya, Śloka Vārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Śphoṭa Siddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra, *Nyāya Ratna Mālā* and *Śāstra Dīpikā* of Pārtha Sārathi Miśra, Bhaṭṭa Cintāmaṇi of Nāgā Bhaṭṭa, *Bṛhatī Ṭikā* of Prabhākara, and *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā* of Śālikanātha Miśra.

The Vedāntic views on the subject can be collected from such works as *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati, and the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* of Dharmarājādhvarīndra. Such Buddhist works as *Pramāṇa Samuccaya* of Dignāga and *Pramāṇa Vārttika* of Dharmakīrti and such Jaina works as *Śabdānuśāsana* of Hemacandra and *Syādvāda Mañjarī* of Mallisena can also provide plenty of precious materials on the subject. The rhetoric approach can be studied with the help of such works on Poetics as *Kāvya Prakāśa* of Mammaṭa, *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* of Viśvanātha, *Rasa Gaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha, *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānanda Vardhana, *Kāvyādarśa* of Daṇḍī, *Kāvyālaṅkāra* of Bhāmaha and *Aucitya Vicāra Carcā* of Kṣemendra.

There are lots of works on Tantra and Yoga, e.g., *Ṣaṭ Cakra Nirūpaṇa, Haṭha Yoga Pradīpikā* etc. which deal with the hidden aspects of language.

The *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas also abound with the precious elements of linguistic philosophy.

The above list is only selective and not exhaustive. The range of literature on linguistic analysis is quite vast, spread over different branches of knowledge and falling under different schools of thought. Thus one who wants to make a comprehensive survey of the various trends of analysis from Nirukta to Navya Nyāya has to traverse a long course of extensive and intensive studies in classical treatises, the number of which is a legion.

A brief outline of the subject-matter dealt with in this book is given below.

The first chapter gives an analysis of language in the light of *Sphoṭavāda*. The fourfold levels of speech, viz., *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, have been described. The threefold theories of linguistic units, viz., *Varṇavāda*, *Padavāda* and *Vākyavāda* have been discussed. The eightfold classification of *sphoṭa* has been elucidated. The Vaiyākaraṇa theory of *Akhaṇḍa Vākya Sphoṭa* has been explained and examined from the standpoints of the different schools of thought.

The second chapter gives an analysis of the nature of the word *(śabda)* and its potency *(śakti)*. The relation between the word and meaning has been discussed in the light of different schools of thought. The different theories about the import of word, viz., *Jātivāda*, *Vyaktivāda* and *Ākṛtivāda* have been examined. The fourfold tendencies ( *Pravṛttis* ) of words, viz , *Jāti*, *Guṇa*; *Kriyā* and *Yadṛcchā* have been brought out. The function of the verb has been described in the light of different schools. The fourfold classification of words from the view-points of convention ( *Rūḍhi* ) and combination

( *Yoga*, viz., *Rūḍha*, *Yaugika*, *Yoga-Rūḍha* and *Yaugika Rūḍha* ) has been explained and illustrated. The eight-fold means of knowing the meaning ( *Śaktigrahopāya* ) and the fourteen determinant factors of meaning have been described and exemplified.

The third chapter gives an analysis of the nature of the sentence and its meaning. The fourfold necessary conditions of a sentence, viz., *Ākāṅkṣā*, *Āsatti*, *Yogyatā* and *Tātparya* have been explained. The eight-fold views about the nature of sentence have been brought out. The process of verbal cognition ( *Śābda Bodha* or *Vākyārtha Bodha* ) has been analysed. The different formulas of interpretation applied by the Vaiyākaraṇas, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas have been explained and illustrated. The theories of *anvitābhidhāna vāda* and *Abhihitānvaya-vāda* as advocated by the rival schools of Mīmāṁsā, viz., *Guru* and *Bhaṭṭa* schools have been explained and examined in their different aspects. The chapter closes with some discussion on validity ( *Prāmāṇya* ), contradiction ( *Vyāhati* ) and verification ( *Upapatti* ).

The fourth chapter deals with the analysis of rhetoric meaning. The literal, figurative and implied meanings ( *vācyārtha*, *lakṣyārtha* and *vyaṅgyārtha* ) have been distinguished. The different varieties of *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* have been enumerated and exemplified. The essential features of poetic language have been brought out in the light of different schools of Poetics, viz., *Rasa*, *Rīti*, *Vakrokti*, *Dhvani*, *Aucitya* and *Alaṅkāra*. Some varieties of *Alaṅkāra* ( figures of speech ) have been illustrated with the help of corresponding ornamental expressions in English.

The fifth chapter is devoted to the Navya Nyāya analysis of proposition The concepts of *Avacchedakatā* and *Prakāratā* etc. have been elucidated. The analysis of *viṣayatā* ( contentness ) into *Viśeṣyatā* (substantivity), *Viśeṣaṇatā* ( adjectivity ) and *Saṁsargatā* ( relationship ) has been described. The nature, function, kinds and uses of *avacchedakas* ( as instruments of specification of the meaning in different contexts ) have been explained and illustrated with the help of various examples. Several propositions ( e.g., 'This is a pot'. 'The pot is blue', 'The pot is on the ground', etc. ) have been analysed in the Navya Nyāya style. The Navya Nyāya technique of analysis has also been applied to the proposition. "Scott is the author of the Waverley" ( which is a stock example of modern analysis given by Russell in his '*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*').

The sixth chapter gives an analysis of the concept of Negation *( Niṣedha* or *Abhāva )* mainly in the light of Navya Nyāya. The various factors associated with *Abhāva, Anuyogitā* ( locusness ), *Pratiyogitā* ( counter-positiveness ), *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ( the specific property of the counter-positiveness ) etc. have been explained. A negative proposition ( viz., 'The pot is not on the ground ) has been analysed in a way that shows, that it can yield eight different meanings. The various kinds of non-existence *Anyonyābhāva* and *Saṁsargābhāva* with its distinctions have been explained and exemplified. Such negative concepts as *Apoha, Paryudāsa* and *Prasajya pratiṣedha* have been elucidated. The complex varieties of non-existence ( e.g.. *Viśeṣābhāva, Ubhayābhāva* and *Abhāvābhāva* etc. ) have been represented in terms of Symbolic Logic.

In my treatment of the subject I have adhered closely to the original Sanskrit texts and the numerous quotations given from them are intended to acquaint the readers with the style of expression and terminology as used by the Ācāryas in propounding their views. The Sanskrit words are put in Roman script with transliteration marks for the convenience of such readers as may not be thoroughly used to Devanāgarī script. The technical terms in Sanskrit have been given side by side with English equivalents as far as possible, with a view to facilitate an understanding of the subject. The references in the foot-notes can be followed with the help of the list of abbreviations given along with the Bibliography in the end of the book. They are meant to provide guidelines to researchers for pursuing further studies in the subject.

The evolution of linguistic analysis in India has not been quite on the same lines as in the West. The two have grown and developed independently of each other. They have different orientations of their own. They pose different questions and propound different theories. There are many concepts in the Indian Philosophy of language which are unknown to Western analysists. For example, the concepts of *Sphoṭa, Apoha, Anvitābhidhāna, Avacchedakatā* etc. do not fall within the field of modern analysis and have no exact synonyms in English. Such concepts which presuppose a thorough knowledge of Sanskrit Grammar cannot be made easily accessible to the English readers who lack such a back-ground.

But in spite of the wide linguistic gulf, the two mighty parallel currents of thought, which are cut off from each other, often exhibit striking resemblances. They sometimes cover a common ground and agree in certain points, though tangentially. For example, the *Akhaṇḍa Vākya Vāda* of the Vaiyākaraṇas may be compared to Bradley's Theory of Judgment. The concept of incompatibility as discussed by modern logicians may be put under the category of *Artha Bādha* or *Ayogyatā* as expounded in Indian Logic. Much that passes by the name of linguistic analysis today can be subsumed under *Śābda Bodha*. If the two systems were brought closer to each other, it might open fresh avenues for thinking.

But attempts at such synthesis and integration can be made, if the Indian side of the picture also gets due focus of attention. It is indeed a Herculean task to render into English such things as the language of *Avacchedakatā*. In this book, I have tried to elucidate such things in as simple and easy a manner as the nature of the subject can admit.

**Author**

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# TRENDS OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

## CHAPTER I

# THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

( in the light of *sphoṭavāda* )

### 1. *The Metaphysical Nature of Speech* ( *Vāk* )

The inner aspect of speech has been subjected to a minute analysis in Indian thought, particularly in the vyākaraṇa darśana ( grammatical philosophy ). The word-essence ( *śabda-tattva* ) has been described by Bhartṛhari as *śabda-Brahman* which is beginningless and endless.[1]

According to Āgama Śāstra, whatever is heard in the form of sound ( *śabda* or *nāda* ) is the manifestation of cosmic energy. So long as sound is produced, there is *akāśa* : when the elements are dissolved, the formless remains. That formless ( *nirākāra* ) and soundless ( *Niḥśabda* ) *quid* is called by the name of *Para Brahman or Paramātman.*[2]

---

1. anādinidhanam Brahma śabdatattvam yadakṣaraṃ.
nivartato'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ..
**VP. I. 1.**

2. yatkincinnādarūpeṇa, śrūyate śrutireva sā.
yastattvānte nirākāraḥ sa eva parameśvaraḥ.
yāvadākāśasaṅkalpaḥ tāvacchabdaḥ pravartate.
niḥśabdam yatparaṃ Brahma paramātmeti gīyate..
**HYP. IV-101-2.**

The *śabda Brahman* ( word-God ) is described as the consciousness in all living beings. It manifests itself in the form of vibrations in two ways :—

( i ) *Nāma* ( name ) and ( ii ) *Rūpa* ( form ). These two, i.e., *śabda* and *artha* constitute the contents of the mind and the objective world. The entire phenomenal world *( nāma rūpātmaka jagat )* is evolved from the same conscious energy *( cit śakti )* which manifests itself in *vāk* or speech.

The word-God is described in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as infinite and boundless like an ocean and extremely difficult to comprehend.[1] The *Mahābhārata* says that one who is well-versed in it can attain the status of the Supreme.[2] Patañjali in his *Mahā-Bhāṣya* observes that even one word which is known and used properly can be most fruitful.[3] There is no idea, says Bhartṛhari, which is not embodied in word. All knowledge is manifested by Word.[4]

The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* says that the Ultimate Reality even beyond the Lord of Creation is *Vāk* ( Speech ).[5] According to the *Atharva Veda*, the ultimate principle of all language or Speech is the Supreme Being.[1] It is by virtue of speech that all gods, men and animals live in the universe.[2]

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[1] śabdabrahma sudurbodhaṃ prāṇendriyamanomayaṃ.
anantapāraṃ gambhiraṃ durvigāhyaṃ samudravat..
BP ( I 2 )

[2] śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ Parabrahmādhigacchati.
MB ( Śānti Parva 270 )

[3] ekaḥ Śabdaḥ Samyak Jnātaḥ Samyak Prayuktaḥ.
kāmadhug bhavati. PM

[4] na so 'stipratyayo loke yaḥ Śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jnānaṃ śarvaṃ sabdena bhāsate.
VP ( I–124 )

[5] yadvā Prajāpateḥ Paramasti vāgeva tat. —SPB

According to the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, it is the self from which the entire creation emanates. From the Self emerges *ākāśa* (ether), from *akāśa*, *vāyu* (air), from *vāyu*, *agni* (fire), and so on.[3] The inner principle of creation is self-consciousness which shines in its own light.[4]

According to Tāntrika philosophy, the cosmic seed (*vindu*) originates from creative sound (*nāda*).[5] The transcendent power (*parā śakti*), i. e., Supreme Consciousness that is manifested through speech is all-pervading and partless.[6]

The vaiyākaraṇas call this eternal (*nitya*) indivisible (*niravayava*) *śabda Brahman* which is the ultimate cause of the world by the name of *sphoṭa*.[7]

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[1] vadanti yatra gacchanti tadāhur Brahmaṇam Mahat.
AV ( 10. 8. 33 ).

[2] vācaṃ devāḥ upajivanti viśve. vācaṃ gandharvāḥ paśavaḥ manuṣyāḥ *ibid.*

[3] etasmāt ātmanaḥ ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ ākāśāt vāyuḥ-vāyuḥ agniḥ TU ( 2. 1 )

[4] svarūpajotirevantaḥ Para Brahmānapeyinī—VP ( 1-2 ).

[5] nādād vindusamudbhvavaḥ—SCN ( Vyākhyā ).

[6] abhivyakta parā śaktiḥ avinābhāvalakṣaṇā.
akhanda paracichchaktir vpāptā cidrupinī vibhuṃ—*ibid.*

[7] jagannidānam sphoṭākhyo nitya niravayavaḥ sabdaḥ brahma eva iti.
SDS ( Pāṇini Darśana ).

## 2. The Different Levels of Speech

How does the transcendental, eternal *sphoṭa* or word-essence pass from its noumenal stage to the phenomenal phases, i.e., to the empirical words that are spoken and heard ? The audible sound which is pronounced by the vocal organs is only the outer expression of the inner force that lies deep-rooted in Reality.

Speech may be compared to an iceberg which is more submerged under the surface and is perceptible only so far as its outer part is concerned. It is manifested through the vocal organs ( *vāgindriyas* ) which are seated in the heart, throat, head, root of the tongue, teeth, nose, lips and the palate.[1]

The external form ( *bāhya rūpa* ) of speech which becomes audible ( *śrotragrāhya* ) is known as *vaikharī*.[2]

The internal ( *ābhyantara* ) level of speech just below *vaikharī* is known as *madhyamā*. It originates in the heart ( *hṛdaya* ) and is inaudible to others.

The level of speech which is deeper still is known as *paśyantī*. It originates in the region of the navel ( *nābhi* ) and is subtle ( *sūkṣma* ). The deepest and subtlest form of speech is known as *parā*. It is located in the *mūlādhāra cakra* ( below the genitals ) and is beyond experience ( *lokavyavahārātīta* ). While *paśyantī* is accessible to the yogins ( by means of supernormal perception ), *parā* is even beyond that.[1]

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[1] aṣṭau sthānāni varṇānām uraḥ kaṇṭhaḥ Śirastathā
jihvāmūlaṃ ca Duntāśca nāsikoṣṭhau ca tālu, ca.
PŚ ( 13 )

[2] vaikharyām tu kṛto nādaḥ paraśravaṇagocaraḥ. PIM

Thus there are four levels of speech ranging from the transcendent to the manifest stage, viz.

( i ) *Parā* ( Trancendent Speech )
( ii ) *Paśyantī* ( Subtle Speech )
( iii ) *Madhyamā* ( Inner Speech )
( iv ) *Vaikharī* ( Manifest Speech )

The *parā* ( which is the underlying root of speech ) is seated in the region ( below the genital ), *paśyantī* is located in the navel, *madhyamā* is located in the heart, and *vaikharī* is located in the throat.[2] While the first three are sub-vocal, it is the fourth, viz. *vaikharī*, i.e. the speech in its vocal stage, that is called language.

### 3. *The Centres of Energy ( Cakras )*

The roots of speech referred to above can be understood by having a knowledge of the sixfold *cakras* ( centres of energy ), viz.

( i ) *Mūlādhāra Cakra*
( il ) *Maṇipūra Cakra*
( iii ) *Svādhiṣṭhāna Cakra*
( iv ) *Anāhata Cakra*
( v ) *Viśuddha Cakra*
( vi ) *Ājñā Cakra.*

These centres are located respectively in the root of the genital, heart, throat, middle of the eye-brows and cerebral artifices.

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[1] yoginām tu tatrāpi prakṛtipratyayavibhāge avagatiḥ; Parayām tu na. L. M. ( Vyākhyā ).

[2] parā Vāṅmūlacakrasthā Paśyantī nābhigā smṛtā
hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeyā vaikharī syāt tu kaṇṭhagā. LM.

Detailed description of *cakras* ( and *nāḍīs* such as *iḍā*, *piṅgalā*, *suṣumnā* along with the mysterious power of the *kuṇḍalinī*, i.e., the coiled serpentine energy are found in Tāntrika literature.[1]

But the exact significance of many terms in such descriptions is not clearly intelligible in terms of modern science. Some eminent Indologists have tried to interpret some of these terms in the language of modern anatomy and physiology. Sir John Woodroffe in his book, 'The Serpent Power' has described the main centres of energy as summarised below.[2]

( 1 ) *Mūlādhāra Cakra* is the special centre of the sacro-coccygeal region ( i. e. the region below the genitals ). It is in this region that the mysterious *kuṇḍalini* ( coiled serpentine energy ) lies. It is the *seat of parā vāk.*

( 2 ) *Svādhiṣṭhāna Cakra* is the special centre in the region of the navel. It is the seat of *paśyantī vāk.*

( 3 ) *Anāhata Cakra* is the special centre in the region of the heart. It is the seat of *madhyamā vāk.*

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[1] mūlādhāraḥ svādhiṣṭhānaṃ
maṇipūraka eva ca
anāhata Viśuddhākhyā
ājñā ṣaṭcakra mucyate.
mūlādhāra liṅgamūle
nābhau ca hṛdi kaṇṭhake
bhruvormadhye brahmarandhre
cakrāṇi cintayet kramāt. SCN ( Vyākhyā ).

[2] for more details, *vide* TSP.

( 4 ) *Viśuddha Cakra* is the special centre in the region of the throat. It is the seat of *vaikharī vāk.*

All these centres of energy are located in the different parts of the vertebral column or the special cord *( meru daṇḍa ).*

It is through the *suṣumnā nāḍī* that the vital air *(prāṇa vāyu)* passes to the *cakras.* It is in the interior of the cerebro-special axis and extends from the basic plexus *( mūlādhāra )* to the *sahasrāra cakra* ( in the vortical region ). It is most closely associated with speech *( vāk ).* Thus the sound that is uttered as a letter *( varṇa )* is the result of a long-drawn process originating in the *mūlādhāra* and carried gradually to *viśuddha cakra* by the force of air till it assumes the stage of *vaikharī* or articulate sound *( varṇa ).*[1]

*Vaikharī* is the gross word *( sthūla śabda )* which refers to the gross object *( sthūla artha ). Madhyamā* is that inner state of silent speech which is ideational and associated with intellect *( buddhi ).* The two-fold aspects, viz., *nāma* and *rūpa* function simultaneously as *śabda* ( word ) and *artha* ( meaning ). But they are in the form of empirical mental impression *( saṁskāra )* and serve both as cogniser *( grāhaka )* and cognised *( grāhya ).*

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[1] mūlādhārāt prathamamudito yastu bhāvaḥ parākhyaḥ,
paśchāt paśyantyatha hṛdayago,
buddhiyum madhyamākhyaḥ,
vyaktervaikharyatha rurudiṣo
rasya jantoḥ suṣummā,
baddhastasmāt bhavati pavana-
prerito varṇa sañjñaḥ.SCN. ( ṭīkā )

*Paśyantī* is the subtle state of *śabda* in vibration ( *spanda* ) accessible only to extraordinary perception ( *alaukika pratyakṣa* ).

*Parā* is a motionless ( *niḥspanda* ) state of undifferentiated *śabda* which is devoid of such particulars as letters ( *varṇādiviśeṣarahita* ).

The fourfold stages ( viz. *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* ) can be traced in the *Ṛgveda*, which says, "While the former three are hidden into the cave, the fourth is spoken by men."[1]

## 4. *The Theory of Sphoṭa*

The theory of *sphoṭa* has been propounded mainly by the Grammatical School of Philosophy ( *Vyākaraṇa Darśana* ). The origin of the concept of *sphoṭa* is attributed to one Sphoṭāyana Ṛṣi who has been referred to by Pāṇini in his sūtra[2] and by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his *sphoṭavāda*.[3]

The word *sphoṭa* is etymologically derived from the root *sphuṭ* which means to open, to unfold, to develop. It is interpreted in various ways, such as that which develops by itself[4], or that which is revealed by letters[5] or that by which a sense is revealed.[1] In the first sense it is equated with Brahman which is a self-unfolding principle. But the word *sphoṭa* is not always used in this metaphysical sense. In the linguistic context, it is used in the second and third senses.

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[1] catvāri vākparimitā padāni
tāni vidur Brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ
guhāyām triṇi nihitāni nengayanti
turīyām vāco manuṣyāḥ vadanti. RV. ( I. 164-45 ).

[2] ayaṅ sphoṭāyanasya P. S. ( I. I. 68 ).

[3] vaiyākaraṇanāgeśaḥ sphoṭāyan ṛṣermatam
pariṣkṛtvoktavān tena prīyatāṃ parameśvaraḥ. SV. ( I ).

[4] sphuṭati sphuṭībhavati iti sphoṭaḥ.

[5] sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇaḥ iti sphoṭaḥ SDS. ( P. D ).

The vaiyākaraṇas describe *sphoṭa* as that eternal word-symbol ( *nitya śabda* ) which is

( i ) different from letters ( *varaṇātirikta* ),
( ii ) manifestable by letters ( *varṇābhivyaṅgya* ) and
( iii ) indicative of meaning ( *arthapratyāyaka* ).[2]

The earliest reference to *sphoṭa* in the above sense is traceable in the *Nirukta* of Yāska.

Bhatṛhari also mentions the names of Audumbarāyaṇa and Vārtākṣa in this connection.[3]

Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* describes *sphoṭa* as a word-essence. A word is not a mere combination of letters ( *varṇa samudāya* ), but a permanent symbol.[4] When it is said that a word is produced ( *śabdaḥ jāyate* ), what is really meant is that the word is revealed or manifested ( *abhivyakta* ) and not created ( *utpanna* ).. Similarly when one says *śabdaḥ naśyati* ( the word vanishes ), what is meant is that the word disappears and not that it perishes. This view of eternity of word (*śabdanityatvavāda*) is further elaborated by Kaiyaṭa.[1]

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[1] sphuṭati arthaḥ asmāt iti sphoṭaḥ VBS.

[2] varṇātiriktaḥ varṇābhivyangyaḥ
arthapratyāyakaḥ nityaḥ Śabdaḥ
SDS. ( PD ).

[3] vākyasya buddhau nityatvaṃ
arthayogaṃ ca laukikaṃ
dṛṣṭvā catuṣṭvaṃ nāstīti
vārtākṣaudumbarāyaṇau. VP. ( II, 343 ).

[4] vide PM ( I. I. 69 ).

There is an interesting question in this connection. A word (*śabda*) which is audible to the ear consists of letters (*varṇas*) that are pronounced in succession. But the moment a letter is uttered, the sound vanishes. Now the question arises. How can the evanescent sounds combine together? How can a whole be formed out of parts which are fleeting and not stable?

Take the word *ghaṭaḥ* ( pot ). When we pronounce *gha* there is no *ṭaḥ* and by the time we say *ṭaḥ*, *gha* is already gone. Then how can there be a union of the two letters which are not co-existent?

It is mainly to solve this tricky problem that a vaiyākaraṇa takes recourse to the theory of *sphoṭa* ( i.e. a permanent word-symbol ). The word is not constituted by the sound (*dhvani*), but only revealed by it. For example, the word *ghaṭaḥ* is not a mere combination of meaningless sounds like *gha* and *ṭaḥ*, but it possesses a unitary character of its own which has the capacity of revealing a meaning ( i. e. pot ). It is this capacity of revelation that characterises *sphoṭa*.[2]

Thus a distinction is made between sound (*dhvani*) and sense (*sphoṭa*). While the former is transient, the latter is permanent.

The theory of *sphoṭa* has been explained elaborately by such eminent grammarians as Bhartṛhari in his

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[1] vide MP.

[2] varṇābhivyaṅgyatve sati arthapratīti janakatvam sphoṭaḥ. VBS.

*Vākyapadīyam* and by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his *Sphoṭavāda*. It is also discussed in detail in such grammatical treatises as *Laghu Mañjūṣā*, *Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa Sāra* etc.

The Mīmāṁsā view has been expounded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Śloka Vārtika*.

The Naiyāyika view has been ably advocated by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya Siddhānta Mañjarī*. Other schools of thought ( i.e. The Vedānta etc. ) have also joined hands in the discussion on *sphoṭa*. We shall examine the pros and cons on the subject later on.

Here we shall consider some of the main issues relating to *sphoṭa* from the standpoints of the Vaiyākaraṇas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas.

### 5. *The Unit of Language*

An interesting question has been raised in this connection; what is the unit of language ? Is it a letter ( *varṇa* ) or a word ( *pada* ) or a sentence ( *vākya* ) ?

The first view, i.e., it is the letter that constitutes the unit of language ( *varṇavāda* ) is held by the *Mīmāṁsakas*. The second view, i.e., it is word that constitutes the unit of language ( *padavāda* ) is advocated by the *Naiyāyikas*. The third view, i.e., it is the sentence that constitutes the unit of language ( *vākyavāda* ) is propounded by the *Vaiyākaraṇas*.

Let us see how these different views are advocated by their protagonists.

### ( i ) *Varṇavāda*

The Mīmāṁsakas hold that the letters ( *varṇas* ) are the ultimate units of language. *Śabara Svāmī* in his commentary on *Jaimini-Sūtra* says that the word *gauḥ* (cow) is nothing but a combination of the constituent letters (*g*, a*u* and *ḥ*).[1]

It is a combination of letters that constitutes a word and it is a combination of words that constitutes a sentence.[2] In other words, a sentence has no separate entity of its own apart from words and words have no separate entity of their own apart from letters.[3] While sentences and words consist of parts, the individual letters are partless (*niravayava*) and indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*).[4] Hence the ultimate units are letters and not words or sentences. The letters alone are *śabda* in the real sense of the terms[5] and constitute the basis of all meaning.[6]

There is no potency of generating the meaning (*sphoṭa*) without letters[7] though the letters occur in different words and sentences, the essential unity of letters cannot be denied.[8]

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1. gauḥ iti atra kaḥ śabdaḥ ? gakāraukāra
   visarjanīyāḥ. teṣāmeva vācakatvaṃ. SB. ( I. I. I. )
2. varṇasamūhaḥ pạdaṃ padasamuhaḥ vākyaṃ. SD.
3. na varṇavyatirekeṇa padamanyanna vidyate
   vākyaṁ varṇapadābhyāṁ ca vyatiriktaṃ na Kiñcana
   VP. ( 1.72 )
4. nanu vākye padāni padeṣu ca varṇāḥ
   varṇeṣu avayavāh na saṅti ŚR.
5. varnaḥ eva śabdāḥ MP.
6. teṣâm varṇānām eva vācakatvaṃ PP.
7. nārthasya vācakaḥ sphoṭaḥ varṇabhyaḥ vyatirekataḥ
   SV. ( 132 )
8. padabhedepi varṇānāṃ
   ekatvam na nivartate.
   vākyeṣu padamekam ca
   bhinneṣvapyupalabhyate VP. ( 1. 71 )

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Ślokavārtika* has made a strong attempt to establish *varṇavāda* ( i. e., the view that the meaning emanates from letters ).[1] The *Tautātikas* hold that it is only the letters that produce the meaning according to their capacity.[2] According to these *varṇavādins* a word is nothing but a collection of letters and there is nothing beyond them which can be regarded as the bearer of meaning.[3] It is the varṇas which lie at the root of all cognition of meaning ( *arthapratyayahetu* ). A word can have no significance apart from the letters[4]. Thus the upholders of *varṇavāda* regard letters and not words or sentences as ultimate units of expression.

### ( ii ) *Padavāda*

The Naiyāyikas are of the view that it is the word ( *pada* ) and not the letters ( *varṇa* ) constitutes the real unit of language. They refute the *varṇavāda* of the *Mīmāṁsakas* on the ground that individual letters taken singly and separately do not convey the sense. Isolated letters or syllables in themselves do not give the meaning. Even all combinations of letters are not meaningful (*vācaka*). While *ghaṭaḥ* means pot, *ṭaghaḥ* means nothing. Such meaningless (*nirarthaka*) combinations of letters do not constitute a word in the real sense of the term. That is why the *pada* is defined as that which possesses potency of generating a meaning.[1] The essence of a word lies in its denotative capacity.[2]

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[1] varṇātiriktaḥ pratiṣidhyamānaḥ
padeṣu mandam phalamādadhāti
kāryāṇi vākyāvayavāśrayāṇi
satyāni kartuṃ kṛta eṣa yatnaḥ SV.

[2] yāvanto yadṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādaka
varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyāḥ te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ SDS.

[3] varṇasamudāyaḥ eva padam, na tu
tadatiriktam sphoṭākhyaṃ kiñcit Ibid.

[4] varṇavyatiriktasya padasya na vācakatvam Ibid.

The main arguments adduced by the Naiyāyikas against *varṇavāda* may be summed up as follows :—

(1) Every letter taken by itself does not convey a meaning.[3]

(2) As the letters pronounced are evanescent, they cannot combine together to form a word.[4]

Hence isolated letters cannot be regarded as meaningful.[5]

The *varṇavādins* are put between the horns of a dilemma. Do the letters generate the meaning when taken collectively or when taken singly ? The first alternative cannot be accepted because evanescent parts cannot form an integral whole (any more than passing waves can form a garland). The second alternative is also untenable, because the letters taken singly and separately do not give rise to meaning. Thus there are difficulties both ways.

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[1] śaktaṃ padam TS.

[2] padatvam ca vṛttimattvam GSV.

[3] pratyekamarthavattā sambhavāt SDS.

[4] varṇānam kṣaṇikānām samūhāsaṁbhavāt. *ibid.*

[5] tasmāt varṇānām vācakatvam na saṁbhavati *ibid.*

Hence the view that the meaning is generated by letters is rejected by the critics of Varṇavāda.[1]

The *Padavādins* regard the *pada* as a unit of meaning. The *pada* is a word which ends in some *vibhakti* ( case-ending or conjugational suffix ).[2]

Such a *pada* or term which is made of some root ( *prakṛti* ) and an affix ( *pratyaya* ), e.g., *gauḥ* ( cow ) in the nominative case or *gacchati* ( goes ) in the present tense is taken as the bearer of a definite meaning ( *arthapratyāyaka* ). Thus the potency of generating a sense lies in the terms as a whole and not in the individual letters.[3]

Thus the *padavādins* put the premium on words and not on letters or sentences. The former are treated as mere abstractions and the latter are treated as mere combinations of words. It is the words alone that are real. The concept of an indivisible sentence ( *akhaṇḍa vākya* ) according to the *padavādins* is a mere fiction.[4]

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[1] Kiṃ varṇāḥ samāstāḥ vyastāḥ vā
Arthapratyayaṃ janayanti ? Nādyaḥ,
Varṇānām kṣaṇikāṇām samūhāsaṁbhāyāt.
Nāntyaḥ. VyastaVarṇebhyaḥ arthapratītya sambhavāt.
Tasmāt varṇānām vācakatvānupattau
yadbalād arathapratipattiḥ saḥ sphoṭaḥ

[2] Suptiñantaṃ padaṃ PS. ( 1. 4. 14 )

[3] te ( padavādinaḥ ) varṇavyatiriktasya
padasya vācakatvaṃ icchanti. SDS.

[4] padavādinaḥ padaṃ eva satyaṃ manyante
( te hi akhaṇḍavākyam kalpitaṃ āhuḥ ) PT.

Thus while the *varṇavādins* hold that the denotative capacity lies in letters, the *padavādins* mention that the denotative capacity lies in the words alone.[1]

( iii ) *Vākyavāda*

While the Mīmāṁsakas are *varṇavādins* and the Naiyāyikas are *padavādins*, the Vaiyākaraṇas are *vākya vādins*. They hold that the real unit of language is a sentence ( *vākya* ) and not words or letters.

The great grammarian Bhartṛhari has expounded the above view in his *Vākyapadīyam*. He holds that there is no separate existence of words or letters apart from that of a sentence, which alone is the real unit.[2]

A sentence, e. g., *gauḥ carati* ( the cow is grazing ) possesses a unitary meaning. The division of the sentence into letters or words is only artificial. Really speaking, a sentence ( or a word ) does not consist of parts.[3]

The component letters and words are only abstractions and present a semblance of separate parts ( *avayavābhāsa* ) in a whole which is realy partless.[4]

The sentence or judgment is one integral whole which is really indivisible.[5]

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1. padasyaiva vācakatvaṃ —Ibid.
2. Pade na varṇāḥ vidyante varṇeṣvavayavāḥ na ca
   vākyāt padānāṃ atyantaṃ praviviktaḥ na kaścana
   —VP. ( I. 73 )
3. nānekāvayavaṃ vakyaṃ padaṃ va sphoṭavādinaṃ —SS.
4. niravayaveṣu varṇapada vākyeṣu
   avayavābhāsaḥ varnābhāsaḥ
   padābhāsaḥ kālpanikaḥ mithyā iti bhāvaḥ —ST.
5. ekaṃ abhinnasvabhāvaṃ vākyaṃ —Ibid.

It may be asked : If the words are mere abstractions and unreal, why are so many distinctions about them made by the Grammarians ?" The answer is : "Such distinctions are made to help the understanding of those who can grasp a judgment only piecemeal and not as a whole.[1]

## 6. Different kinds of *Sphoṭa*

Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his *Sphoṭavāda* has mentioned the following eight kinds of *Sphoṭa*.

( 1 ) *Varṇa Sphoṭa*
( 2 ) *Pada Sphoṭa*
( 3 ) *Vākya Sphoṭa*
( 4 ) *Varṇa jāti Sphoṭa*
( 5 ) *Pada jāti Sphoṭa*
( 6 ) *Vākya-jāti Sphoṭa*
( 7 ) *Akhaṇḍapada Sphoṭa*
( 8 ) *Akhaṇḍavākya Sphoṭa*

The *Sphoṭa* has been viewed as
( i ) *Vyakti* ( Individual ) or
( ii ) *Jāti* ( Universal )

The former is of two kinds, viz.
( i ) *Sakhaṇḍa* ( with parts ) and
( ii ) *Akhaṇḍa* ( partless ).

The first *( Sakhaṇḍa )* again is subdivided into three kinds :—

( a ) *Varṇa* ( Letter )
( b ) *Pada* ( Word )
( c ) *Vākya* ( Sentence )

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[1] abuddhabodhanāya hi padavibhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ. -Ibid.

The second ( *akhaṇḍa* ) is of two kinds, viz.

( i ) *Pada Sphoṭa*
( ii ) *Vākya Sphoṭa*

*Jāti Sphoṭa* again is of three kinds, viz.

( i ) *Varṇa Jāti*
( ii ) *Paḍa Jāti*
( iii ) *Vākya Jāti*

Thus there are altogether eight kinds of *Sphoṭa* as envisaged by different thinkers.[1]

The above kinds of *Sphoṭa* may be represented in a tabular form as follows :


Sphoṭa
Vyakti
Jāti
Sakhaṇḍa
Akhaṇḍa
Varṇa
Pada
Vākya
Pada
Vākya
Varṇa
Pada
Vākya

---

[1] sphoṭaḥ dvividhaḥ—vyaktisphoṭaḥ jātisphoṭaḥ ca. Vyaktisphoṭaḥ sakhaṇḍākhaṇḍabhedena dvidhā. Tatra sakhaṇḍasphoṭaḥ varṇapadavākyabhedena tridhā. Akhaṇḍasphoṭo'pi padavākyabhedena dvidhā. Jātisphoṭo'pi varṇapadavākyabhedena tridhā ithaṃ aṣṭau sphoṭāḥ —ST.

(i) *Vyaktisphoṭa* and *Jātisphoṭa* :

We have already seen the standpoints of *varṇavāda, padavāda* and *vākyavāda* in the previous section.

According to *varṇavāda* the meaning emanates from letters. It is mainly advocated by the Mīmāṁsakas who hold that the various letters which are heard by the ear are words; they alone are denotative.[1]

As Śālikanātha puts it : what is a word ? It is only letters. They alone are heard by the ear. Thus the Varṇavādins maintain that words are nothing but letters and these letters alone constitute the basis of all meaning.[2]

Now a question arises here. Is a letter, e. g., G be treated as one individual *( vyakti )* or as a class of individuals having a common character *( jāti )* ? In other words, is a letter, e. g., G, one or many ?

The Mīmāṁsakas hold the first view, the Naiyāyikas hold the second. According to the former, the letter G is one eternal individual; according to the latter, there are many individual G's and they are transient. The first theory is known as *varṇavyaktivāda,* the second as *varṇajātivāda.*

The Mīmāmsakas hold that when one repeats 'G' ten times, he does not speak ten G's but the same G ten times.[1] Although the G is heard at different times and places, it is recognised to be the same G.[2] The G may be pronounced quickly or slowly, in a loud tone or in a low tone, but it is always recognised as the same G. The differences of voice, pitch, tone, time, place etc. do not change its identity and it is recognised as the same letter 'G'.[3]

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[1] śrotragrāhyāḥ varṇāḥ eva śabdāḥ
teṣāṃ eva ca vācakatvaṃ —P. P.

[2] kaḥ śabdaḥ abhimataḥ varnāḥ teṣām eva
vācakatvaṃ śrotragrāhyatvāt. —Ibid.

Thus a letter G must be treated as one individual[4] and not as a class. And as a single individual does not form a class, the letter G ( or for the matter of that any other letter ) does not possess a class-character ( *jāti* ). As there is no single-membered class, it is not plausible to admit a universal G-ness.[5]

The upholders of *varṇajātivāda* contend that a letter like 'G' cannot be regarded as one individual because different persons can pronounce 'G' at the same time. This shows that all G's are not the same, but similar inasmuch as they possess a common character. Just as different cows, in spite of difference in size, shape, colour etc. possess an essential common attribute ( cowness ), similarly the different G's in spite of differences of time, place and circumstances, possess an assential common attribute ( 'G' ness ). As the 'G's like the cows are innumerable, the law of parsimony *( Lāghava Nyāya )* demands that instead of treating each G as a separate individual *( pṛthak vyakti )* we should bring all the 'G's under a universal 'G'ness which is inherent in G every time that G is pronounced. Thus a letter ( e.g. G ) should be treated as a *jāti* ( universal ) and not as a *vyakti* ( individual ).

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[1] Devadattena daśakṛtvo gakāraḥ uccāritaḥ iti eva pratītiḥ jāyate na tu daśa gakārāḥ uccāritāḥ. Sarve gakārāh eka eva –ST.

[2] Deśakālabhedena pratīyamānasyāpi gakārasya sa eva ayam gakāraḥ iti pratyabhijñā –Ibid.

[3] Drutamadhya vilambita tāramandrādibhinneṣu gakāreṣu so'yaṃ gakāraḥ iti pratyabhijñā. –Ibid.

[4] gakārādi vyakteḥ ekatvaṃ. –Ibid.

[5] na ekavyaktikā jātiḥ siddhyati. vastutaḥ tu gotvākhyā jātiḥ angīkartum na śakyate. –Ibid.

Similar arguments in favour of *jātisphoṭa* are also applied to word *( pada )* and sentence *( vākya )* also. The *jatisphoṭa* is taken recourse to for the sake of brevity *( lāghava )*. In other words in such expressions as "the same letter" or "the same word" or "the same sentence" the word 'same' means 'of the same kind'. Such usage of the word 'same' denoting 'similar' or 'of the same kind' can be seen in such expressions as "I am taking the same medicine as you took last year". Thus a letter or a word or a sentence should be treated not as a unique individual but as a class. This is the stand taken by the supporters of *jātisphoṭavāda.*[1]

( ii ) *Varṇa Sphoṭa and Pada Sphoṭa :*

The Varṇavādins argue that although every individual letter ( like *gha* or *ta* ) taken singly or separately does not seem to carry a sense, yet when the letters are combined[2] together, they produce a meaning. But they also add that there is nothing

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1. Anantānāṃ varṇanāṃ padānāṃ vākyānāṃ ca vācakatva kalpanāpakṣayā tanniṣṭthāyāḥ jāteḥ eva vācakatvakalpanā lāghavaṃ iti jātisphoṭapakṣaḥ. –Ibid.
2. upadyapi varṇānāṃ pratyekamartha. bodhakatvaṃ nāsti adarśanāt tathāpi samuditānāṃ teṣāṃ sambhavati. –Ibid.

beyond the letters which possess the capacity of expressing the meaning. The potency of generating the sense lies in the letters alone.[1]

The objection how the evanescent letter-sounds can combine together is replied to by saying that it is by means of memory ( *smṛti* ) that the pronounced letters are joined together. The last letter that is heard being linked with the preceding letters that are remembered gives the meaning.[2] There is no word apart from these remembered letters, which alone convey the meaning.[3]

A question arises here. If a word is nothing but a combination of letters, how is it that the aggregates of the same letters give rise to different meanings ? For example, the words *kapiḥ* and *pikaḥ* are constituted by the same letters, but while the former means a monkey, the latter means a cuckoo.

To this the reply is given by saying that it is a combination of letters in a regular sequence or fixed order ( *niyata krama* ) that constitutes a word.[4] That is why such words as *saraḥ* ( lake ) and *rasaḥ* ( juice ) etc. though consisting of the same letters cary different meanings.[1] The Padavādins also agree that a word is a combination of letters in a fixed order.[2] They too regard a word as a group of letters ( *varṇa-samūha* ). But they put the emphasis on the power of the whole ( *samudāya śakti* ) and not on the power of parts ( *avayava śakti* ).

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[1] varṇa samudāya eva padaṃ na tu tadatiriktaṃ sphoṭākhyaṃ kiñcit āstheyaṃ —Ibid.

[2] pūrvavarṇajanitasaṁskārasahitaḥ antyaḥ varṇāḥ vācakaḥ. —SB.

[3] smaryamāṇāḥ varṇāḥ vācakāḥ. na anyaḥ śabdaḥ asti. —SD.

[4] kramasamuditāḥ varṇāḥ eva padaṃ —SDS.

Just as the power of binding an elephant lies in a rope and not in the individual straws, so the power of generating a sense lies not in the individual letters, but in the aggregate which emerges as a new product. Just as the function of fetching water is performed by a pot and not by the component particles of clay of which the pot is made, similarly the function of conveying a sense is performed by the word and not by letters.

( iii ) *Sakhaṇḍa and Akhaṇḍa Sphoṭa.*

The *Sphoṭa* may be viewed as external ( *bāhya* ) or internal ( *āntara* ). From the former standpoint, what is spoken is looked upon as consisting of parts ( *sakhaṇḍa* ); from the inner perspective it is taken as a unitary partless whole ( *akhaṇḍa* ).

On the practical plane, a word is a combination of letters ( *varṇasamūha* ) and a sentence is a combination of words ( *pada-samūha* ). For example, *Ghaṭaṃ ānaya* ( bring the pot ). The sentence can be analysed into parts, viz., the verb *ānaya* ( bring ) and the object *ghaṭam* ( the pot ).

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[1] saraḥ iti asmin pade yāvantaḥ varṇāḥ tāvantaḥ eva rasa iti atra api. evem vanam navaṃ nadī dīna rāmaḥ ityādiṣu arthapratītiḥ kramabhedena bhedasambhavāt.
–Ibid.

[2] kramavad varṇasaṁhatiḥ ( prātipadikaṃ ) —NL.

Again the word *ghaṭaṃ* may be analysed as consisting of parts, viz., ( i ) *prakṛti* (root) i.e. *ghaṭa* and ( ii ) *pratyaya* ( affix ) i.e. the objective case-ending, *am*. Similarly, the verb *ānaya* may be analysed into *ā* ( prefix ), *nī* ( root ) and conjugational suffix in the imperative mood.

In this way, every term ( *pada* ) which by its very definition consists of a root word ( *prātipadika* ) and a suffix ( *vibhakti* ) is analysable into parts and is thus sakhaṇḍa.

But from an inner perspective, all such distinctions of parts are only artificial; the meaning as a whole is one and indivisible ( *akhaṇḍa* ). This view is known as *Akhaṇḍavākya Sphoṭavāda* and is sponsored by the Vaiyākaraṇas. According to them the meaning of a sentence is really partless ( *niravayava* ) i. e., devoid of letters and words ( *varṇapadarahita* ). When the very existence of a letter or word ( e.g. *gauḥ* or cow ) as a separate entity is unreal, the question whether it is an individual ( *vyakti* ) or universal ( *jāti* ) does not arise.[1]

In short, there are two main views on the nature of a proposition viz.,

( 1 ) that the sentence consists of independent words which are the real parts. In other words, the sentence is divisible into parts ( sāvayavas ). This view is known as *sakhaṇḍa vākyavāda*.

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[1] sphoṭasya varṇarahitatvāt gaurit padaṃ eva na asti kutaḥ tanniṣṭhā jātiḥ ? kutaḥ tasyāḥ vācakatvam ? anārabdhe tu gośabde gośabdatvaṃ kathaṃ bhavet. –ST.

(2) that the sentence is really partless *(niravayava)* and indivisible *(akhaṇḍa)*. This view is known as *akhṇḍa vākyavāda.*

It is the second view (i.e. *akhaṇḍa vākyavāda*) which is the generally recognised view of the Vaiyākaraṇas.

It may be asked here that when the Vaiyākaraṇas regard letters and words as mere abstractions, why do they make grammatical divisions of letters and words so elaborately ? The reply is that such divisions are made from the view point of outer (*bāhya*) *sphoṭa* which is viewed as *sakhaṇḍa* (i.e. consisting of parts). But though such a *sakhaṇḍa sphoṭa* in only apparent (*bhāsamāna*), it is described in order to lead the beginners from the gross to the subtle, just as one going on a wrong track is directed later on the right path.[1]

Though the appearance of divisions of letters etc. (*varṇādivibhāga pratīti*) is a mere semblance *(ābhāsa)* yet it is a means *(upāya)* of cognition *(grahaṇa* or *pratipatti)*. The letters and words are necessary for the revelation of meaning *(sphoṭa vyañjana)* because one is unable to apprehend the meaning as one partless whole *(niraṁśa sphoṭa)*.

The main points in this connection may be summed up as follows.

(i) *Sphoṭa* is ultimately one whole that is indivisible *(akhaṇḍa)*.

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[1] Upayaḥ śiṣyamāṇānām
balyānāmupapālanā
asatye vartmani sthitvā
tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate —VP.

(ii) Though the *sphoṭa* is one, it is manifested through different letters and words.

(iii) The distinction between a sentence and its parts (i.e. words and letters) is recognised for practical purpose (*lokavyavahāra*).

7. *Sphoṭa* and *Dhvani*.

*Dhvani* (sound) is the external manifestation of *sphoṭa* (sense).

Dhvani is subject to spatial and temporal limitations, e.g., a drum-beat may continue for a few seconds or more, but the length or shortness is a quality of the sound and not of *śabda* or *sphoṭa*. The variations of mode (*vṛttibheda*) are merely projected (*āropita*) on *śabda*. Thus while sound depends on time, *sphoṭa* is independent of time (*kālanirapekṣa*).[1]

Just as the same face is reflected in various ways in jewels, swords etc. so the same *sphoṭa* appears variously in different sounds.[2]

The *sphoṭa* is essentially partless (*niraṁśa* or *niravayava*). But it cannot be grasped without the help of parts. These parts (i.e. *padas* and *varṇas*) are abstractions or fictions from the ultimate standpoint. Nevertheless they are helpful in the cognition of the *sphoṭa* which is really indivisible ( *akhaṇḍa* ) and eternal ( *nitya* ). The apparennt multiplicity in unity is an illusion like the colour-illusion of a jaundiced man or like the delusion of a running mountain from a fast moving carriage.[1]

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[1] Sphoṭa bhinnasya kālasya
dhvanikālānupātinaḥ
grahaṇopādhibhedena
vṛttibhedaṃ pracakṣate —VP. (I.75)

[2] yathā maṇi kṛpāṇādyaiḥ
mukhamekamanekadhā
tathaiva dhvaniṣu sphoṭaḥ
eka eva vibhidyate —Ibid.

## 8. *Prākṛta* and *Vaikṛta Dhvani*.

The sense ( *sphoṭa* ) is revealed by the sound ( *dhvani* ). *Dhvani* is of two kinds, vize

( i ) *Prākṛta*
( ii ) *Vaikṛta*

The former is constant while the latter is variable due to variations of modes ( *vṛttibheda* ) caused by circumstantial changes ( *upādhis* ). It is the former which is the real cause of the cognition of word ( *śabda-grahaṇa-hetu* ).[2]

The second reveals the sense just as the mirror reflects the face. The two may be regarded as *pratibimba* ( image ) and *bimba* ( original ) respectively.

Though the sounds vary in their mode ( *vṛtti* ) due to loud or feeble voice etc. the essence or meaning ( *sphoṭatattva* ) remains unhampered.[3]

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1. madhuraṃ tiktarūpeṇa śvetaṃ pītatayā tathā,
gṛhṇanti pittadoṣeṇa viṣayaṃ bhrāntacetasaḥ,
yathā vegeṇa dhāvanto naukārūḍhasya gacchataḥ,
parvatādīn vijānanti bhrameṇa bhramataśca tān
vyañjakasthamabuddhyaiva vyangye bhrāntirbhaviṣyati –ŚV.

2. śabdasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākṛtadhvaniriṣyate
grahaṇopādhi bhedena vṛttibhedaṃ pracakṣate.
–VP. ( 1.75 )

3. śabdasyadhvanabhivyakte vṛttibhedena vaikṛtaḥ
dhvanayaḥ saṃupohante sphoṭātmā taiḥ na bhidyate –Ibid.

The primary sound ( *prākṛta dhvani* ) is the revealer of the sphoṭa and the varying modes of sound ( *vaikṛta dhvani* ) do not affect the character of the former.[1]

Just as light reveals an object, say a pot, which is different from other objects, say a cloth, and whenever there is light the pot is manifested and recognised as the same pot as seen before and the variations of light do not change the identity of the pot, similarly the primary sound ( *prākṛta dhvani* ) reveals the meaning and the variation of sound ( *vaikṛta dhvanis* ) do not cause a change in it.

### 9. Some Questions relating to Sphoṭa :

Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīyaṃ* has discussed a number of questions regarding the nature and function of *sphoṭa*.

One such question is,

( i ) How does the sense emerge from the sound ?

The question how the sense is revealed through sound has been discussed at great length.

The meaning is revealed gradually by the sequence of pronounced letters ( *uttarottarābhivyañjana krameṇa* ).

Take the sentence

*Gāṃ Ānaya.*

( Bring the cow. )

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[1] **sphoṭasya grahaṇe hetuḥ**
**prākrtadhvanirişyate**
**vṛttibhede nimittatvaṃ**
**vaikṛtaḥ pratipādyate** **–VS.**

Here the different letters that are spoken tend to manifest the meaning bit by bit till the last letter completes the process and gives rise to a meaning in a clear and definite form.[1]

The gradual manifestation of the *sphoṭa* is illustrated with the help of various examples. The meaning embodied in a sentence is manifested gradually by the sounds of letters and words, just as the colours of a hen that are implicitly present in the egg are manifested gradually. Just as the milk gradually turns into curd and a seed gradually assumes the shape of a tree, so the manifestation of the meaning ( *sphoṭa* ) is apprehended gradually in a successive order.

Thus it is not the *sphoṭa* but the manifestation of it *( sphoṭavyañjana )* that takes place successively from letters to words and through words to the sentence. As mentioned before the revelation of the *sphoṭa* depends not only on the syllables that are uttered, but also on the order *( krama )* in which they are uttered. This is why the words *deva* and *veda* though constituted by the same letters reveal different meanings.[2]

### ( ii ) Does the sound affect the organ or the object ?

### ( Three views )

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[1] **Prathamaḥ varṇaḥ sphoṭaṃ asphuṭaṃ vyanakti, dvitīyaḥ varṇaḥ sphuṭaṃ tṛtīyaḥ varṇaḥ sphuṭataraṃ, caturtho varṅaḥ sphuṭaṭamaṃ vyanakti. —SDS.**

[2] **yathānupūrvi niyamaḥ**
**vikāraḥ kṣīranīrayoḥ**
**tathaiva pratipatrīṇāṃ**
**niyato buddhiṣu kramaḥ . -VP. ( I.91 )**

Does the sound ( *dhvani* ) cause a change ( *saṁskāra* ) in the organ of hearing or in the object or in both ?

Three views have been held on this point.

( i ) Some say that the sound causes a change in the auditory sense-organ ( *śrotrendriya* ) by stimulating it to hear, just as an eye-glass applied to the eye enables it to see more clearly.

( 2 ) Others hold that the sound affects the object ( i. e. *śabda* ) itself in the same way as the sprinkling of water on heated earth stimulates the smell. Here the change is in the object ( i. e. the earth ) and not in the olfactory sense organ ( i.e. the nose ).

( 3 ) Others again maintain that the sound affects both the object ( i.e. *śabda* ) and the sense organ ( i.e. the ear ) in the same way as when the visual sense-organ ( *cakṣurindriya* ) goes to an object ( say a wall ) to grasp it with the help of a light, the light affects both the object and the eye.

Thus it is held that the sound ( *dhvani* ) affects both the organ ( *indriya* ) and the object ( *viṣaya* i. e. *śabda* ).[1]

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[1] **indriyasyaiva samskāraḥ**
**samādhānāñjanādibhiḥ**
**viṣayasyaiva samskāraḥ**
**tadgandhapratipattaye**
**cākṣusaḥ prāpyakāritve**
**tejasā tu dvayorapi**
**viṣayendriyayoriṣṭaḥ**
**samskāraḥ saṅkramo dhvaneḥ** —VP. ( I. 79–80 ).

( iii ) Is the cognition of sound and sense different or non-different ?

There are three views on this issue also.

( 1 ) Some are of the view that the two cognitions are simultaneous and identical. When we see a pot in light, the cognitions of the pot and light are one and the same. Similarly the cognitions of sound and sense are non-different. But yet we know that the pot is caused by the earth and the light is caused by a lamp. In the same way, though sound and sense are apprehended together, the one is known as caused by the vocal organ ( *vāgindriya* ) and the other is known as a non-effect ( *akārya* ).

( 2 ) Others hold that *dhvani* is imperceptible *(asaṃvedya)* and is inferred just as the eye is inferred on the basis of seen objects. In other words, *dhvani* which is the cause of cognition ( *pratītikāraṇa* ) is not perceived, but postulated as a necessary assumption ( *arthāpatti* or *anyatarānupapatti* ).

( 3 ) Others again hold that *dhvani* is independent ( *svatantra* ). When the *śabda* is manifested ( *vyakta* ) the *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* are apprehended together. But when the *śabda* is unmanifested ( *avyakta* ) the *dhvani* alone reveals it. Just as one and only one lamp does not reveal an object, but different times and different places reveal it, similarly different sounds produced at different times and places reveal the same object ( i. e. *sphoṭa* ).[1]

( 4 ) How are fleeting sounds combined together ? The question arises :—

How can there be a garland of passing waves which originate and vanish away before they can be united together ?

The answer given is that the sounds are strewn together like a garland of jewels ( *maṇisūtra nyāya* ). Just as pearls are strewn together with the help of a thread, so also the sounds are combined together with the help of memory ( *smṛti* ).

The point has been illustrated with the help of analogies. Just as a verse or an incantation ( *mantra* ) becomes more intelligible by repeated readings similarly the sphoṭa becomes more clear by repeated sounds.

When a word is pronounced, it does not become clearly known unless the last sound is pronounced ( e.g. the syllable *ti* in *gacchati* i.e. goes ). But when we pronounce *ti*, the prior syllables *gaccha* are already gone. How can there be a union then of the present and the past which do not synchronise ?

The answer is that the prior sound ( *pūrva dhvani* ) leaves behind an impression ( *saṃskāra* or *bhāvanā* ) which generates an effect ( *paripāka* ) in the posterior.[2]

---

[1] **sphoṭaḥ rūpavibhāgena**
**dhvanergrahaṇamiṣyate.**
**kaiścit dhvanirasamvedyaḥ**
**svatantro'nyaiḥ prakalpitaḥ.** —VP. ( I. 81 ).

[2] **āvṛttiparipākāyām**
**buddhau śabdo'vadhāryate.** —VP. ( I. 84 ).

Thus even the sounds which are no longer present continue as objects of memory ( *smṛtirūpa viṣaya* ).

But though the meaning becomes clear when the last syllable is uttered and conjoined to the preceding ones by memory, the whole act of apprehension is simultaneous.[1]

## 10. *A critical estimate of Sphoṭavāda*

The theory of sphoṭa as propounded by the Vaiyākaraṇas has been subjected to criticism by various schools of thought, particularly the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas.

The Naiyāyikas do not recognise śabda as eternal. Gautama in his Nyāya Sūtra gives a number of arguments to establish his theory of non-eternity of śabda ( *śabdānityatvavāda* ).[2] The gist of the argument is that a sound has got both a beginning and an end. The drum is silent until it is beaten. A bell is mute until it is rung. A sound is produced when there is a contact ( *saṃyoga* ) between two things. Such a contact takes place at some particular point of time. For example, when we pronounce a letter, e.g., *ka*, it is due to the contact of air with the vocal organ. Thus all words are produced by some kind of contact and hence have a beginning. Similarly, sounds produced spread like currents ( *vīci-taranga-nyāya* ) and come to an end like passing waves.

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[1] antyavarṇepi vijñāte
pūrvasaṃskārakārite.
smaraṇaṃ yaugapadyena
sarveśvanye pracakṣate. —ŚV.

[2] vide NS. ( II. 2. 13–38 ).

Hence they are not eternal *( nitya )* but transient *( anitya )*. Had they been beginningless *( anādi )* or endless *( ananta )*, they would have been always audible, for the substance, *ākāśa* of which they are qualities is eternal and all-pervading and always inherent in the ear. Thus the Naiyāyikas reject the theory of eternity of śabda and the concept of an eternal sphoṭa, which according to them cannot be established by any means of proof ( i.e. by perception, inference, analogy or authority ). The Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṃsakas reply to the Naiyāyikas by saying that it is not the śabda but a manifestation of it ( i.e. *dhvani* or sound ) which has got a beginning and an end. A word is not created but revealed by pronunciation. Just as the Sun is perceived by many persons and is yet one and the same, similarly the word also though perceived by many in diverse circumstances is one and the same. Thus the Naiyāyika theory of the origin of word *( śabdotpattivāda )* is replaced by the theory of manifestation of word *( Śabdābhivyaktivāda )*.

But the Mīmāṃsā theory of eternity of words *( śabda nityatvavāda )* does not mean that all words or sentences are eternal. It means the eternity of letters which are indivisible and constitute the permanent basis of all words ( i.e. *varṇanityatvavāda* ). Thus the Mīmāṃsakas do not subscribe to the Vaiyākaraṇa theory of *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*.

The Vedāntins also criticise the notion of sphoṭa as expounded by the Grammarians like Bhartṛhari; such great masters of Advaita vedānta as Śaṅkara reject the concept as an unnecessary hypothesis. The emergence of meaning from successive sounds can be explained, they say, by the power of synthetic apprehension that lies in intellect ( *samasta pratyaya vimarśinī buddhi* ) by means of which we apprehend the members of a series as one whole ( e.g. an army, a forest, a line of ants etc ).[1] This view, as Dr. D. M. Datta observes, anticipates Kant's theory of Synthetic unity of apperception and the approach of Gestalt Psychology.[2]

The Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas, the Vedāntins, the Buddhists and the Jainas do not see eye to eye with the Vaiyākaraṇas on the theory of sphoṭa. The *Sphoṭavāda* has been criticised by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Śloka vārtika,* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāya Mañjarī, by Vyāsa in his *Yoga Bhāṣya* and by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārtika.* The concept of sphoṭa however finds support from Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* and from Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattvavindu.*

The great merit of sphoṭavāda lies in the fact that it invites attention to a very thought-provoking linguistic issue. How can we explain the felt unity of a word ? How does a meaning arise from a multiplicity of passing sounds ? How is such a relation between sound and sense possible ? How can this relation be created by any one ? As Vyāḍi puts it, how can relation of words be explained by means of words themselves ?[3]

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[1] vide ŚB. and BT. on BS. ( I. 3. 28 ).

[2] vide SWK. ( Book VI, Chap II ).

[3] sambandhasya na kartā'sti
śabdānāṃ lokavedayoḥ.
śabdaireva hi śabdānāṃ
sambandhaḥ syāt kṛtaḥ kathaṃ. —VS.

The question is yet a riddle and can challenge the intelligence of thinkers even today. The minute discussion on the subject from various perspectives in the different schools of thought can open fresh avenues for thinking in the field of linguistic analysis even today.

## CHAPTER TWO

# THE ANALYSIS OF WORD

### 1. *What is meant by śabda ?*

The word *śabda* has been used in different senses in different contexts.

( 1 ) In a wide sense, *śabda* is used in the sense of sound *( dhvani )* of any kind which is perceived by the auditory sense-organ.[1]

( 2 ) In a restricted sense, *śabda* is used to denote a spoken word *( pada )* which signifies something ( e.g. *gauḥ* which signifies an animal having a dewlap, a tail, hoofs and horns etc. )[2]

( 3 ) In a still more restricted sense *śabda* is used in the sense of a sentence spoken by a reliable person *( āpta vākya )* which is taken as authority or testimony.[3]

*Śabda* ( in the sense of sound ) is of two kinds, viz.,

( 1 ) *Dhvanyātmaka* ( inarticulate ), e.g., the sound produced by the beat of a drum or the ringing of a bell etc.

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[1] śrotragrāhyo'rthaḥ śabdaḥ. —VV.

[2] yenoccāritena sāsnā-lāṅgūla-khura-viṣāṇiṇām sampratyayo bhavati saḥ śabdaḥ —MP.

[3] āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ. —VB.

( 2 ) *Varṇātmaka* ( articulate ) i.e. sound produced by the vocal organs i.e. the throat, palate etc. e.g. the sound of the letter 'ka'.[1]

*Varṇātmaka Śabda* again is of two kinds, viz :

( 1 ) *Sārthaka* i.e. meaningful, e.g. the word *ghaṭa* which means a pot.

( 2 ) *Nirarthaka* i.e. meaningless, e.g. the word *ṭagha* which is not a word in the proper sense of the term.

### 2. *The potency ( Śakti ) of Word :*

A word is a combination of letters ( *varṇa samūha* ).[2] But every combination of letters is not a word in the real sense of the term. For example, while *gauḥ* ( cow ) is a word, *tauḥ* is not. It is only a meaningful combination of letters[3], which constitutes a word. A word is that which is capable of meaning. The word is known as *pada* and its meaning[4] is known as *artha* or *padārtha* ( i.e. the object denoted by the word ). The potency of a word to denote or mean something is called *vṛtti*. Thus a *pada* is that which possesses the denotative capacity ( i.e. *vṛtti* ).[5] It is this *vṛtti*, i.e., the relation between word and meaning which gives rise to verbal cognition ( *śābda bodha* ).[6]

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[1] dhvani viśeṣasahakṛta kaṇṭhatālva bhighāta janyaśca varṇātmakaḥ —SR.

[2] varṇasamūhaḥ padaṃ —SD.

[3] saṅketavat varṇatvaṃ —VU. ( 2. 2. 21 )

[4] śaktaṁ padaṃ —TS.

[5] padatvaṃ ca vṛttimattvaṃ —GSV. ( 2. 2. 60 ).

[6] śābdabodhajanakapadapadārtha-sambandhatvaṃ vṛttitvaṃ. —LM.

The potency of a word ( *vṛtti* ) is of two kinds viz., ( 1 ) *Śakti* and ( 2 ) *Lakṣaṇā.*

( 1 ) *Śakti* ( or *abhidhā* ) is the potency to denote the primary meaning ( *mukhya artha* ) of a word, e.g., the word 'cow' means a quadruped of a particular type, possessing certain features e.g. horn, tail etc. This is the dictionary meaning of the word.

( 2 ) *Lakṣaṇā* is the potency to connnote secondary significance ( *gauṇa artha* ) of a word e.g., the word 'cow' may be used in the sense of 'as simple as a cow'.

Rhetoricians recognise a third kind of *vṛtti* also viz. *vyañjanā.*[1]

*Śakti* is that power of a word by virtue of which it refers to an object and causes its remembrance *(Smṛti).*[2] The cognition of one relative reminds the other by force of association.[3]

Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya defines a word as *saṅketavat* i.e. that which signifies something. But the Mīmāṁsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa raises certain objections against such a definition, which are summed up below.

( i ) A perceived smoke signifies fire, but it is not a word, so the definition is too wide.

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[1] lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā will be treated in a later Chapter. We shall confine ourselves to śakti or saṅketa in this chapter.

[2] śaktiḥ padārthasmṛtijanikā. : DT.

[3] eka sambandhi jñānaṃ apara sambandhi-smārakaṃ. —TP.

( ii ) A word *ghaṭa* would not be a word ( according to the definition of Patañjali ) before its meaning is known and it would become a word after its meaning is known. So the definition is defective. The above charges can be repudiated by saying that though the smoke is indicative ( *Sūcaka* ) of fire, it is not denotative ( *vācaka* ) of fire. The essence of a word lies in its denotative capacity ( *vācakatā* ). The word is *vācaka* ( signifier ) and the thing signified is *vācya*.[1] This relation of signification ( *vācya vācaka bhāva* ) is determined by the primary function ( *mukhya vṛtti* or *śakti* ) of a word.[2]

### 3. *Ājānika and Ādhunika Saṅketa* :

The word serves as a sign ( *saṅketa* ) that is intended to signify some object. This *saṅketa* ( sign ) is of two kinds, viz.

( i ) *Ājānika*
( ii ) *Ādhunika*

( i ) *Ājānika saṅketa* is that which carries a traditional or conventional meaning coming from times immemorial, e.g., the word 'cow'. We do not know, who gave the specific meaning to this word and when. We simply know that this has been the meaning all the times. Such a beginningless sign or symbol is called *Ājānika śaṅketa*.

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[1] artha bodhakaṃ padaṃ vācakaṃ.
vācakabodhyo'rthaḥ vācyaḥ. —NK.

[2] asmāt padāt ayaṃ arthaḥ
boddhavyaḥ iti icchā. —GS.

( ii ) *Ādhunika saṅketa* is that which has been fixed by some one at some time, e.g., the name 'Devadatta' is given to a child by his parents on some day after his birth. Such names of human origin given at will are called *ādhunika saṅketa* or *paribhāṣā*.[1]

The *Ājānika saṅketa* is eternal ( *nitya* ) and is called *śakti* ( primary denotative capacity ) in the real sense of the term.[2]

*Ādhunika saṅketa* also includes technical terms coined by scientists and philosophers for specific purposes.[3]

4. *Relation between Word and Meaning ( Different Views ) :*

There are different views on the relation between word and meaning. Some of these are given below :

( 1 ) The older Naiyāyikas hold that the relation is dependent on the will of God ( *Iśvarecchā* ).[4]

( 2 ) The Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the view that this relation depends on mere will ( whether divine or human ( *icchāmātra* ).[5]

( 3 ) The old Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that the *śakti* ( primary denotative capacity ) does not lie in *ādhunika saṅketa*. e.g. such proper names as Devadatta are non-connotative.[1]

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[1] **saṅketaḥ dvividhaḥ, ādhunikasaṅketaḥ īśvarasaṅketaśca. Tatrādyaḥ paribhāṣā ucyate, dvitīyaḥ śaktiḥ iti ucyate —GŚ.**

[2] **nitya ājānikastatra yā śaktiriti gīyate. —BP.**

[3] **kādācitka stvādhunikaḥ śāstrakāvādibhiḥ kṛtaḥ —Ibid.**

[4] **idaṃ padaṃ amuṃ arthaṃ bodhayatu iti iśvarasaṅketaḥ —SM.**

[5] **icchāmātraṃ śaktiḥ iti navyāḥ āhuḥ —Ibid.**

( 4 ) The Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that even such words possess *śakti*.[2]

( 5 ) The Vaiyākaraṇas regard the relation between word and meaning as one of revealer *(vācaka)* and revealed *( vācya )* as determined by the potency *( śakti )* of the word.[3]

( 6 ) Some older Naiyāyikas take the relation between word and meaning as *avinābhāva* ( i.e, non-existence of the one without the other ).[4]

( 7 ) Patañjali is of the view that the relation between word and meaning is one of identity *( tādātmya )*. That which is the word is also the meaning and vice versa.[5]

( 8 ) Some Mīmāṁasakas regard the denotative capacity *(abhidhā śakti)* of a word as a separate entity.[6]

( 9 ) According to Kumārila, the relation between word and meaning is neither one of difference *( bheda )* nor one of identity *( abheda )* but one of identity in difference *( bhedābheda )*.[7]

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[1] ādhunike tu saṅketite na śaktiḥ —Ibid.

[2] ādhunike saṅketite'pi sā śaktiḥ iti navyāḥ. —Ibid.

[3] padapadārthayoḥ vācyavācakabhāvaniyāmaka-
sambandhāntaram śaktiḥ iti śābdikāḥ. —VBS.

[4] avinābhāva eva śaktiḥ iti prāñcāḥ. —TP.

[5] yo'yaṃ śabdaḥ saḥ eva arthaḥ
yo'yaṃ arthaḥ saḥ eva śabdaḥ. —PM.

[6] mīmāṁsakāḥ tu abhidhā nāma padārthāntara-
saṅketagrāhyam śaktiḥ iti āhuḥ. —SM.

[7] kaumārilamate padād bhinnamabhinnaṃ vākyaṃ. —TP.

( 10 ) According to Prabhākara and his followers, the potency ( *śakti* ) of a word is of two kinds viz.

( i ) *Ānubhāvikā* i.e. that which gives the meaning of word.

( ii ) *Smārikā* i.e. that which arouses the memory of objects signified.[1]

( 11 ) According to Buddhist Logicians the *śakti* of a word lies in what they call *Apoha*.[2] They do not recognise any eternal universal ( *nitya jāti* ) like *gotva* ( cowness ) or *ghaṭatva* ( potness ). According to the Apohavādins, when we call a number of objects by the same name, e.g. *ghaṭa* ( pot ), what happens is the cognizance of likeness with and unlikeness from other objects. For example, the word blue ( *nīla* ) means that which is different from non-blue ( *anīla* ). Thus what we call by the name of blue colour is nothing but that which is different from what is different from it. This difference from what is different is known as *atadvyāvṛtti* or *tadbhinnabhinnatva*. It is this that constitutes the real meaning of the word. The Buddhist logicians call this power ( *sakti* ) of word by the name of *apoha*. It is a negative concept as it explains the meaning in negative terms.

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1. padaśaktiḥ dvividhā ānubhāvikā smārikā ca.
ādyā śabdānubhavajanikā smārikā tu
padārthasmṛti janikā. —Ibid.
2. apohārthe śaktiḥ iti bauddhāḥ manyante.

5. *Vācya-vācaka bhāva :*

There is an interesting question regarding the relation between word and meaning. Some regard this relation as *vyāpya vyāpaka saṃbandha* i.e. the relation of universal concomitance between the pervader *(vyāpaka)* and the pervaded *(vyāpya)*. The Buddhists, the Jainas and the Vaiśeṣikas subsume *śabda* under the category of *anumāna* ( inference ). In Anumāna, we go from *liṅga* ( sign ) to the *liṅgī* ( that which is signified ). Similarly, in verbal cognition *( śabdajñāna )* also, we go from the *vācaka* ( i.e. *pada* or word ) to the *vācya* ( i.e. *padārtha* or meaning ). Here the *pada* is a *liṅga* (sign) and the *padārtha* is a *liṅgī* ( signified ).

Then why should it not be treated as a case of anumāna ?.

Gautama, in his Nyāya Sūtra has replied to the above objection.[1] Gautama argues that the relation between word *( vācaka )* and meaning *( vācya )* cannot be regarded as *vyāpti*. Had it been so, then the word 'food' would have filled the mouth with food, the word 'fire' would have caused burning sensation and the word 'sword' would have had the effect of cutting. But it is not so. Hence there is no relation of universal concomitance between the word and the signified object. The pot is not always present. When the word 'pot' is used and vice versa ( i.e. the pot exists even in the absence of the word 'pot' ). When we say,

"There is no pot", the word 'pot' is there, but not the object. In view of all these considerations, it is not right to treat the relation between word and meaning as one of *vyāpti* or *avinābhāva.*[1]

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[1] pūraṇapradāha pātanānupalabdheśca saṃbandhābhāvaḥ. —NS. 2. 1.53 .

According to Gautama, the relation between word and meaning is not natural *( naisargika )* as in the case of fire and heat, but it is conventional *( sāmayika ).* Thus, as the relation is voluntary and not necessary, it cannot be treated as *vyāpti* and *śabdajñāna* ( verbal cognition ) cannot be brought under anumāna.

*6. Does the word signify individual ( vyakti ) or universal ( jāti ) or form ( ākṛti ) ?.*

Let us try to understand the problem with the help of some examples. Take the word 'cow'. The point at issue is what is exactly meant by the word cow ?. Does the word mean

( i ) the individual cow ? or ( ii ) the universal cowness ?

or ( iii ) the form of the object that is the cow ?

Let us take the sentence.

"This is a cow."

What does the word 'cow' refer to ?

In other words, what is the referred object *( saṅketita padārtha )* here ?

The common sense view is that the word 'cow' refers to an individual. But such a view would give rise to some difficulties. By the word 'cow' one may refer to a cow 'A', another may refer to a cow

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[1] na sāmayikatvāt śabdārthasampratyayasya.

—NS. ( 2. 1. 55 )

'B' and a third man may refer to a cow 'C'. If one name would have referred to one individual only, there should have been as many names as individuals. But that would lead to inifinity ( *ānantya* ).

In order to avoid the above difficulty, it might be said that it is not necessary to have a separate name for every individual, but one and the same name is enough to denote all the individual cows. But such a view gives rise to another difficulty. If the word 'cow' stands for all the individual 'cows' how can it apply to the future cows that are unborn ? Should a word like 'cow' then be taken as a general concept or universal ( *jāti* ). Which connotes the class-character of cows i.e. cowness by virtue of which individual cows are called by the name of 'cow' ?

But such a view also is not free from difficulty. Take a sentence "Bring the cow".

How can the universal 'cowness' be brought ? It is obvious that what is wanted to be brought is not a quality but a concrete individual ( *vyakti* ) which is the substratum of quality.

Should we then say that the word 'cow' stands for the individual alone and for nothing else ? But that also would present a difficulty. For how can we apply the word 'cow' to a particular individual unless it possesses the form ( *ākṛti* ) of a cow ? How can we know that the animal standing there is a cow and not a horse ? It can be known only with the help of a form or figure ( *ākṛti* ) which is the sign of 'cowness'.[1]

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[1] ākṛtirjāti liṅgākhyā. —NS. ( 2. 2. 65 )

Thus the form plays an important part in determening the meaning of a word.[1]

But even then there is a difficulty. If the clay statue of a cow is placed in front, can it be called a 'cow' ? No. Because it does not possess the common and essential character of cows ( i.e. cowness or *gotva* ). Thus a bare resemblance of form is not enough. The particular individual with that form *(ākṛtiviśiṣṭa Vyakti)* must also possess the class character *( jāti )*.

Hence Gautama defines the meaning of a term *( padārtha )* as a composite of *vyakti, ākṛti* and *jāti.*[2] The Vaiyākaraṇas hold that different kinds of words carry different sorts of primary significance, for example, a class-name or noun *( nāma* or *sañjā )* like 'cow', which is *jātivācaka* connotes a universal or general concept. Proper names like 'Devadatta' are *vyaktivācaka* ( i.e. they denote individuals. Such words as *tribhuja* ( triangle ) primarily signify the figure *( ākṛti )*.

Thus the three kinds of potency *( śakti )* reside in different kinds of words.[3]

Such words as 'ākāśa' possess a unique character of their own.[4]

### 7. *The Import of Word*

( Different views ).

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1. gavādi padānāṃ jātyākṛtiviśiṣṭa-vyaktau śaktiḥ.
2. vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padārthāḥ —NS. ( 2. 2. 63 )
3. jātyākṛtivyāktiṣu triṣu
   śaktitrayaṃ iti śābdikāḥ manyante —NK.
4. ākāśādayaḥ śabdāḥ viśiṣṭavastuvācinaḥ āhuḥ. —Ibid.

It may be interesting to compare the different views that have been held by the different schools of thought in this connection.

( 1 ) Patañjali is of the opinion that the primary potency of the word lies in the form.[1]

( 2 ) The Mīmāṁsakas are of the view that the word primiarily denotes a universal ( *jāti* ) and denotes an individual only secondarily ( i.e. by *ākṣepa* or imposition ).[2]

( 3 ) The Bhaṭṭas take recourse to such postulation because a universal ( e.g. cowness ) cannot be comprehended without its substratum ( the cow ).[3]

( 4 ) The Guru School takes recourse to it because both cowness and the cow are known by the same act of cognition.[4]

( 5 ) The Neo-Naiyāyikas hold that the primary potency of a word lies in the individual.[5]

( 6 ) Some Neo-Naiyāyikas like Jagadīśa hold that the word means a universalised particular ( *jāti viśiṣṭa vyakti* ).[6]

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[1] akṛtau eva śaktiḥ iti Patañjali prabhṛtayaḥ āhuḥ *ibid.*

[2] jātau eva śaktiḥ, vyaktilābhastu ākṣepāt. *ibid.*

[3] gotvaṃ hi svāśrayaṃ vinā anupapannaṃ iti svāśrayaṃ āksipati. *ibid.*

[4] samānavitti vedyatvaṃ ākṣepaḥ iti Prābhākara mataṃ. *ibid.*

[5] vyaktau śaktiḥ. SSP

[6] jātiviśiṣṭavyaktau śaktiḥ. *ibid,*

( 7 ) Some Neo-Naiyāyikas like Gadādhara hold that the word stands for an individual qualified by a class-character and form.[1]

( 8 ) The Vedāntins hold that it is not the shape or structure ( *ākṛti* ) but the universal class-character ( *jāti* ) which is the real import of the word. They are of the opinion that the power of a word like 'cow' resides in the universal in an explicit way and in the individual in an implicit way.[2]

( 9 ) Some logicians are of the view that the words mean not only the universals but also the loci in which they reside. For example, the word 'pot' stands for a pot as well as potness. 'White' means a white object along with whiteness, the word 'goes', the act of going along with that which goes.[3]

## 8. *The Fourfold Pravṛttis of Words*

Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya recognises fourfold tendencies ( *pravṛttis* ) of words, corresponding to which there are four kinds of words, viz.

( i ) *Jātivācaka,* i.e., denoting a class, e.g.'cow'(*gauḥ*).

( ii ) *Guṇavācaka,* i.e., denoting a quality, e.g. white ( *Śuklaḥ* ).

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[1] jātyākṛtiviśiṣṭavyaktau. śaktiḥ *ibid.*

[2] gavādi padānām vyaktau śaktiḥ
svarūpasatī na tu sā jnātā,
jātau tu sā jñātā. *ibid.*

[3] ghaṭa śabdaḥ ghaṭaghaṭatvayoḥ śaktaḥ
śukla śabdaḥ guṇaguṇinoḥ śaktiḥ
gati sabdaḥ kriyātadāśrayayoḥ. *ibid.*

( iii ) *Kriyāvācaka*, i.e., denoting some action, e.g. 'goes' ( *gacchati* ).

( iv ) *Yadṛcchā vācaka*, i.e., denoting a name given at will ( e.g. *ḍittha* ).[1]

Rhetoricians like Danḍi Ācārya recognise the following four-fold significance of words :—

( i ) *Jāti* ( Class ), ( ii ) *Dravya* ( Substance ), ( iii ) *Guṇa* ( Quality ) and ( iv ) Kriyā ( action ).[2]

The signifying power of a word ( *saṅketa* ) applies not to the individual ( *vyakti* ), but to the upādhis which reside in the individual, viz. ( i ) *Jāti* ( universal ), ( ii ) *guṇa* ( quality ), ( iii ) *kriya* ( action ) and ( iv ) *yadṛcchā* ( proper name ).

*Upādhis* are of two kinds, viz.

( i ) *Vastudharma*, i.e., the essential property residing in the thing.

( ii ) *Yadṛcchā*, i.e., a name or epithet attributed to a thing according to the wish of the speaker. *Vastudharma* ( natural property ) is of two kinds, viz.

( i ) *Siddharūpa*

( ii ) *Sādhyarūpa*

The former includes ( i ) *jāti* ( universal ) and ( ii )

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[1] Śabdaireva pratīyante. Jātidravyaguṇakriyāḥ caturvidhyadamī Śantī. śabda uktaścatirvidhaḥ. SSP.

[2] Jātidravyaguṇaspandaiḥ dharmaiḥ saṅketavat tathā Jātiśabdādibhedena cāturvidhyaṃ pare jaguḥ. K

*guṇa* ( quality ). The latter *( i.e. sādhya rūpa )* is in the form of *kriyā* ( action ), e.g. 'cooks'.[1]

*Jāti* is defined as the generic class-character.[2]

It inheres in many individuals and is eternal.[3]

It is by virtue of a common generic nature that all individual cows are known by the same name.

This *jāti* is an essential life-giving ( *prāṇaprada* ) or life-sustaining *( jīvanādhāyaka )* character of the thing.[4]

The function of *guṇa* is to differentiate. The word 'blue', for example, serves as a differentiator*(vyāvartaka)*; it distinguishes things which are not blue ( *anīla* or *nīletara* ). It points to a specific or particular nature of the object ( i.e. is *viśeṣādhāna hetu* ).

The *sādhyarūpa* ( *kriyā* or action ) is described as that which includes the sequence of activities, e.g. the process of cooking beginning from the burning of the fuel to the lifting of the utensil from the fire.[5]

The Mīmāṁsakas are of the opinion that *guṇa* ( quality ) and *kriyā* ( action ) also should be treated as *jāti* ( universal ). For example, 'white' is a universal

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1. upādhiḥ dvividhaḥ, vastu dharmaḥ vaktṛyadṛcchayā sannivesitaśca. Vastudharmopi dvividhaḥ, siddharūpaḥ sādhyarūpaśca siddhopi dvividaḥ tatrādyā jātiḥ dvitīyo guṇaḥ. Sādhyarūpaḥ kriyārūpaḥ. NK.
2. samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ. NS. ( 2. 2. 68 )
3. nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam jātitvam. GSV.
4. anuvṛtti pratyayahetu sāmānyam ekākārapratītihetuḥ NK.
5. Pūrvāparabhūtāvayavakriyā rūpam. *ibid.*

which is present in all white objects ( e.g. milk, snow etc. ). Similarly, an action, e.g. cooking is a universal which is present in all acts of cooking (e.g. boiling rice baking bread, frying vegetable, etc. ).

Even *yadṛcchā* ( i.e. an arbitrary name like Devadatta ) may be regarded as universal *( sāmānya )* for it is applicable to many individuals.

### 9 *The Role of the Verb ( Different Views )*

Words are broadly classified under two main heads, viz.

( i ) *Sañjñā* or *Nāma* ( noun or name )

( ii ) *Kriyā* or *Ākhyāta* ( verb )

Which of the two is more important ? Opinion is divided on this issue.

( 1 ) The Naiyāyikas regard the noun as the chief word which stands as a substantive *( viśeṣya )* in relation to the verb which serves as an attribute ( *viśeṣaṇa* ).

( 2 ) The Vaiyākaraṇas on the other hand regard the verb as the chief word and treat the other parts of speech as qualifying it.

( 3 ) The Mīmāṁsakas also emphasise the importance of the verb. They treat it as the central axis round which the other parts of speech hover as auxiliaries or adjectives. The Mīmāṁsakas emphasise the role of verb, because they attach greater importance to actions ( as enjoined by Vedic injunctions or *vidhi vākya* ). They have a pragmatic outlook and lay stress on *karma kāṇḍa* or fruitful activity.

According to the Vaiyākaraṇas the meaning of a verb ( *kriyā* ) is what is ussually denoted by its root *(dhātvartha)*, i.e., some kind of activity*(vyāpāra)*, e.g., the root *pac* means to cook. It consists in a process which involves a series of activities ( *vyāpārasamūha* ), e.g., the burning of fuel, putting the pan on the oven, etc. All these form the process stage ( *sādhyāvasthā* ) of the act which reaches its stage of completeness *(siddhāvasthā)* when the cooking ( *pāka* ) is done ( e.g. when the rice is boiled ). This product or result of the process is known as *phala.* Hence the act of cooking is called *pākānukūla vyāpāra* i.e. a process which leads to a result, viz. cookedness.

Does the force ( *śakti* ) of verb lie in the process ( *vyāpāra* ) or in the product ( *phala* ) ? There are different views on this issue.

( 1 ) The older Naiyāyikas hold that the verb primarily means the process or activity ( *vyāpāra* ) only.[1]

( 2 ) The Mīmāṁsaka holds that the denotative power of a verb lies only in the *vyāpāra.*[2]

( 3 ) The Bhaṭṭas hold that the verb signifies a process ( *vyāpāra* ) leading to some act (*kriyā*).[3]

( 4 ) Maṇḍana Miśra and his followers are of the view that the verb denotes the product ( *phala* ) only.[4]

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[1] vyāpāre śaktiḥ iti prācina tārkikāḥ. SSP.

[2] vyāpāramātra śaktiḥ iti mīmāmsakāḥ *ibid.*

[3] kriyājanakavyāpāramātra iti Bhaṭṭāḥ. *ibid.*

[4] phale eva śaktiḥ iti Maṇḍanādayāḥ *ibid.*

(5) The Vaiyākaraṇas are of the view that the force of the verb lies in the process (*vyāpāra*) as well as in the product (*phala*) separately.[1]

(6) The Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the view that the force of a verb lies in the process (*vyāpāra*) together with the product (*phala*) jointly.[2]

(7) The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas are of the view that the essence of a verb (*ākhyāta*) lies in the will-to-do (*bhāvanā*). The words in different case-endings (*kārakas*) such as objective (*karma*), instrumental (*karaṇa*) cases etc. serve only as adverbs (*kriyāviśeṣaṇa*) to it.[3]

The notion of the verb has been subjected to a minute analysis. According to grammarians, the meaning of the verb covers both the process (*vyāpāra*) and the effect (*phala*).

The agent *(kartā)* is the substratum *(āśraya)* of the activity *(vyāpāra)*[4] The object *(karma)* is the locus of the effect *(phala)* of the action.[5] The agent is an adjective *(viśeṣaṇa)* in relation to the act denoted by the verb.[6] The object *(karma)* stands in relation of an adjective to the effect *( phala )*.[1] An intransitive verb *( akarmakakriyā )* has a *vyāpāra* ( process ) unassociated with a *phala* or product.[2] The meaning of the verb is described in such terms as kriyā, vyāpāra, bhāvanā, utpādana etc. which are used more or less synonymously.[3]

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[1] phale vyāpāre ca pṛthak pṛthak śaktiḥ iti śābdikaḥ *ibid.*

[2] phalāvacchinnavyāpāre śaktiḥ iti navya Naiyāyikaḥ. *ibid.*

[3] bhāvaneva hi vākyārthaḥ, sarvajñākhyātavattayā.
anekaguṇa jātyādi kārakārthānurañjitā. TV.

[4] vyāpārāśrayaḥ kartā. VBS.

[5] phalāśrayaḥ karma. *ibid.*

[6] kartāvyāpāraviśeṣaṇam. *ibid.*

The Mīmāṁsaka's emphasis on the verb is mainly prompted by their insistence on Vedic injunction *(vidhi)*, e.g., "pray" or prohibition *(niṣedha)*, e.g. "Do not kill". A sentence which is a mere statement of fact *( Arthavāda )* and does not directly or indirectly help an action is regarded as of no consequence.[4] That is why the Mīmāṁsakas put the premium on the verb and regard other words as subsidiary or auxiliary to it.

### 10. *Classification of Words according to Convention ( Rūḍhi ) and Combination ( Yoga ) :*

A word is a combination of letters. For example the word *ghaṭa* ( pot ) is a combination of the letters *gh-a-ṭ-a*. But the constituent letters taken by themselves are unmeaningful. The meaning arises from the cumulative force ( *samudāya śakti* ).[5]

But there are also such words as *ghaṭa-kāra* ( potmaker ) etc. which consist of meaningful parts and the meaning of the whole word arises from the force of these parts ( *avayavas* ).

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1. karmaphale viśeṣaṇam. *ibid.*
2. akarmakakṛiyām phalānavacchinnavyāpāraḥ. *ibid.*
3. vyāpāro bhāvanā saivotpādanā saiva ca kṛiyā VP.
4 amnāyasya kriyārthatvāt ānarthakyam atadarthānāṃ. JS. ( 1. 2. 1-7 )
5. samudāyaśaktiḥ rūḍhiḥ. TD.

The power of significance derived from the union of such parts (i.e. *avayava śakti*) is known as *yoga*[1] Let us try to understand the point clearly. The question is : Does the meaning of a word depend upon the mere combination of unmeaningful letters or on the meaning as supplied by *prakṛti* ( root ) and *pratyaya* ( affix ) which enter into the composition of the word ?

In other words, is the meaning dependent upon etymological derivation or independent of it ? Take the word *pācaka* for instance. Here the meaning ( cook ) depends on the root *pac* which means 'to cook'. Here the meaning ( i.e. cook ) depends on the root-meaning ( *dhātvartha* ) and the affix ( *ak* ) which denotes agency ( *kartṛtva* ). Here the meaning depends on the parts ( *avayavas* ) and is known as *avayavārtha.*

But all meanings are not like this. For example, take the word *panasa* which means a jackfruit. Here the meaning is not derived from the constituent parts but arises from the mere aggregate ( *samudāya* ) of the letters *pa-na-sa.* This kind of meaning which depends on the cumulative effect of the letters is known as *samudāyārtha.*

The Naiyāyikas recognise three kinds of *śakti*[2], i.e., capacity of a word to generate the meaning, viz.

( 1 ) *Yoga* i.e. the capacity of generating the meaning from the union of meaningful parts ( *avayavaśakti* ).

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[1] avayavaśaktiḥ yogaḥ. *ibid*

[2] Nyāyamate śaktiḥ trividhā, yogaḥ, Rūḍhiḥ, yogarūḍhiḥ ca. Tatrādyā pācakādi padeṣu dvitiyā ghaṭādi padesū, tṛtīyā paṅkajādipadeṣu. TD.

( 2 ) *Rūḍhi*, i.e., the capacity of generating the meaning from the accumulation of unmeaningful parts ( *samudāyaśakti* ).

( 3 ) *Yogarūḍhi*, i.e., the capacity of generating the meaning partly from each of the above two.

Some recognise a fourth kind of śakti also, viz. *yaugika rūḍhi*.[1] Accordingly, words have been denoted into the following four kinds :—

1 ) *Rūḍha*,

2 ) *Yaugika*,

3 ) *Yogarūḍha*,

4 ) *Yaugikarūḍha*.

( 1 ) *Rūḍha*, i.e , that kind of word the meaning of which is fixed by convention.[2] It is a conventional name given to an object, for example, the word '*jala*' means water.

Here the meaning is dependent on the force of the aggregate ( *samudāya* ) of the constituent letters, *ja* and *la* arranged in a specific order and not on the force of the parts ( *avayavas* ), i.e, *jala* taken separately.[3]

( 2 ) *Yaugika*, i.e., that kind of word the meaning of which is determined by the meanings of parts, e.g. the word *pācaka* derives its meaning from

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1. atra yaugika ruḍhiḥ turīyāpi
śaktiḥ asti iti kecit vadanti. PC.

2. ruḍhaṃ saṅketavat nāma saiva sāñjñeti kīrtyate TP.

3. yatrāvayavaśaktiḥ nairapikṣyeṇa
samudāyaśaktimātreṇa arthaṃ bodhayati
tatpadaṃ. SSP.

the constituent members, i.e., the root (*prakṛti*) and affix ( *pratyaya* ) and etymologically means one who cooks.[1]

Such words as *ghaṭakāra* ( pot-maker ) etc. also fall under this category. Here the meaning of the compound word which consists of two members ( viz. *ghaṭa* ( pot ) and *kāra* ( doer ) is determined by the meanings of these two members ( *avayavas* ) only.[2]

A word which carries only the meaning denoted by the parts is known as *yaugika*.[3]

( 3 ) *Yogarūḍha*, i.e., that word the meaning of which is determined partly by the union ( *yoga* ) of parts and partly by the convention ( *rūḍhi* ).[4] For example the word *paṅkaja* is derived from *paṅka* ( mud ) and *ja* ( born of ). Etymologically, it means that which is born of mud. But this literal meaning is not taken here *in toto*.

The meaning of the word is restricted and it denotes a lotus flower only. It does not denote a lily flower or any other thing that is born of mud.[5] So the meaning is partly derivational and partly conventional. Such a compound word which is used in a special fixed sense is known as *yogarūḍha*.

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1. atra pacati iti vyutpattyā prakṛtipratyayādinā pākakartā boddhyate. N.
2. avayavaśaktimātreṇa arthapratipādakam. SM.
3. yatra avayavārthaḥ eva buddhyate tatpadaṃ. *ibid.*
4. atra pade avayavaśaktiviṣaye samudāyaśaktiḥ api asti. SM.
5. paṅkajātepi kumudādau na paṅkajapadaprayoga prasaṅgaḥ. TP.

Such English words as the 'morning star' fall under the category of *yoga rūḍha*, because the meaning is restricted here only to a particular star that is visible in the morning and does not extend to other stars that are visible in the morning.

( 4 ) *Yaugikarūḍha*, i.e., a compound word the meaning of which is determined in a conventional way irrespective of the meanings of the component words that form the compound.[1] For example, the word *aśvagandhā* is a compound word which consists of the word *aśva* ( horse ) and *gandha* ( smell ) and literally means that which smells like a horse. But the word denotes a medical herb which has nothing to do with a horse or its smell.

Such English words as 'honey-moon' can be treated as *yaugikarūḍha*, for though the word is a compound of 'honey' and 'moon', it does not derive its meaning from either and is used in a fixed conventional sense.

## 11. *The Eightfold Means of Knowing the Meanings of Words :*
## *( Śaktigrahopāya )*

The apprehension of meaning *( śaktigraha )* can be had in various ways. The meaning of a word can be known by the following eightfold means[2] :—

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[1] yogena rūḍhyā ca paraspara sahakāreṇa arthapratipādakaṃ. SM.

[2] śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇopamāna—
kośāptavākyāt vyavahārataś ca,
vākyasya śeṣāt vivṛter vadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ.

(1) *Vyākaraṇa* (grammar): It is with the help of grammar that one can understand the significance of a word in the light of case-endings etc. e.g.

(i) *Mitraḥ bhāti.*
(ii) *Mitraṃ bhāti.*

The same word '*Mitra*' used in the masculine gender as in (i) means the sun and used in the neuter gender as in (ii) means a friend.

(2) *Upamāna* (analogy): For example, the meaning of the word *gavaya* (a particular species of animal looking like a cow) understood if it is known that it resembles a cow. Similarly the meaning of a *zebra* can be understood by its resemblance to an ass.

Here the meaning is got by knowledge of similarity (*sādṛśya jñāna*)

(3) *Kośa* (Dictionary): For example, the meaning of the Sanskrit word *kramelaka* (which means a camel) or of the English word 'Hippopotamus' (river-horse) can be known with the help of a dictionary.

(4) *Āptavākya* (Authoritative Statement): For example the meaning of the word 'Pātaliputra' is got from the testimony of reliable persons, who say that it is the ancient name of Patna.

(5) *Vyavahāra* (usage): For example, a child hears an elderly man saying–

Take away this pot.
Bring a cow.

and observes the activities of taking away and bringing *(āvāpodvāpa)* that follow. Thus he becomes gradually acquainted with the meanings of such words as 'pot', 'cow', 'take away' 'bring' etc. Thus the constant usage of a word in practical behaviour is an important means of learning the meanings of words.[1]

( 6 ) *Vākyaśeṣa* ( End of Sentence )

For example, take the sentence :

Prepare a pudding of *yava.*

The word '*yava*' may signify either barley or another corn ( *kākuni* ). How can we know in what sense it is used ? But if at the end of the sentence we find a description that the *yava* has got sharp pointed projections, the meaning becomes clearly known ( that the word *yava* here means barley ( and not *kākuni* ).

( 7 ) *Vivṛti.* ( Elaboration ) : For example, the word *Rāma* may mean either Rāmacandra or Paraśurāma. But if the word is explained as *Dāśarathiḥ* ( i.e. son of Daśaratha ) the meaning becomes clearly known.

( 8 ) *Siddha pada Sānnidhya* ( Juxtaposition of a well-known word ) : For example, the word '*Śilīmukha*' means a bee as well as an arrow. But when the word is used in connection with Arjuna, the famous hero it is taken in the sense of an arrow ( and not in the sense of bee ).

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[1] **ghaṭamānaya, gām ānaya ityādi**
**āvāpodvāpābhyām ghaṭādi padasya**
**ghaṭabhāvaśaktigraho bhavati NK.**

## 12. *The Fourteen Determinant Factors of Meaning :*

When a word is equivocal ( i.e. it carries more than one meaning ), how can we determine which meaning is intended ? Bhartṛhari has enumerated the following fourteen factors which can be the chief determinants of meaning in such cases, i.e., which can help us to understand the meaning intended.[1]

( 1 ) *Saṁyoga* ( Association ) : For example, the word 'Arjuna' may mean either the famous hero of that name or a tree having the same name. But when we get the expression Arjuna along with *Gāṇḍīva* ( the well-known bow of the famous hero, Arjuna ) the word obviously refers to the hero and not to the tree.

( 2 ) *Viprayoga* ( Disassociation ) : Similarly, the expression "Arjuna devoid of *Gāṇḍīva*" should also be taken as referring to the hero and not to the tree.

( 3 ) *Sāhacarya* ( Companionship ). For example, if the word 'Arjuna' is used along with the word '*Bhīma*' ( brother of Arjuna ) it should be taken as signifying the hero and not the tree.

( 4 ) *Virodha* ( Opposition ) : Similarly if the word 'Arjuna' is used along with the word Karṇa ( who was his opponent ) it should be taken as referring to the hero and not to the tree.

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[1] saṁyogo viprayogaśca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā
arthaprakaraṇaṃ lingaṃ śabdasyānyasya sannidhaḥ.
sāmarthyaṃ aucitī deśaḥ kālovyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ
śabdārthasyānavacchedo viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ. VP.

(5) *Artha* ( purpose ) : For example, the word 'Hari' means both God Viṣṇu and a monkey. But when it is said, "Let us worship Hari", the word 'Hari' obviously refers to God and not to the monkey.

(6) *Prakaraṇa* ( context ) : For example, the word *saindhava* means salt as well as a horse. But when some one says : 'Bring *saindhava*' at the time of taking food, the intended meaning is obviously salt and not the horse.

(7) *Liṅga* (gender) : The word *madhu* means honey when it is used in the neuter gender and it means a demon when used in the masculine gender. Thus in the sentence, "*Madhum paśya*" ( see Madhu ) the word Madhu ( which is in the masculine gender ) means the demon and not honey.

(8) *Anya Śabda Sannidhi* ( proximity of another word ) : For example, the word *madhu* means both honey and a demon of that name But when the word is linked with another word *sūdana* ( Killer ), it obviously refers to the demon ( who was killed by God Viṣṇu ) and not to honey.

(9) *Sāmarthya* ( capacity ) : For example, the word '*mahiṣī*' may stand for a she-buffalo or a queen. Bnt when it is said : "The *mahiṣī* is singing", the word *( mahiṣī )* obviously refers to the queen, for the buffalo is incapable of singing.

(10) *Aucitya* ( propriety ) ; For example, if it is said "Pay respect to the *mahiṣī*", the word *( mahiṣī )*

should be taken in the sense of the queen and not the buffalo, because it would be in the fitness of things to respect the queen and not the buffalo.

(11) *Deśa* (place): For example, the word '*citrabhānu*' means both the sun and fire. If it is said: "See *citrabhānu* in the sky", the word is obviously used in the sense of the sun and not fire.

(12) *Kāla* (time): For example, if it is said: "See *citrabhānu* at night", the meaning is obviously fire and not the sun.

(13) *Vyakti* (person): For examples, the word 'sthāṇu' means both God Śiva and a dry tree. But when a Śaiva (i.e. a devotee of God Mahādeva) is asked to remember 'sthāṇu', it is the former meaning (i.e. God Śiva) that is intended.

(14) *Svarabheda* (Difference of tone): If the same word is spoken in a different tone (e.g. with a changed emphasis) the meaning becomes different. For example, If the stress *Indra śatruṃ Nāśaya* is put on 'Indra', it may mean 'Kill Indra who is the enemy, if the stress is put on *śatru*, it may mean, "Kill the enemy of Indra."

The main purport of the above is that the meaning of a word should be determined in the light of the universe of discourse, i.e., *deśa, kāla, pātra* (place, time, person) etc. If the word 'Bat' is used in the context of cricket, it signifies a wooden stick, if it is used in the context of Zoology, it means a bird of a particular species.

The main determinant of the meaning of words is the intention of the speaker ( *vivakṣā* ). For example, take the sentence, "Bring some water". What is meant by the word 'some' here ? If the intention of the speaker is to drink water, the expression 'some water' means a glass of water. If his intention is to take bath, it may mean a bucketful of water. If his intention is only to affix a stamp, it may mean only a few drops of water. Thus what is the intended meaning ( *vivakṣita artha* ) should be judged in the light of the context ( *prakaraṇa* ). A word may be used figuratively or metaphorically and may mean something quite different from the literal meaning. Such implication of words will be dealt with in the fourth chapter.

## CHAPTER THREE

# THE ANALYSIS OF SENTENCE

## ( VĀKYA )

### 1. *Necessary Conditions of Sentence*

A sentence *( vākya )* is a combination of words *( padas )*.[1] But a mere collection of words without a mutual relation among the concepts *( padārtha saṁsarga )* does not constitute a *vākya*. For example, a jumble of such unrelated words as 'pot', 'cowness', 'red', 'brings' etc. does not make a sentence. The combination of words should be such as to produce a specific sense or meaning.[2] For example, "Bring a cow" is a sentence, because the combination of words here gives a specific sense.

A sentence in order to be a sentence must fulfil the following conditions :—[3]

( 1 ) *Ākāṅkṣā* ( Expectancy of words ).

( 2 ) *Āsatti* ( Juxtaposition of words ).

( 3 ) *Yogyatā* ( Compatibility of words ).

### ( 1 ) *Akānkṣā* ( Expectancy )

If we say merely 'bring', the meaning is not complete. Bring what ? There are innumerable objects that can be brought, e.g, a book, a pen, a cloth, a pot etc. So mere 'bring' does not deliver the goods. Similarly if we say merely 'cow' and nothing else, it is not clear what is to be done with the cow. Is it to be fed or milked or taken away? So any word taken singly or separately is not self-sufficient. It requires to be aided or supplemented with the help of some other word ( or words ) in order to convey a full sense.

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[1] vākyaṃ padasamūhaḥ. —TS.

[2] vākyatvaṃ ca viśiṣṭārthapara śabdatvaṃ. —TC.

[3] ākānkṣā yogyatā sannidhiś ca
vākyārthajñānahetuḥ. —TB.

When we say, 'Bring a cow' the two words ( 'bring' and 'a cow' ) help each other to make a complete sense. This mutual expectancy of one word to another is known as *ākānkṣā*.[1]

In other words, that word without which another word is unable to convey the full meaning is called the *ākāṅkṣita pada* i.e. the desired or required word.[2]

( 2 ) *Āsatti* or *Sannidhi* ( juxtaposition )

If the word 'bring' is pronounced today and the word 'cow' is pronounced tomorrow, it will not be able to convey the meaning. The meaning of the words 'bring a cow' can be understood only if the words are co-uttered ( *sahoccārita* ). The co-utterance ( *samabhivyāhāra* ) of words is known by the name of *āsatti* or *sannidhi*.

If other words intervence between 'bring and cow' ( eg. 'bring', 'read', 'the book', 'cow' ), the intended meaning is not clear. Hence there should be no intervention ( *vyavadhāna* ). The required ( *ākāṅkṣita* ) words should be uninterrupted ( *avyavahita* ) and contiguous ( *sannihita* ). Then alone they can generate the meaning.[1]

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[1] padasya padāntara vyatirikta prayuktā nvayānanubhāvakatvaṃ ākāṅkṣā. —TS.

[2] yatpadena vinā yasya ananubhāvakatā bhavet sā ākāṅkṣā... ... ... ... ... ... —BP.

( 3 ) *Yogyatā* ( Fitness or concord of words )

The words constituting a sentence should be mutually compatible. A typical example of incompatibility is *vahninā siñcati* ( He irrigates with fire ).

The act of irrigation can be done with the help of water and not with fire, which has the potency to burn and not to moisten or irrigate. Thus the function of the verb 'irrigates' becomes inoperative by the word 'fire' which has been used in the instrumental case ( *karaṇa kāraka* ). The two words ( 'fire' and 'irrigates' ) which are of a conflicting nature clash together or cancel each other's meaning. This stultification of meaning makes the sentence non-sensical. The combination of the two words is so incongruous or incompatible than it does not carry any sense. There is an obstruction of meaning ( *artha-bādha* ) and consequently there is no cognition ( *arthopalabdhi* ). Hence the words should be fit enough to be combined together. This fitness of words is called *yogyatā* ( i.e. non-obstruction of meaning ).[2]

It consists in the possession of that capacity in a thing which is ascribed or attributed to it.[3]

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[1] yatpadārthasya yatpadārthena anvayaḥ
apekṣitaḥ tayoḥ avyavadhānena upasthitiḥ kāraṇam. —SM.

[2] Arthābādho yogyatā. —TS.

[3] padārthe tatra tadvattā yogyatā parikīrtitā. —BP.

It is by virtue of such relational force *( saṁsarga maryādā )* that words form a sentence. Hence a sentence has been defined as that combination of words which is possessed of fitness, expectancy and juxtaposition.[1]

### ( 4 ) *Tātparya*

Some logicians like Viśvanātha add a fourth condition also for 'sentence' *( vākyatva )*. They call it by the name of *tātparya* ( intention of the speaker ).[2]

If a parrot utters the words, 'Bring a cow', it cannot be regarded as a sentence in the proper sense of the term, because there is no intention to convey the meaning there. The words should be pronounced with a view to convey the desired sense.[3]

The knowledge of the speaker's intention *( tātparya jñāna )* becomes more particularly necessary in the case of an equivocal expression and can be determinant with the help of various factors *( śaktigrahopāya )* as pointed out in chapter II.

## 2. *Eightfold Theories Of Sentence*

Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīyam has enumerated eight different views *( aṣṭhadhā bheda )* regarding the nature of a sentence *( vākya )* as summed up below :—[4]

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[1] yogyatā'kāṅkṣā' sattiyuktaḥ padoccayaḥ. —SD.

[2] vakturicchā tu tātparyaṃ parikīrtitā. —BP.

[3] tatpratīticchayo'ccāritatvaṃ. —SM.

[4] ākhyāta śabdaḥ sanghātaḥ jātiḥ sanghātavartinī
ekonavayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusamhṛtiḥ.
padamādyaṃ pṛthakasarva padaṃ sākānkṣamityapi
vākyaṃ pratimatirbhinnā bahudhā nyāyavādinām.
—VP. ( II. I, 2 )

( 1 ) *Ākhyātaśabdaṃ*

A sentence is that which is characterised by a verb *( ākhyāta ).* "Go home by boat". Here it is the act of going which forms the central meaning of the sentence.

The other words, viz. home ( which is in the objective case ) and boat ( which is in the instrumental case ) are only auxiliary to it. A single verb, e.g. 'go' may be able to constitute a sentence.

( 2 ) *Padasaṅghāta*

A sentence is a combination of different words, the cumulative meanings of which constitute the meaning of the sentence *( vākyārtha ),* e.g.,

You go home just now.

Even in a single-worded sentence ( e.g. go ) some other word ( e.g. you ) is implied. So a sentence is a collection *( saṅghāta )* of words each of which contributes its meaning.

( 3 ) *Saṅghāta Vartinījātiḥ*

The same sentence uttered by different persons, e.g. "look here", is possessed of a universal character *( jāti ).* So the essence of a sentence consists in the universal *( jāti )* inherent in a collectien of words.

( 4 ) *Eko'navayavaḥ Śabdaḥ*

The sentence is one indivisible *( anavayava )* unitary verbal cognition or meaning which in reality cannot be split into such parts as letters and words.

( 5 ) *Krama*

The essence of the sentence lies in the order *(krama)* or sequence *( paurvāparya )* of words.

( 6 ) *Buddhyanusamhṛtiḥ*

The essence of a sentence lies in an ideal content apprehended by intellect.

( 7 ) *Ādyaṃ Padaṃ*

A sentence is that in which the first term is most important and the other terms are only auxiliary to it. e.g. come, O friend".

Here the first word constitutes the chief meaning of the sentence.

( 8 ) *Pṛthaksarvapadaṃ Sākāṅkṣam*

A sentence is that in which every word is taken separately and linked with other words, which supplement the meanings of each other.

It may be noted that out of the above eight views ( 3 ), ( 4 ) and ( 6 ) come under the theory of *Akhaṇḍa vākya* ( indivisible sentence ) and the remaining views come under the theory of *sakhaṇḍa vākya* ( divisible sentence ). The former is propounded by the Vaiyākaraṇas, the latter, by the Naiyāyikas.

## 3. *The Process of Verbal Cognition ( śābda bodha )*

*Śābdabodha* literally means that cognition which arises from words.[1]

Viśvanātha defines it as that cognition which arises through the knowledge of words.[2]

He puts it in a clear-cut way like this.

The knowledge of words *( padajñāna )* functions as the instrument *( karaṇa )*, the process *( vyāpāra )* is the presentation of the meanings of the words ( *padārthopasthiti* ), the product ( *phala* ) is the verbal cognition ( *śābda bodha* ) and the knowledge of meaning ( *śakti* ) generated by manifold factors like fitness etc. is auxiliary or helpful ( *sahakārī* ).[1]

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[1] śabdājāyamānaḥ bodhaḥ. —SM.

[2] padajñānakaraṇakaṃ jñānaṃ. —*Ibid.*

The cognition of meaning of a sentence ( *vākyārtha bodha* ) thus depends upon a number of conditions. The meaning of a sentence ( *vākyārtha* ) consists in the mutual relation ( *saṁsarga* ) of the meanings presented by the word.[2]

One meaning is correlated with another.[3]

According to the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁskas the relation is one of synthesis.[4]

The Grammarians view it in the form of subject-predicate ( *uddeśya-vidheya* ) relation.[5]

The cognition of the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārtha-bodha*) is thus the knowledge of the relation between one object and another presented by the meanings of words.[6]

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[1] padajñānaṃ tu karaṇaṃ
dvāraṃ tatra padārthadhīḥ
śābdabodhaḥ phalaṃ tatra
śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī. —BP.

[2] padopasthitānāṃ arthānāṃ mithaḥ saṁsargaḥ. —TK.

[3] ekapadārthavat aparapadārthaḥ. —SSP.

[4] vākyārtha rūpānvaya viśiṣṭa padānāṃ
śaktiḥ iti bhaṭṭāḥ āhuḥ. —TP.

[5] śābdikaḥ tu padārthānāṃ mithaḥ
anvayaūpa uddeśya-vidheya bhāva
sambandhaḥ iti āhuḥ *Ibid.*

[6] eka padārthe aparapadārtha-
saṁsargaviṣayakajñānaṃ. VV.

The process *( prakriyā )* of *śābda bodha* ( verbal cognition ) is generally described as follows :

( 1 ) First, there is knowledge of the relation of such word as 'cow' with the objects signified by them.[1]

( 2 ) When some body says :

"Bring the cow", then the meaning of the word 'cow' etc. is remembered.[2]

( 3 ) Such remembrance is caused by the relation of the word with its meaning. One relative reminds the other.[3]

( 4 ) Then with the help of the knowledge of expectancy *( ākāṅkṣā )* etc. the meaning of this sentence *( vākyārtha )* becomes known.[4]

## 4. *What is the most important word in a sentence ?*
## *( Different Views )*

The question is raised :

What is the most important word in a sentence ? In other words, what is the central nucleus of a sentence ?

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[1] prathamaṃ gavādipadānāṃ gavādi–padartheṣu sambandhaḥ. —VV.

[2] tataḥ kālāntare gāṃ ānaya iti ukte gavādi padebhyaḥ gavādīn arthān smarati. *Ibid.*

[3] padasya padārtha smārakatvaṃ ca ekasaṁbandhi-jñānaṃ apara saṁbandhismārakaṃ. *Ibid.*

[4] ākāṅkṣādijñānataḥ tadanantaram ( gokarmānukūla kṛtimān tvaṃ iti ) buddhiḥ jāyate *Ibid.*

According to the Vaiyākaraṇas, it is the verb (*kriyāpada*). They define a sentence as that which possesses a finite verb.[1]

The verb is the central axis round which the other words perform their functions as auxiliary. The *kriyā* is the chief substantive (*mukhya viśeṣya*) and the *kartā* (agent or doer) serves as its qualified or adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*).[2]

The Mīmāṁsakas also emphasise the importance of the verb and agree with the Vaiyākaraṇas in holding that it is the action which constitutes the central meaning of a sentence.[3]

But the Naiyāyikas put the emphasis on the *kartā* (doer) and regard the word in the nominative case (i.e. the subject of a sentence) as the chief substantive (*mukhya viśeṣya*). According to them, the other words (including the verb) are only subsidiary to it and qualify it in some way or other (i.e. directly or indirectly).

While the verb is all-important for the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṁsakas, it is not so important for the Naiyāyikas. They do not even deem it to be a necessary part of a sentence. Some Neo-Naiyāyikas go to the extent of ridiculing the view of grammarians that there can be no verbless sentence. They admit the possibility of a sentence without a verb ( *kriyārahita vākya* ).[1]

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[1] eka tiṅ vākyaṃ. —PM.

[2] eka tiṅarth mukhyaviśeṣyaka-bodhajanaka padasamūhaḥ. —NK.

[3] kriyārūpaḥ vākyārthaḥ. —*Ibid.*

For example, *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* ( blue pot ) though devoid of a verb can function as a sentence. It may be contended that although no verb is explicitly present in the above case, the verb 'is' is implicitly present here and can be got by implication ( *adhyāhāra* ). But the Naiyāyikas reply that even such *adhyāhāra* is not possible in all cases, e.g.,

Threefold times ( *trayaḥ kālāḥ* ). Here no verb can be posited to cover the present, past and future tenses.

The Mīmāmsakas with their pragmatic outlook attach greater importance to action ( particularly to the Vedic injunctions ) and hence they lay stress on the verb.

The Naiyāyikas on the other hand have a realistic approach and they attach a greater importance to things and lay stress on the noun.

This difference in attitude leads to the different ways in which they interpret the meaning of sentence.

### 5. *Different formulas of Interpretation of Sentence ( Vākyārtha Bodha )*

( 1 ) The Naiyāyika formula of *śābda bodha* is that the meaning of the word in the first case-ending, i.e., in the nominative case is the substantive ( *mukhya viśeṣya* ).[1]

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[1] kriyārahitaṃ na vākyamasti iti prācām pravādaḥ niryuktikatvāt aśrayāsiddheḥ. —SSP.

( 2 ) The Vaiyākaraṇa formula is that the root meaning of the verb is the main substantive.[2]

( 3 ) The Mīmāṃsaka formula is that the meaning of the finite verb ( *ākhyātārtha* ) is the main substantive.[3]

Now let us take an example and see how the above formulas of interpretation are applied. "Ram brings a pot."

The Naiyāyika interpretation will be something like this.

"Ram is the doer of an act of ( or rather of an effort leading to ) the bringing of a pot".[4]

Let us analyse the above sentence. It is in the active voice ( *kartṛ vācya* ) and the verb is transitive ( *sakarmaka kriyā* ) of which the object ( *karma* ) is the pot.

The subject ( i.e. Ram ) is the agent ( *kartā* ) or doer of the act, i.e., the locus or substratum of the action. The object ( *karma* ), i.e., 'the pot' is the locus of the effect ( *phala* ) produced by the action.

The process ( *vyāpāra* ) is described as *ānayanānukūla vyāpāra* ( i.e. a process or action which tends towards the production of an effect, viz. 'being brought' ). The agent is a single person ( Rāma ) and the act is in the present tense ( *vartamāna kāla* ). So the above sentence can be more fully described as "Rāma, who is qualified by oneness, is the doer of a present act leading to the bringing of a pot.[1]

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[1] prathamāntārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaḥ śābdabodhaḥ. —KT.

[2] dhātvartha mukhyaviśeṣyakaḥ bodhaḥ. —Ibid.

[3] ākhyātārthamukhya viśeṣyakaḥ bodhaḥ. —Ibid.

[4] ghaṭakarmakānayanānukūla kṛtimān Rāmaḥ. —Ibid.

If the sentence is in the passive voice, e.g.,

"The pot is being brought by Rāma", the meaning will be—

"The pot is the possessor of the effect produced by the activity lying in Rāma."[2]

The Vaiyākaraṇas will interpret the sentence 'Rāma brings a pot' as an act ( or process of activity ) leading to the bringing of a pot by Rāma.[3]

The Mīmāmsakas will interpret the sentence as an act ( rather a will-to-do manifested in the act ) inherent in Rāma.[4]

There are subtle points of distinction between the above views. Broadly speaking, it can be said that while the Naiyāyika interpretation is agent-oriented ( *kartṛpradhāna* ), the Vaiyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsaka interpretations are action-oriented ( *kriyāpradhāna* ).

### 6. *Synthesis ( Anvaya ) of Words in a Sentence*

It is the synthesis of words which helps us to understand the meaning of a sentence. Such synthesis is of two kinds, viz.

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[1] ghaṭa karmakānayanānukūlavartamāna kṛtimān ekatva viśiṣṭaḥ Rāmaḥ. Ibid.

[2] Rāmaniṣṭha ānayanānukūlakṛtijanya phalaśālī ghaṭaḥ. Ibid.

[3] Rāmakartṛka ghaṭakarmaka ānayanukūla vyāpāraḥ. Ibid.

[4] Rāmasamavetā ghaṭānayanānukūlakṛtiḥ. —Ibid.

( 1 ) *Bhedānvaya,* i.e., Synthesis of words in different case-endings, e.g, Rāma's cow is grazing. Here the word Rāma is in the sixth case-ending ( i.e. possessive case ) and the word 'cow' is in the first case-ending ( i.e. the nominative case ). So the synthesis will be a case of *bhedānvaya.*

( 2 ) *Abhedānvaya,* i.e., Synthesis of words in the same case-ending ( samānavibhaktika ), e.g.,

"The cow, Kāmadhenu, is grazing". Here both the words 'cow' and 'Kāmadhenu' are in the same case ( i.e. in the nominative case ). So the synthesis of the two words will be a case of *Abhedānvaya*—knowledge of the meaning of a sentence *( śābdabodha )* is either ( i ) of parts *( khaṇḍa·bodha )* or ( ii ) of the whole *( akhaṇḍa bodha ).* The former is a stepping stone to the latter. In order to understand the meaning of the whole sentence, it is necessary that one should know the meaning of parts. That is to say, the cognition of the meaning of the entire sentence *( akhaṇḍa vākyārtha bodha )* is dependent upon a knowledge of the parts *( khaṇḍa bodha ).*

The meaning of words ( and parts thereof ) have been analysed thoroughly in Indian grammar and logic. For instance, the meanings of the sixth case-ending *( ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti )* have been analysed in a scrutinising manner as illustrated by some examples given below—

( 1 ) *The cow of Hari.* Here *of Hari* means possessed by Hari. That is to say, '*of*' indicates a relation of ownership ( *Svāmitva Saṁbandha* ).

( 2 ) *The hand of Hari.* Here 'of Hari' means related as an organ ( avayava ) to the body of Hari. That is, the relation indicated by 'of' is whole-part relation ( *Avayava-avayavī Saṁbandha* ).

( 3 ) *The son of Hari.* Here 'of Hari' means produced by Hari. The relation indicated is that of producer-produced ( *Janya-Janaka Saṁbandha* ).

( 4 ) *The wisdom of Hari.* Here 'of Hari' means 'inherent in Hari'. The relation indicated is one of inherence ( *Samavāya* ).

( 5 ) *The touch of Hari.* Here the relation indicated by 'of' is that of contact ( *Saṁyoga Saṁbandha* ).

( 6 ) *The news of Hari.* Here the meaning 'of Hari' is 'about Hari'. The relation indicated is subject-object relation ( *Viṣaya-Viṣayi-bhāva* ).

( 7 ) *The absence of Hari.* Here 'of Hari' means of which the counterpart ( *pratiyogī* ) is Hari. Thus the relation indicated is that of counter-positiveness ( *Pratiyogitā Saṁbandha* ). Thus the different case-endings ( in the accusative, instrumental, ablative, locative and other cases ) are indicative of multifarious relations in different contexts. The various functions of affixes ( *pratyayas* ) are analysed in such treatises as Vaiyākaraṇa-Bhuṣaṇa-sāra of Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Vyutpattivāda of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.

### *Theories of ( i ) Anvitābhidhānavāda and (ii) Abhihitānvaya-vāda :*

It is admitted on all hands that a sentence ( *vākya* ) involves synthesis ( *anvaya* ) of concepts. The question arises : How does the synthesis take place ? Are the words synthesised ( *anvita* ) from before or does the synthetic construction take place later ?

The first view, i.e., it is the synthesised concepts that give rise to the expression is known as *Anvitābhidhāna-vāda.*[1] The second view that the general concepts used in a sentence are subsequently synthesised together is known as *Abhihitānvaya-vāda.*[2]

The above two views are advocated by the two rival schools of the Mīmāṁsā, viz. the *Guru* School and the *Bhaṭṭa* School respectively. The first theory has been formulated by Prabhākara in his *Bṛhati Ṭīkā* and has been elaborated fully by Śālikanātha Miśra in his *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā.*

The socond theory is propounded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his Ślokavārtika and has been expounded forcefully by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra in his Nyāya-Ratna-Mālā and by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa in his Bhāṭṭa Cintāmaṇi.

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1. anvitānāmeva abhidhānam —NK.
2. abhihitānāmeva anvayaḥ. –ibid.

In this controversy, other schools of thought, e.g. the Nyāya, Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa and Alaṅkāra Śāstra etc. have also joined hands.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya* ( *Siddhānta* ) *Mañjarī* has thoroughly examined the pros and cons of the two theories.

Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī Ṭīkā ( on Brahma Sūtra 1.4 ), Citsukhācārya in his Citsukhī and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Advaita Siddhi have also expressed their views on the issue. The subject has been discussed elaborately in such grammatical treatises as the Vākyapadīyaṃ of Bhartṛhari and the Vaikākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa Sāra of Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and in such poetic treatises as Kāvya Prakāśa of Mammaṭa and Sāhitya Darpaṇa of Viśvanātha Ācārya.

Let us try to understand the main points of distinction between the two theories.

According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers, all words convey their own meanings separately. That is to say, each word first presents only a general concept as indicated by the denotative power ( *Śakti* ) of the word. For example, the word 'cow' denotes only a cow-in-general ( *go-sāmānya* ) as unrelated ( *ananvita* ) to another word. The different words become related together by a synthetic construction ( *saṁsarga maryādā* ). The synthesis takes place in accordance with rules of *Ākāṅkṣā* ( expectancy ), *āsatti* ( juxtaposition ), *yogyatā* ( compatibility ) and *tātparya* ( intention of the speaker ). Thus the meaning of the sentence arises from a synthesis ( *anvaya* ) of the words.

This view, i.e., that which is expressed ( *abhihita* ) is construed by mutual synthesis of words ( *pārasparika anvaya* ) is known as *abhihitānvaya-vāda.*[1]

Prabhākara and his followers, on the other hand, maintain that the words expressed are already related together and they collectively generate the meaning in an automatic way. This view is known as *anvitābhidhāna-vāda.*[2]

According to this theory, it is not the case that words are said first and that synthesis is made later on. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as an unrelated word. An isolated word ( divorced from all relation ) is a mere abstraction. For example, take the word 'cow'. How does one first know the meaning of of the word cow ? By practical usage ( *loka vyavahāra* ). Someone says ;

"Bring the cow",
and a cow is brought. He says,
"Take away the cow",
and the cow is taken away.

It is by means of observation of such behaviour of bringing and taking away ( *āvāpodvāpa* ) that the child becomes acquainted with the meanings of such words as, 'bring', 'take away', 'cow' etc. A word, e.g. 'cow' is never used in isolation. From the very beginning, the meaning of the word is understood as related

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1. abhihitasya kathitasya
   parasparaṃ anvayaḥ iti abhihitānvayavādaḥ —NK.
2. anvitasya parasparamilitasyaiva
   abhidhānam iti anvitābhidhāna vādaḥ –ibid.

to some other thing. Hence there is no need of postulating an additional synthesis or construction over and above the related meanings.

The distinction between the two views has been made clear by Pārtha Sārathī Miśra in his Nyāya Ratna Mālā in this way, "While you ( anvitābhidhāna-vādins ) say that a word denotes a qualified ( *viśiṣṭa* ) meaning, we ( *abhihitānvaya-vādins* ) say that a word denotes only a simple unqualified meaning ( *svarūpa mātra* )".[1] According to the former, the meaning of a sentence ( *vākyārtha* ) is nothing but the related meaning.[2] According to the latter, a sentence is nothing but a construction of the meaning of words.[3]

A question may arise here. What is meant by saying that words have related meaning ? Does it mean that the words of a sentence related together give rise to the meaning ? If so, it will not be disputed by any one. It is admitted on all hands that the necessary of a sentence ( i.e. of the words that constitute ) is the result of the construction of related concepts. There should be no difference of opinion on this score. But the protagonists of anvitābhidhānavāda do not mean simply this. They also add that the primary capacity ( *śakti or abhidhā-vṛtti* ) of a word lies in denoting a related meaning. For example, the word 'cow' must always be related to some other word, e.g. 'the cow is white', 'the cow is grazing', 'bring the cow', 'feed the cow', 'milk the cow' etc. Thus the 'cow' always stands is some relation to other concepts. An isolated concept devoid of all relation is a misnomer. In the sentence, 'bring the cow' for instance, the words 'bring', and 'cow' do not stand for the isolated concepts 'the act of bringing in general' or 'the cow in general'. Every word is linked with a hook, as it were, which joins it with another.

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[1] bhavān ( anvitābhidhānavādi )
padasya viśiṣṭa śaktim kalpayati
vayaṁ ( abhihitānvaya vādinaḥ )
tu svarūpamātraṃ —NRM.

[2] viśiṣṭaḥ eva padārthaḥ vākyārthaḥ—NK.

[3] padārthānāṃ vaiśisṭyaṃ
eva vākyaṃ –Ibid.

A word does not denote a bare concept ( *svarūpa mātra* ), but also possesses a relational aspect ( *apekṣā buddhi* ) which is inherently present in the very meaning of a word.

The above view of the *anvitābhidhāna-vādins* is criticised by the *Abhitānvaya-vādins*, who accuse the former of making an unnecessary assumption, i.e., of postulating a double denotative capacity in words, i. e. the meaning aspect and the relational aspect. The latter ( i.e., *abhihitānvayavādins* ) on the other hand claim the merit of brevity ( *lāghava* ) for themselves inasmuch as they posit a single capacity in word, i.e. a simple meaning only and ascribe the capacity of relating to synthetic construction ( *anvaya* ).

The former ( i.e. *anvitābhidhānavādins* ) retort by saying that if they assume two capacities their opponents ( i.e. *abhihitānvayavādins* ) assume three, viz.

( i ) the capacity of words to denote an unrelated meaning.

( ii ) the capacity of meaning to be related by a power of synthesis.

( iii ) the capacity of words to endow meanings with such power.[1]

They hold that the words of a sentence present meanings ( as indicated by their grammatical and syntactical features such as number, gender, case-ending, tense, juxtaposition etc. ) and they ( the words ) are self-sufficient to carry the load of the meaning like the bearers of a palanquin.[2]

They do not postulate any intermediary between the co-related words ( *anvita padas* ) and the meaning of the sentence ( *vākyārtha* ). The meaning of a sentence, according to them, is nothing but the meanings of the words mutually related. No further operation is necessary to get the *vākyārtha*. As Śālikanātha puts it : A sentence gives only construed meanings of words which are expressed.[3]

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[1] śaktitrayaṃ prakalpyaṃ syāt,
padānām arthagocaraḥ.
Arthānāmanvite śaktiḥ,
tadādhyāyakatā pade. —NRM.

[2] yathā hi śivikāyāḥ udyantāraḥ,
sarvemilitvā śivikām udyacchanti tathā hi
sarvāṇī eva padāni vākyārtham avabodhayanti. —NM.

[3] padārthā eva vākyārthaḥ,
mithaḥ saṅgatiśālinaḥ,
ācakṣate 'bhidhīyante,
padaisteṣāṁ tathāvidhaḥ. —NM.

The meaning of a sentence is only the mutually related ( *parasparānvita* ) meanings of words.[1]

Hence no separate power ( *śakti* ) need be hypothesised to exist in synthetic activity.[2]

The *abhihitānvayavādins* on the other hand maintain ( as pointed out earlier ) that the primary denotative power ( *śakti* or *abhidhā vṛtti* ) of words is to reveal only a general content ( *svarūpa mātra* ) and not the relational aspect ( *apekṣā buddhi* ). The meanings when strewn together like a garland of flowers give rise to a verbal cognition. The different words do their job ( i.e. transmit their individual meanings ) and cease functioning and the meanings thus got are synthesised and generate a knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.[3]

Thus according to *abhihitānvayavādins*, the constituent words of a sentence present only their isolated meanings, which are combined according to syntactical rules ( i.e. juxtaposition etc. ) and the meanings are then brought under a synthetic or constructive process which gives the intended meaning.[4]

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[1] padārthā eva parasparānvitāḥ
vākyārthaḥ iti uccyate. —PP.

[2] anvaye pṛthak śaktiḥ na kalpanīyā. —SBV.

[3] padāni hi svaṃ svaṃ padāṁ padārthām
abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇī. atha
idānīṃ padārthāḥ jñātāḥ santaḥ
vākyārthaṃ gamayanti. —SB.

[4] ākāṅkṣāyogyatā sannidhi vaśāt
vakṣyamāṇa svarūpānāṃ padārthānāṃ
samanvaye tātparyārthaḥ. —KP.

Thus according to *abhihitānvayavādins*, the words or terms in a sentence are not the immediate instruments ( *sākṣāt sādhana* or *karaṇa* ) of verbal cognition. They are only the mediate cause ( *ārāt sādhana* or *dvāra* ). The immediate cause of verbal cognition ( *śābda bodha* or *vākyārtha jñāna* ) is the knowledge of the meanings of words ( *padārtha jñāna* ).[1]

They argue that the fact that isolated words can be used in abstract sense is well-illustrated by the use of dictionary. This point is conceded by the *anvitābhidhānavādins* also. But the latter contend that a word used in a sentence cannot exist without a relatedness ( *saṁsargatā* ) which is an integral part of the meaning of the word. The *abhihitānvayavādins* do not accept the last part of the contention. According to them, the relatedness is an external and not an internal part of the meaning. Different relations are imposed on a word, e.g. 'cow' in different sentences. If it may be contended on behalf of the *anvitābhidhānavādins* that the relatedness ( *saṁsargatā* ) here means relation in general ( *saṁsarga mātra* ), it is too wide and vague to be of any practical use. As Jayanta puts it, what is the use of an ocean which cannot satisfy thirst ? It is no better than a desert.[2]

There is another aspect of the controversy. Take the sentence :

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[1] vākyārthasya padārthāḥ eva
sākṣāt sādhanam, padāni tu
dvāreṇaiva sādhanaṃ na sākṣāt. —NRM.

[2] na hi rasavidām pūrṇo' pi
abdhiḥ maroratiricyate salilakāryāniṣpatteḥ. —NM.

Bring a cow.

The *anvitābhidhānavādins* say that the words stand for general concepts. But how can the universal 'cowness' be brought at all ? Hence they take the help of *tātparya śakti* ( i.e. the power that is added by the intention of the speaker ). Though the word pre-eminently means a universal ( *jāti* ), it secondarily signifies a particular individual ( *vyakti* ) included under that. Thus the meaning of the particular cow is got by implication (*lakṣaṇatā*). Such a projection ( *ākṣepa* ) is necessary to render the sentence meaningful.[1]

The *anvitābhidhānavādins* also agree that words connote universals. But they maintain that an universal automatically denotes an individual without which it cannot be conceived. That is to say, the word means a universal together with the individual.[2]

The *abhihitānvayavādins* do not accept the above position. How can a single potency ( i.e. *śakti* ) singnify both universal and individual simultaneously ? Hence they posit a special power ( i.e. *tātparya śakti* ) which gives the intended meaning of the sentence ( *tātparyārtha* ).[3]

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[1] Gām ānaya ityādau gopadopasthita-
sāmānyasya ānayanā'saṁbhavāt go-viśeṣā-
nanayanameva vākyārthaḥ. sa ca lākṣaṇikaḥ.
ataḥ lākṣaṇika eva vākyārthaḥ —BC.

[2] sā ( jātiḥ ) tu śabdenaiva pratīyamāna,
vyaktayā saha pratīyate. —NRM.

[3] tātparyaṃ nāma vṛttiḥ tadarthaśca
tātparyārthaḥ tadbodhakavākyam iti
abhihitānvayavādināṃ mataṃ. —SD.

The different stages in the process of verbal cognition ( *śābda bodha* ) can be described in this way—

( i ) First, the meanings of words are understood separately, i.e., words like 'cow' reveal their meanings separately.[1]

( ii ) Words are like reminders; verbal cognition is like memory ( *smṛti* ).[2]

( iii ) In sentences like 'Bring a cow', the specific meaning ( i.e. the particular act of bringing an individual cow ) is got by synthesis (*anvaya*) of verbs etc.[3]

( iv ) The meanings thus synthesised ( in accordance with the laws of fitness etc. ) reveal the specific relation in which they stand to each other and thus the meaning of the whole sentence ( *vākyārtha* ) is got.[4]

( v ) Hence it is the meaning of words ( *padārthas* ) and not the words ( *padās* ) which serves as the vehicle of the specific meaning of the sentence ( *vākyārtha* ) that becomes known.[5]

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[1] padaiḥ padārthāḥ pṛthak pṛthak prathamameva abhidhīyante. —ibid.

[2] padāni smāraka-tulyāni avabodhaḥ smaraṇatulyaḥ. —ibid.

[3] kriyānvayādiḥ avagamyate sa vākyagamyaḥ. —ŚBV.

[4] Te abhihitāḥ padārthāḥ yogyatvena parāmṛśyamāṇāh svayameva viśeṣa saṁsargātmakaṃ vākyārthaṃ avabodhayanti. —ibid.

[5] arthaireva arthaviśeṣas siddhiḥ ( na tu tatra śabdavyāpāraḥ ). —ibid.

Pārtha Sārathī Miśra in his *Nyāya Ratna Mālā* gives the gist of *abhihitānvayavāda* by saying that it is not the words or sentences themselves that generate verbal cognition; it is the construed meanings of words put together that give the meaning of a sentence.[1]

The meaning of a sentence ( *vākyārtha* ) is thus regarded as dependent on the meanings of words ( *padārtha jñāna* ). But a question arises here. When a child understands the meaning of a sentence, e.g. "Bring an elephant" by means of repeated observations of such acts as bringing and taking away ( *āvāpodvāpa* ) the animal, the meaning of the sentence is understood as a whole without the knowledge of the meaning of constituents. How can it be said then that there can be no verbal cognition without previous knowledge of the meanings of words ?

The reply is that though, one may be able at times to understand or guess the meaning of a particular sentence taken as a whole by observation of practical behaviour in life, he cannot know the meanings of innumerable sentences unless he is acquainted with the meanings of the words used therein.[2]

The meaning of a sentence can be apprehended only by a knowledge of the meaning of words ( *padārtha jñāna* ). In the absence of such knowledge there can be no verbal cognition. That is why one does not understand the meanings of sentences in an unknown language.

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[1] śaktijñāna-viṣayasya śabdabodhā' viṣayatva niyamaḥ.

—NK.

[2] Na sańghātātmanā vākyaṃ,
vākyārthasyābhidhāyakaṃ.
Anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ
bhāgaśaḥ tattu vācakaḥ. —NRM.

A critical estimate reveals that the controversy between *anvitābhidhānavāda* and *abhihitānvayavāda* seems to be more a matter of emphasis than of fundamental difference. The one puts stress on the function of words ( *pada śakti* ), the other puts stress on the synthesis of meanings ( *padārthānvaya* ). But there is no water-tight compartment between words and meanings. They are only two sides of the same coin. As Dr. D. M. Datta puts it in his 'Six Ways of Knowing', the central isuse of the controversy is whether construction ( *anvaya* ) precedes expression ( *abhidhāna* ) or follows it. He offers a novel suggestion in this connection. While the one ( i.e. *anvitābhidhānavāda* ) is speaker-oriented ( i.e. true from the speaker's point of view ), the other ( i.e. *abhihitānvayavāda* ) is hearer-oriented ( i.e. true from the standpoint of the hearer ). Thus the two approaches though apparently contradictory and incompatible may be reconciled and synthesised together.[1]

Paṇḍita Gaurī Nātha Śāstrī in his work, "The Philosophy of Word and Meaning" has given a critical exposition of this interesting controversy in meticulous details which are highly helpful for further studies on the suject.[2]

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1. vide SWK ( Book VI, Chapter IV ).
2. vide PWM, Chapter VIII.

### 8. *The Validity of Statements* :

The understanding of the meaning of a statement is called *śābdabodha*. The objective reference or factual knowledge by it is known as *śābdī pramā*. The function of a statement is to impart such knowledge.

The orthodox schools of Indian philosophy recognises two kinds of statements, viz.,

( 1 ) *Vaidika Vākya* ( scriptural statements )
( 2 ) *Laukika Vākya* ( ordinary statements ).

The former is of two kinds, viz.,

( i ) *Vidhi Vākya*,[1] i.e. imperative sentence exhorting one to do some duty[2] or to refrain from some wrong act,[3] e.g. :

( a ) Perform the sacrifies for the sake of heaven ( Injunction ).[4]

( b ) Do not kill any living creature ( Prohibition )

In ( a ) reference has been made to something that is not seen. It is called *adṛṣṭārthaka*.

In ( b ), it relates to seen things of these words : *It is called dṛṣṭārthaka.*

The second type of Vedic sentences is known as *Arthavāda*. It is of four kinds, viz.[5]

( i ) *Stuti* ( Praise )
( ii ) *Nindā* ( Blame )

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[1] yadvākyaṃ vidhāyakaṃ codakaṃ sa vidhiḥ. —VB. ( 2. I. 62 )

[2] aniṣṭasādhanatābodhakavākyaviśeṣaḥ. –Ibid.

[3] agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ. —ŚB.

[4] yasyāmutrārtha pratīyate so'dṛṣṭārthaḥ. —VB. (2. I : I.8)

[5] stutiḥ nindā parākṛtiḥ purākalpaśca. —GS. ( 2. I. 64 )

( iii ) *Parākṛti* ( Narrative )
( iv ) *Purākalpa* ( History ).

The *Arthavāda* plays an auxiliary role to *Vidhi Vākya* by extolling something or decrying it.[1]

The Vedic sentences are deemed to be authoritative as they are of divine origin.[2] The Vedas are self-evident ( *Svataḥ pramāṇa* ),[3] i.e. their validity does not depend upon any other evidence.[4]

It may be noted in this connection that the question of self-validity ( *svataḥ prāmāṇya* ) of knowledge is a controversial issue that has been discussed elaborately in the different schools of Indian Philosophy.

The Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins hold that knowledge is intrinsically valid and shines in its own light.

The validity ( *prāmāṇya* ) of it is generated and revealed automatically by its own nature ( *svataḥ utpadyate jñāyate ca* ).

This theory of self-validity of kowledge is known as *svataḥ prāmāṇya-vāda.*

According to it, belief in the truth of knowledge is the normal rule and invalidity ( *aprāmāṇya* ) of it is an exception. The latter is caused by some extraneous conditions and is detected through some other knowledge.

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[1] vidhyarthaṃ śīghraṃ pravṛttaye
praśaṁsati, niṣiddhārthaṃ śīghraṃ
nivṛttaye nindati ca. —ibid ( 2.I.63 )

[2] vaidikaṃ īśvararoktatvāt svayameva pramāṇaṃ.
—TS. ( 3.9.3.9. )

[3] vedāḥ svataḥ pramāṇaṃ. —AS.

[4] svataḥprāmāṇyaṃca pramāntarānadhīnā
pramitijanaktvaṃ. —NKU.

The Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and the Bauddhas, on the other hand, maintain that the validity as well as invalidity of knowledge is caused and known by some other knowledge. That is to say, the origin ( *utpatti* ) or cognition ( *jñapti* ) of validity and invalidity is dependent on something else ( *parataḥ jñāyate ca* ).

This theory of extrinsic validation is known as *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*. According to the Sāṁkhyas, the invalidity is known by itself ( *aprāmāṇyasya svataḥ jñaptiḥ* ). According to the Jainas it is sometimes known extrinsically ( *parataḥ* ).[1]

## 9. *The Role of Verification*

A matter of fact statement which affirms or denies something can be accepted as true, if it comes from an *āpta* ( i. e. a reliable person who speaks the truth sincerely ).[2] An *āpta* is one who describes a thing as it is.[3] He must have himself seen it.[4] He must be fully conversant with the meaning of what he says.[5] He should be incapable of telling a lie even under the stress of a passion or even in joke.[1]

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[1] pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāṁkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ.
naiyāyikāste parataḥ saugatāḥ paramaṁ svataḥ.
prathamaṃ parataḥ āhuḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vedavādinaḥ
pramāṇatvaṁ svataḥ prāhuḥ parataśca' pramāṇatāṃ.
—SDS ( 12.2 18 )

[2] laukikavākyaṃ tu yaddharmabuddhyā āptenoktaṃ tadeva pramāṇaṃ. —SC.

[3] āptastu yathārthavaktā. —TB.

[4] sākṣātkṛtadharmā. —VB.

[5] prakṛtavākyārthayathārtha jñānavān. —GV. ( 1.1. 7 )

But how can it be ascertained whether a given statement is really *Āptavākya*, i.e. it fulfils all the conditions mentioned above? Hence the need of verification. A statement is accepted as true if it is corroborated by reason and experience. It is rejected as false, if it becomes contradicted ( *bādhita* ).

The verification of a statement is not required in all cases. Some prepositions are self-evident ( *svayaṁ siddha* ), e.g.,

The whole is greater than a part.

This is necessarily true and needs no verification. Some statements, on the other hand, are self-contradictory (*vyāhata*), e.g.,

This is a square circle.

This is necessarily false and does not deserve any examination whatsoever.

Both types of statements illustrated above have one thing in common, i.e., they need not be examined. The one is accepted at once because it is evident. The other is rejected at once because it is self-condemned. It is only an empirical statement which is neither analytic nor contradictory that affords a scope for verification.

The above point has been brought out by MM. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā in his *Paramārtha darśana* in a detailed manner.[2]

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[1] rāgadveṣādapi nānyathāvādī yaḥ saḥ āptaḥ. —LM.

[2] This is an original system of philosophy propounded by Rāmāvatāra Śarmā ( 1877-1929 ) in his work Paramārthā Darśanasūtra ( published in 1913 ) which consists

Śarmā defines a statement of fact ( *arthavāda* ) as that which is characterised by the verb, 'was', 'is' or 'will be'.[1]

He classifies such statements under three heads, viz.[2],

( 1 ) *Apekṣyopapattika*, i.e., that statement which needs verification, e.g., Devadatta has a brother.

( 2 ) *Anapekṣyopapattika*, i.e., that which does not require any verification, e.g.,

Devadatta has ( or had ) a mother.

( 3 ) *Upapattiviruddha*, i.e., that statement which is contradicted ( *bādhita* or *vyāhata* ) by reason or experience., e.g.,

The mother of Devadatta was a barren woman.

Such propositions are rejected outright without[3] any examination, for they are vitiated by contradiction ( *vyāhati* )[4].

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of 445 Sanskrit sūtras elaborated in 940 ślokas. It is now out of print and little known outside the circle of Pundits in Bihar. This obscure philosophy which is old in style but modern in spirit was brought to limelight by the present writer in his article entitled : *Paramārtha Darśana* "a revolutionary trend in contemporary Indian philosophy" ( published in the Rādhā Kṛṣṇa Memorial Volume, Darśana International, Moradabad, 1964. )

[1] āsidasti bhaviṣyati iti arthavādaḥ. —PD. ( I. 2.10 )

[2] ekāpekṣyopapattiśca nāpekṣyopapattikā
paropapattivihatā pratijñā trividhā smṛtā. -Ibid. (I. 2.4)

[3] vyāhataṃ aparīkṣyaṃ. -Ibid. ( I. I. 20 )

[4] vyāhatiḥ bādhaḥ. -Ibid. ( I. 1.4 )

Statements can thus be brought under two categories, viz.,[1]

( 1 ) Questionable ( *saṅdigdha* ) which requires verification.

( 2 ) Unquestionable ( *asaṅdigdha* ) which needs no verification.

10. *Contradiction ( Vyāhati )*

The occasion for doubt ( *sandeha* or *saṁśaya* ) arises only when there is possibility of some obstruction ( *bādha* ) in the way of its being accepted.[2] So long as a statement is not verified, it is in the stage of doubt.[3] But when it becomes confirmed by right perception or inference it becomes free from doubt.[4]

When the statement is contrary to reason and experience ( *upapatti-viruddha* ), i.e., suffers from some contradiction ( *vyāhati* ), it should be rejected at once.[5]

The instances of statements which are characterised as *upapattiviruddha* may be brought under two categories :

( i ) Contrary to reason ( *tarkaviruddha* ), e.g.,
She is a barren mother.

( ii ) Contrary to experience (*anubhavaviruddha*), e.g.,
This is a hare's horn.

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[1] arthavādaḥ sandigdhaḥ asandigdhaḥ. –Ibid. ( I. 2.22 )

[2] bādhasambhave sandehaḥ. –Ibid. ( I. 2.24 )

[3] pratyakṣāmanumānaṁ vā,
yāvadbādhavivarjitaṃ.
śabdamātroditastāvat,
arthaḥ saṁśayagocaraḥ –Ibid ( I. 6.20 )

[4] abādhita pratyakṣānumāne vā tadabhāvaḥ. –Ibid. (I. 60)

[5] vyāhate tu sadyaḥ asatyatāniścāyaka-
vakrādinirapekṣapravṛtteḥ
bādhakaḥ. –Ibid ( 1.1.26 )

The one ( barren mother ) is false as there is an inherent contradiction ( *vyāghāta* ) here. The other ( hare's horn ) is false, because it is contradicted by experience. The one goes against the Law of Thought, the other goes against the Law of Nature. The one is logically impossible ( *asaṁbhava* ), the other is empirically false ( *ayathārtha* ). The one is inconceivable ( *akalpanīya* ) at any time or place, the other may be conceived to exist ( *saṁbhāvya* ) in some other planet or even on earth in the future course of evolution of species. In terms of Aristotelian Logic the one is formally false ( like a square circle ), the other is materially false ( like a golden mountain ).[1]

The essence of formal falsity lies in self-cotradiction ( *vadato-vyāghāta* ). A typical illustration is given below.[2]

"The dumb man speaks. I am dead. My mother is barren. My father is impotent. My grandfather was childless."

The above is a glaring example of palpable self-contradictions, which make the expressions ridiculously absurd or non-sensical.

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[1] A paper on this subject (viz. Is the concept of formal falsity recognised in Indian logic ) was contributed by the writer to the Kanpur Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held in 1972.

[2] mūko vaktā mṛto'smīti,
bandhyāsti jananī mama.
napuṁskaśca janakaḥ
niḥsantānaḥ pitāmahaḥ.

The above expressions which are vitiated by *vyāhati* suffer from an inner incompatibility ( *ayogyatā* ). They are as incongruous as the expression,

( i ) Wet the book with fire.

( ii ) Burn the book with water.

They can be called meaningless ( *nirarthaka* ) because the conflicting words stifle the sense and no verbal cognition ( *śābdabodha* ) is generated.

But all cases of *vyāhati* ( contradiction ) are not so obvious. Suppose, some saintly man comes and says that he is a monogamist and that his wife is barren, and after a year he comes to collect funds for the marriage of his sons, any one who recollects his previous statement can see that what he says is contrary to reason ( *upapattiviruddha* ) and as such it should be rejected.[1]

A truth seeker (*pāramārthika*) investigates the truth of what is said irrespective of who has said it and when or where.[2]

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1. bandhyā bhāryā mametyādi
vadato vatsarātparam.
eka-patnīvratasyemau
pariṇeyau sutau mama.
iti vāgvyāhatā spaṣṭam
vyāhatistu na lakṣyate
ādyam vismarata vākyam
lakṣyate smaratobhayam. —P.D. ( I. 2. 74. 74 )

2. kutra kena likhitaṃ kimityayaṃ
nāmamātraviduṣām duragrahet
vastu kīdṛgiti 'vaktṛnispṛhā
nveṣanaṃ tu paramārthadṛśānepha. —Ibid. ( I.I. I )

Śarmā insists on the rejection of such an authority as cannot stand the test of reason. A belief without adequate rational evidence is a superstition. He attacks such superstitious beliefs prevalent in the field of philosophy. Such statements as

(i) There is a soul that survives after death,
(ii) That soul is reborn in another body,
(iii) Soul enjoys the fruit of action done in the past life,
(iv) Soul attains liberation (*mokṣa*) after all such fruits are exhausted,

are unverified and unverifiable, and therefore, not acceptable to him.

Śarmā illustrates his point by giving a long list of such statements as are contradicted (*vyāhata*) and therefore rejectable, though they are widely believed by people. Such superstitious beliefs, he says, are due to ignorance, prejudice or wishful thinking. Śarmā's insistence on the rejection of the contradicted and on the verification of empirical statements may be compared to the attitude of the logical positivists.[1]

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[1] Those who may like to be acquainted more fully with the philosophy of Paramārtha Darśana may consult the series of articles on the subject by this writer (published in the *Dārśanika*, Quarterly Journal of the Akhila Bhāratīya Darśana Pariṣad, 1958-59.

## CHAPTER FOUR

# ANALYSIS OF RHETORIC LANGUAGE

### 1. *Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā*

We have seen in chapter II that the significatory capacity ( vṛtti ) of a word is twofold, viz.

( i ) *Abhidhā* and ( ii ) *Lakṣaṇā*.

The Vaiyākaraṇas, the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁs-kas and the Vedāntins recognise only these two kinds of potency. But the great masters of poetics ( *Kāvya-śāstra*) like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and others recognise a third kind of *vṛtti* ( potency ) also, viz. *vyañjanā.*[1]

According to the Rhetoricians, the threefold *vṛttis*, are—

( i ) *Abhidhā* ( Primary potency of word )
( ii ) *Lakṣaṇā* ( Secondary potency )
( iii ) *Vyañjanā* ( Tertiary potency )

Accordingly, there are three kinds of meaning which correspond to the above, viz.[2]

( 1 ) *Vācyārtha* ( Literal meaning )
( 2 ) *Lakṣyārtha* ( Figurative meaning )
( 3 ) *Vyaṅgyārtha* ( Implied meaning )

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[1] artho vācyaśca lakṣyaśca
vyaṅgyaśceti tṛdhā mataḥ. —SD. ( 2.2 )

[2] vācyārthobhidhayā bodhyo
lakṣyo lakṣaṇayā mataḥ.
vyaṅgyo vyañjanayāstāḥ syuḥ
tisraḥ śabdasya śaktayaḥ. —Ibid. ( 2.3 )

*Vācyārtha* is the chief meaning (i.e. the fixed dictionary meaning). It is also known as *mukhyārtha, abhidhārtha, śakyārtha* or *saṅketitārtha*.[1]

As it has already been dealt with in Chapter II it is not necessary to repeat it here.

### 2. Characteristics of Lakṣaṇā

*Lakṣaṇā* (secondary sense) is taken recourse to when *Abhidhā* (primary sense) is not applicable, i.e., when the chief meaning (*mukhya artha* or *vācyārtha*) is obstructed or hampered (*bādhita*) in some way. It gives an occasion for figurative interpretation (*lakṣyārtha*).[2] For example, "That man is a lion".

Here, if we take the dictonary meaning of the word 'lion' it will not fit in, because the lion is a quadruped with a tail, mane etc. which are not possessed by the man. Hence the word 'lion' cannot be taken in its literal sense here. It can be taken only in a figurative sense.

Thus we find that when some discrepancy results from taking the literal meaning (*vācyārtha*), we take recourse to the secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*).

That is to say, the occasion for *lakṣaṇā* arises only when there is an obstruction to primary meaning (*mukhyārtha bādha*).[3] In other words, it is some syntactical incompatibility[1] or a hindrance to the intended meaning[2] that necessitates *lakṣaṇā.*

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[1] tatra saṅketitārthasya
bodhanāt agrimā'bhidhā. —Ibid. (2.4)

[2] mukhyārthabādhe tadyukte
yathānyo'rthaḥ pratīyate —Ibid. (2.5)

[3] mukhyārthānupattiḥ lakṣaṇābījam. —PC.

In the sentence 'that man is a lion' the word lion cannot be taken literally, because the subject ( man ) and predicate ( lion ) are incompatible, i.e. there is lack of concord ( *anvayānupatti* ). What is to be done then ? We are to see what is the intention ( *tātparya* ) of the speaker. The intended meaning (*vivakṣhita artha*) is that the man possesses the lionine virtue of bravery.

It may be noted here that the figurative meaning taken here though different from the literal meaning is not altogether unrelated with it.

The characteristic feature of a lion is bravery and it is the part of the meaning which is taken here. Thus the *lakṣyārtha* also bears some relation with the primary meaning that makes the meaning possible.[3] The essential characteristics of *lakṣaṇā* have been described by Mammaṭa Ācārya as follows :

( i ) Obstruction of primary meaning ( *mukhyārtha bādhaḥ* )

( ii ) Substitution of another meaning associated with the primary meaning (*mukhyārthayuktaḥ*)

( iii ) Some convention ( *rūḍhi* ) or purpose ( *prayojana* ).[4]

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[1] anvayānupapattiḥ lakṣaṇābījam —SM.

[2] tātparyānupapattiḥ lakṣaṇābījam —BP.

[3] śakyasambandhaḥ lakṣaṇā. —LM.

[4] mukhyārthabādhe tadyukte yovānyorthaḥ pratīyate.
rūḍheḥ prayojanādvāpi lakṣaṇāśaktirarpitā. —SD.

A similar definition of *lakṣaṇā* is given by the Naiyāyikas also.[1]

### 3. *Rūḍha and Prayojanavatī Lakṣaṇā*

A lakṣaṇā is either conventional ( *rūḍha* ) or purposive ( *prayojanavatī* ). When the figurative meaning of a word becomes fixed ( *prasiddha* ) by constant usage ( *vyavahāra* ), it is called *rūḍha* ( conventional )[2]. For example, 'the arm of a chair', 'the leg of a table', 'the eye of the needle', etc., come under this category. When the meaning of a figurative expression becomes so much fixed, it acquires almost the same force as a literal meaning. For example, the expression, *prathamaḥ pādaḥ* ( the first foot ) in the beginning of a book is taken to mean 'the first chapter' in the same way as if it were the literal meaning. Similarly the Sanskrit word *kuśala* ( which originally meant one who is an expert in cutting *kuśa* grass ) is extended by long usage to mean "one who is an expert in doing work".[3]

A *lakṣyārtha* ( figurative meaning ) may either be conventional or purposive.

Take the sentence :

*Gaṅgāyāṃ grāmaḥ*

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[1] mukhyārthabādhe tadyogo
rūḍhito'tha prayojanāt.
anyorthaḥ lakṣyate yat sā
lakṣaṇā ropitākriyā. —TR.

[2] nirūḍhāḥ lakṣaṇāḥ kāścit sāmarthyādabhidhānavat. —TSV.

[3] karmaṇi kuśalaḥ ityādi
rūḍhalakṣaṇāyāḥ udāharaṇaṃ. —SDS.

( The village is situated on the Ganges )

Here the expression *Gaṅgāyām* ( i.e. on the Ganges ) cannot be taken in its literal sense, as the village cannot lie on the waters of the Ganges. Obviously, the meaning intended by the speaker is that the village is located on the bank of the Ganges. 'On' in this context means "in the vicinity of". Such meaning has become conventional ( rūḍha ) by constant usage.[1]

But if the purpose of the speaker is also to suggest that the village lying in the vicinity of the Ganges possesses the coolness and purity of the Gaṅgā, it would be a case of *prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā*. Some call it *lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā*.[2]

### 4. *Jahatsvārthā and Ajahatsvārthā Lakṣaṇā*

The Naiyāyikas, Vedāntins and some others recognise three kinds of *Lakṣaṇā*, viz.

( i ) *Jahat svārthā*, i.e., that which abandons its own meaning.

( ii ) *Ajahat svārthā*, i.e., that which does not give up its own meaning.

Now let us try to understand each of these with the help of examples.

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[1] gaṅgāpadasya śakyārthapravāharūpe ghoṣasya anupapattyā tātparyānupapattiḥ vā yatra pratisandhīyate, tatra lakṣaṇayā tīrasya bodhaḥ. —VSM.

[2] gaṅgāyāṃ grāma iti prayoge
śaityapāvanatvādipratītiḥ
lakṣaṇāmūlikā vyañjanā. —SD.

(1) *Jahat svārthā Lakṣaṇā* (or briefly, specially *Jahat lakṣaṇā*) is present when some word or words (used in a sentence) give up their own meaning.[1] For example, the word 'on' in the sentence "the village is *on* the Ganges" gives up its own meaning (i.e. upon) and assumes another meaning (i.e. on the bank of).[2]

Thus a *Jahat svārthā Lakṣaṇā* is that in which the primary meaning of a word has been abandoned and replaced by another meaning.[3]

It occurs when the meaning of a word cannot be construed literally.[4]

*Jahat svārthā lakṣaṇā* is taken recourse to when "rūḍha, i.e., the conventional meaning of a word arising from the power of a specific combination of letters (*samudāya śakti*) or established usage (*prasiddhi*) is of an incompatible nature.[5]

Let us take some more examples.

(1) The gallery is crying.

(2) *Ghee* is life.

In (I) the word 'gallery' cannot be taken literally, as an inanimate object like the gallery is incapable of crying. The meaning of the gallery here is "the people who are seated in the gallery."[1]

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[1] jahāti padāni svārthaṁ yasyāṁ cā jahatsvārthā, --VBS.

[2] gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ atra svārthasya pravāhasya tyāgāt tīre ghoṣaḥ iti eva bodhaḥ, tarhi jahatsvārthā. --DT.

[3] śakyārthaparityāgena itarārthalakṣaṇā jahatsvārthā. -SM.

[4] yatra vākyārthasya anvayābhāvaḥ tatra jahatī. --TD.

[5] jahatsvārthā ca tatraiva yatra rūḍhir virodhinī. --SM.

In ( 2 ) *ghee* ( clarified butter ) is not life, but conducive to life. Hence the word 'life' here is to be construed in the sense of 'life-giving'. These are instances of *Jahat svārthā lakṣaṇā.*[2]

( ii ) *Ajahatsvārthā* ( *Ajahallakṣaṇā* ) is that type of *Lakṣaṇā* where the literal meaning is not given up.[3]

Let us take an example. A teacher while going to take his bath in the river said to his pupil—

*"Protect the curd from crows."*

The pupil began to scare the crows with the help of a bamboo. Meanwhile, a cat came from backside, and ate up the curd. When the teacher came back and asked for an explanation, the pupil took the plea that the instruction given to him was that the curd should be protected from crows ( and not from cats ).

Now the point is what is the real meaning intended by the teacher when he said—

*"Pratect the curd from crows."*

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1. mancāḥ krośanti iti atra vākyārthasya krośana kartṛtvānvyāsambhavāt mañca padam mañcasthapuruṣalākṣaṇikam. —Ibid.

2, āyurghṛtamityatra āyuḥ śabdena āyuḥ sādhanasya bodhanāt svārthasya tyāgāt jahat svārthatvam. —Ibid.

3. na jahati padani svārtham yasyāḥ sā ajahatsvārthā. —VBS.

The intention of the teacher was obviously that the curd should be protected not only from crows, but from all other creatures like cats and dogs which are capable of eating the curd.[1]

The word 'crow' here serves as a symbol which signifies a creature that may destroy the curd.[2] So the proposition,

*"Protect the curd from crows,"*

should be interpreted in a wider sense to mean that the curd should be protected from crows, cats, dogs, i.e., those which can spoil the curd.[3]

It may be noted here that in the above instance, there is no difficulty in syntactical analysis ( *anvaya* ) and there is no descripancy in accepting the literal meaning, i.e., there is no obstruction in the way of the primary meaning ( i.e. *mukhyārtha-bādha* ). But the intention of the speaker was not to convey only that sense which accrued from the words actually used; it was something more than that. The word 'crows' was intended in a much wider sense and it should be taken in that light. It is the intention ( *tātparya* ) which determines the real meaning of a sentence and when the actual purpose of the speaker is not served by the literal meaning of the words used by him, we should interpret them in such a way that the purpose may be served.[4]

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[1] atra dadhyupaghātakebhyaḥ dadhi-rakṣaṇe tātparyam. –NB.

[2] kākapadasya dadhyupaghātake lakṣaṇā. –Ibid.

[3] kāka-viḍālaprabhṛti dadhibhakṣakajantubhyaḥ rakṣyatām.

[4] tātparyasya niścaya eva śābdabodhe kāraṇam. –Ibid.

( iii ) *Jahadajahat Svārthā Lakṣaṇā* is that type of *Lakṣaṇā* in which the primary meaning is partly rejected and partly retained; for example.

This is that Devadatta.

Here, a conflict appears between the meanings of 'This' ( denoting nearness ) and 'That' ( denoting remoteness ). This conflict is removed when we retain the essential identity of Devadatta and ignore the differences caused by time, place and other circumstances.

Such Vedāntic expressions as 'That thou art' 'I am He' etc. also fall under this category.

This kind of *Lakṣaṇā* is also known as *Bhāga-tyāga Lakṣaṇā.*

## 4. *Śuddhā and Gauṇī Lakṣaṇā*

The Ālaṅkārikas ( rhetorcians ) recognise various other distinctions of *Lakṣaṇā*. A brief account of them is given below.

That *Lakṣaṇā* which is based on similarity ( *sādṛśya* ) is called *gauṇī.*[1]

That man is an ox.

Here the meaning is,

That man is as dull as an ox.

Here the differences of form etc. have been ignored and attention is focussed on the essential point of similarity, i.e., slowness of understanding. Thus it is a case of *gauṇī lakṣaṇā.*[1]

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[1] sādṛśyāt tu matā gauṇī. —SD. ( 2.10 )

The essence of *gauṇī lakṣaṇā* lies in *upacāra*, i.e., non-cognizance of distinction between different objects in view of some essential similarity. The poeticians call such identification between two different things by the name of *Rūpaka Alaṅkāra.*

It differs from *upamā alaṅkāra* in the same way as metaphor differs from simile. The distinction may be exemplified in this way.

That man is *like* an ox. ( *Upamā* )

That man is an ox. ( *Rūpaka* )

Thus a *gauṇī lakṣaṇā* may be characterised as a suppressed simile ( in which the point of resemblance is implicit, e.g.

That child is fire.

( i.e. as brilliant as fire )

She is honey.

( i.e. as sweet as honey )

*Śuddhā Lakṣaṇā* is that which is based on some relation other than similarity, e.g., causality. ( *kārya-kāraṇa sambandha* ) etc.[2]

For example

*Ghee* is life.

---

[1] Gaurvāhīkaḥ atra gavā buddhimāndyadau sādṛśyāt jaḍa ityarthaḥ lakṣhyate.

[2] sādṛśyetara sambandhaḥ
śuddhāstāḥ sakalā api –Ibid ( 2.9 ).

Here *ghee* is identified with life not because it is like life but because it is life-giving.

Such expression as

Old age is misery,
( i.e. the cause of misery );
Virtue is happiness,
( i.e. the cause of happiness )

can be brought under this category.

## 5. *Upādāna Lakṣaṇā and Lakṣaṇa Lakṣaṇā*

*Upādāna Lakṣaṇā* has been defined by Mammaṭa as that in which there is an imposition of some other word ( *parākṣepa* ) in order to make its own meaning clear.[1] For example.

Spears are entering.

Here the spears being inanimate weapons are incapable of entering by themselves. Hence an imposition ( *ākṣepa* ) of some other word is necessary to make the meaning possible. Thus the word 'spears' here should be taken in the sense of 'spearsmen'. If such an imposition ( of the word 'man' ) is not made, the sentence cannot be meaningful.[2]

When a white horse is running, we say

"The white is running".

---

[1] svasiddhaye parākṣepaḥ
syād upādānalakṣaṇā. —KP. ( 2.10 )

[2] atra kuntānāṁ śastraviśeṣaṇām
acetanānāṁ praveśanakriyā kartṛtvāsaṁbhavāt. –Ibid.

8

Here the white colour is incapable of running. So the meaning has to be constructed with the help of some other word ( the horse ) which can make the sentence meaningful.

Hence *upādāna lakṣaṇā* has been defined as that in which the imposition ( *ākṣepa* or *adhyāhāra* ) of some other word is necessary to render the sentence intelligible.[1]

*Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* has been defined as that which gives up its own original meaning for rendering intelligibility to another word.[2] For example :

Bengal is brave.

Here the word 'Bengal' gives up its original meaning ( i.e. the land called Bengal ) and assumes another meaning ( i.e. the inhabitants of Bengal ). This renunciation of its own meaning ( *svasya arpaṇam* ) has been done to make the meaning of the other word ( i.e. brave ) possible.

This distinction between *upādāna lakṣaṇā* and *lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* can be understood by analysing the examples of each.

( 1 ) The white is running.

( 2 ) Bengal is brave.

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[1] mukhyārthasyetarākṣepo
vākyārthānvayasiddhaye,
syādātmanopyupādānāt
eṣopādānalakṣaṇā. —SD.

[2] arpaṇam svasya vākyārthe
parasyānvayasiddhaye,
upalakṣaṇahetutvād
eṣā lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā. —Ibid. ( 2.7 )

Mādhavācārya in his *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha* explains the distinction between the two in the following manner. When we say "the white is running" or "spears are coming" the words 'white' and 'spears' do retain their original meaning ; only their operation is made possible by positing some other words which make the sentence meaningful. But in the case of *lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* the literal meaning of a word is abandoned and replaced by another meaning, i.e., 'the people of Bengal' or 'the men seated in the gallery'.

Thus it can be seen that while the former ( i.e. *upādāna lakṣaṇā* ) is a case of *ajahat svārthā lakṣaṇā*, the latter ( i.e. *lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* ) is a case of *jahatsvārthā lakṣaṇā*.[1]

## 6. *Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā Lakṣaṇā* :

*Sāropā lakṣaṇā* has been defined as that in which the identity of the subject ( *viṣaya* ) on which the imposition ( *āropa* ) has been made is not swallowed up ( *nigīrṇa* ) by that which is imposed ( *āropyamāna* )[2]. For example, when it is said :

Food is god.

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[1] svārthāparityāgena parārtha
grahaṇaṃ upādānaṃ.
svārthaparityāgena parārtha
grahaṇaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ iti. —SDS.

[2] viṣayasyānigīrṇasyā-
nyatādātmyapratītikṛt
sāropā syāt nigīrṇasya
matā sādhyāvasānikā. –Ibid.

the subject (i.e., food) on which the imposition is made is not swallowed up by that which is imposed (i.e. God). Hence it is a case of *sāropā lakṣaṇā.*

*Sādhyavasānā* is defined as that in which the imposition made is completely swallowed up (*nigīrṇa*) by that which is imposed on it. For example, when somebody says :

Destroy the thorns

(meaning thereby, "Destroy the enemies.")
The word 'enemy' (which is the subject or *viṣaya* of imposition is not explicitly mentioned here. It is swallowed up by the *viṣaya* (i.e. the thorn) which is imposed (*āropita*) on the *viṣaya* (i.e. enemy). This is a case of *sādhyavasānā lakṣaṇā.*[1]

## 7. *Vyañjanā (implication)*

*Vyañjanā* is that capacity of suggestiveness of implication which differs both from *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā.*

Let as try to understand it with the help of an example.

The sun has set.

The primary meaning of the sentence is quite clear. It means sunset pure and simple.

If the sentence is intended to carry a figurative meaning, it may mean a glorious man has died. This is the secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*).

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[1] sāropānyā tu yatroktau
viṣayaḥ viṣayī tathā
viṣayyāntaḥ kṛtenyasmin
sā syāt sādhyāvasānikā. —KP. (2.14)

But a third kind of meaning is also possible here.

The sun has set.

This proposition may carry different suggestions to different persons in different contexts. To a student, it may mean that it is high time to close up the studies. To a herdsman, it may mean that it is time to drive cattle home. Such kind of meaning as suggested by a sentence is known as *vyañgyārtha.*

The above sentence can carry different suggestions in different situations. It is not possible to enumerate them exhaustively. It is difficult to define *vyañgyātha* in a clear-cut way. It can be described in a general way by saying that when the *abhidhā* ( i.e. the primary potency of a word ) has performed its function and the *vācyārtha* ( literal meaning ) is known, it gives rise to an implication which is known as *vyañjanā*[1].

## 8. *Śābdī Vyañjanā*

Rhetoricians recognise two varieties of *vyañjanā*, viz.

( i ) *Śābdī vyañjanā*

( ii ) *Ārthī vyañjanā.*

The *vyañjanā* is called *śābdī* if the implication arises from some specific word ( *śabdaviśeṣa* ). It is called *ārthī* if the implication arises from the meaning of the sentence as a whole and not from any specific word.

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[1] viratasvabhidhādyāsu
yathārtho bodhyate paraḥ.
sā vṛttir vyañjanā nāma
śabdasyārthādikasya ca. —SD. ( 2.12 )

Let us try to understand the distinction clearly. Some words are such as carry more than one meaning. For example, the Sanskrit word "*bhūdhara*" means a mountain as well as a king. If some one says,

*Dūrataḥ bhūdharāḥ ramyāḥ*

Bhūdharas are pleasant only from a distance, the sentence is pregnant with a double meaning. The explicit meaning is

"It is a difficult task to climb mountain". But the implicit suggestion is,

"Live at a respectable distance from the Kings."

Such a suggestion would not have been possible, had the word '*bhūdhara*' been substituted by any synonym such as '*parvata*' which lacks the other meaning. Hence the suggestive force lies in the equivocal word '*bhūdhara*'. Thus it is the use of an ambiguous word ( *anekārthaka śabda* ) which gives rise to a pun ( *śleṣa* ). It is this ambiguity of meaning caused by an equivocal expression which lies at the root of *śabdī vyañjanā*.

*Śābdī vyañjanā* is of two kinds, viz.[1]

( i ) *Abhidhāmūlā* ( i.e. dependent on primary meaning ).

( ii ) *Lakṣaṇāmūlā* (dependent on secondary meaning).

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[1] abhidhā lakṣaṇāmūla śabdasya
vyañjanā dvidhā. –Ibid. ( 2.13 )

In the above example, the suggestiveness depends on the literal meaning (*vācyārtha*) of the word '*bhūdhara*'. Hence it is *abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā*.[1]

When the suggestiveness depends upon the figurative meaning ( *lakṣyārtha* ) it is called *lakṣaṇāmūlā*, e.g.,

The village is on the Ganges.

Here the *lakṣyārtha* is "the village lies on the bank of the Ganges" and the *vyañgyārtha* is

"The village is cool and pure"[2]

This kind of *vyañjanā* which depends on *lakṣaṇā* is known as *lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā*.[3]

## 9. *Ārthī Vyañjanā*

When the suggested meaning depends not on any particular word used literally or figuratively but on the sense of the entire sentence taken as a whole, the *vyañjanā* is called *ārthī*. For example, take the sentence,

The sun has set.

The different suggestions arising from the sentence as exemplified earlier do not emanate from any ambiguity or figurative use of any word in the sentence. It emanates from the meaning of the sentence as a whole. But though the primary meaning is one and the same, it can have innumerable implications.

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[1] **anekārthasya śabdasya saṁygādyāḥ tu**
**niyantritāḥ. ekalārthe nyadha hetuḥ**
**vyañjanā sābhidhāśrayā. –Ibid. ( 2.14 )**

[2] **Gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ iti prayoge**
**śaityapāvanatvādi pratītiḥ**
**lakṣaṇamūlā vyañjanā. —KP.**

[3] **lakṣaṇopāsyate yasya**
**kṛte tattu prayojanam**
**yayā pratyāyate sā śyāt**
**vyañjanā lakṣaṇāśrayā. —SD. ( 2.15 )**

Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and others have enumerated various factors or conditions that determine the *ārthī vyañjanā* i.e. the implication carried by the meaning of the sentence.[1]

For example, the nature of the speaker, ( *vaktṛ-vaiśiṣṭya*), the nature of the bearer (*boddhavya vaiśiṣṭya*), the proximity of some other sentence ( *anya vākya sannidhi* ), the place ( *deśa* ), time ( *kāla* ). The intonations and gesticulations ( *kāku ceṣṭā etc.* ) of the speaker are also the determinants of *ārthī vyañjanā.*

The point may be illustrated with the help of some examples taken from common experience.

If the sentence

The sun has set

is spoken by a devout Jaina ( who does not take food after sunset ) the suggested meaning may be,

"I shall not eat now".

If the sentence be spoken by a devout Muslim who has observed his Roza fast, it may mean,

"I shall eat now".

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[1] **vaktṛ boddhavya vākyānāṃ**
**anyasannidhi vācyayoḥ,**
**prastāva deśakālānām**
**kākośceṣṭādikasya ca.**
**vaiśiṣṭyādanyamarthaṃ yā**
**bodhayet sārthasaṁbhavā.** **–Ibid. ( 12.16 )**

Similarly, the meaning is also determined by the nature of the person to whom the sentence is spoken. For example, if the sentence

"The sun has set", is spoken to an evening walker, it may mean

"You should go out now".

If it is spoken to one who is suffering from night-blindness, it may mean,

"You should not go out now."

If spoken in a village home to a house-wife, it may mean

"Burn the lamp now."

If spoken to a dancing girl in a street brothel, it may mean.

"Decorate yourself now."

In a temple, it may mean–

"Prepare for evening worship".

In a thieves' den, it may mean

"Prepare for nocturnal adventures."

In the midst of wood-cutters in a forest, it may mean

"It is high time to leave the jungle now".

In the midst of a hunting party, it may mean, "It is high time to enter into the thick of the jungle."

Thus the time, place and other circumstances in which a sentence is spoken determine the meaning as intended by the speaker.

The various factors enumerated above are neither exclusive nor exhaustive.

They simply serve as guide-lines to help one in deciphering the intended meaning in specific situations as far as possible.

## 10. *Can vyañjanā be reduced to inference ?*

The logicians do not recognise *vyañjanā* as an independent *vṛtti*. The various circumstances in which a sentence is spoken and the multifarious subjective associations that can arise therefrom are incapable of exhaustive enumeration.

Hence no hard and fast rule can be laid down about *vyaṅgyārtha* ( implied meaning ). As it is not a matter of fixed connotation, it is of little logical importance to the logicians.

Some logicians try to reduce *vyañjanā* to inference ( *anumiti* ). The great Naiyāyika Mahima Bhaṭṭa in his *Vyakti Viveka* argues that the *vyaṅgyārtha* ( implied meaning ) is nothing but the inferred meaning ( *anumitārtha* ). He illustrates his point by bringing the examples of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* given by Ānanda Vardhana Ācārya under the syllogistic form. He has also pointed out many defects in the definition of *dhvani*. His arguments, however, have been refuted to by Mammaṭa Ācārya in his *Kavyā Prakāśa*. The main point urged by the latter is that the implied meaning cannot be characterised as inferential, because the relation of *vyāpti* cannot be established in such cases.

The great Vaiyākaraṇa Vyāḍi in his *Saṅgraha* as quoted by Puṇya Rāja in his *ṭīkā* on *Vākyapadīyam* of Bhartṛhari is of the view that no word has an absolute fixed meaning. The meaning is determined by the sense of the sentence as intended by the speaker.[1]

### *Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa as quoted by Mammaṭa*

Mammaṭa is of the view that the meaning of a word is what is intended by the speaker.[2] He holds that just as the same arrow first pierces the amulet, then the coat and then the heart, similarly the same word that is used first denotes the *vācyārtha*, then indicates the *lakṣyārtha* and finally implies the *vyaṅgyārtha*. As the arrow has only one power (and not three) similarly the word also has only one power ( *vṛtti* ) that operates in all the three stages.

But such a view would obliterate all distinctions of *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*. So let us try to understand the distinction between the threefold *vṛtti* clearly.

### 11. *How does Vyañjanā differ from Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā ?*

( i ) Distinction between *vācyārtha* and *vyaṅgyrātha*.

The main point of distinction between *vācyārtha* and *vyaṅgyārtha* lies in the fact that while the former is the same for all, the latter varies according to the nature of the context or the intention of the speaker[3].

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[1] na hi kiñcit padaṃ nāma rupeṇa
niyataṃ kvacit,
padāṇāmartharūpaṃ tu
vākyārthādeva jāyate. —VS.

[2] yatparaḥ śabdaḥ saḥ eva śabdārthaḥ. —KP. ( 5.47.69 )

[3] Sarvān prati ekarūpaḥ iti viṣayo'sau vācyārthaḥ tattat-prakaraṇa-vaktṛpratipatrādi sahāyatayā nānātvaṃ bhajate ( vyaṅgyārthaḥ ). —KP.

Sometimes the *vyaṅgyārtha* ( implied meaning ) is so different from the *vācyārtha* ( literal meaning ) that it may be suicidal to equate the two. For example

"Take poison, but do not take food in his house."

Here the *vācyārtha* (i.e. Take poison) is not actually meant by the speaker. It is only an emphatic way of saying : "Never take food in his house." The first clause is not meant to be taken separately apart from the whole sentence of which it is an integral part. Although there are two finite verbs and apparently two sentences, as a matter of fact, there is only one sentence ( *ekavākya* ). Here the *vyaṅgyārtha* or *tātparyārtha* is not only different from but quite opposed to the *vācyārtha* as denoted by the words "Take poison".

### ( ii ) *Distinction between Lakṣyārtha and Vyaṅgyārtha*

Some Logicians are of the view that *vyañjanā* need not be taken as a separate *vṛtti*, but may be subsumed under the category of *lakṣaṇā*. For in both cases there is a transition to another meaning *( artha-saṅkramaṇa )*. Then wherein lies the distinction between the two ?

Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya Prakāśa* has replied to the above charge by enumerating various points of distinction between *Lakṣyārtha* and *vyaṅgyārtha* the main among which are summarised below :—

( 1 ) The *lakṣyārtha* ( figurative meaning ) is almost definite ( *niyatārtha* ), but *vyaṅgyārtha* is not so.

( 2 ) The *lakṣyārtha* is taken recourse to when there is obstruction to the primary meaning *( mukhyārtha bādha )*. In *vyaṅgyārtha*, it is not so.

(3) *Lakṣaṇā* is related to the primary meaning (*mukhyārtha saṁbandha*). That is to say, *lakṣaṇā* is tailed (*pucchībhūta*) to *abhidhā* as it were. The *vyaṅgyārtha* is not always so.

(4) *Vyañjanā* always carries some purpose (*prayojana*) which is more or less hidden (*gūḍha*) and discernible only to one who can see that purpose. *Lakṣaṇā* is not always purposive. It may be conventional (*rūḍha*). It is only a purposive (*prayojanavatī*) *lakṣaṇā*, which can come under *vyañjanā*.

(5) *Vyañjanā* is wider than *lakṣaṇā*. *Vyaṅgyārtha* is based some times on primary meaning (*abhidhāmūlā*), sometimes on figurative meaning (*lakṣaṇāmūlā*) and sometimes independent of either. A simple twinkle of the eye may imply a lot.

From all these, it is clear that *vyañjanā* is different both from *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*.

In *vyañjanā* sometimes 'yes' may mean 'no' and vice versa.

The point may be illustrated by an example. A clever lady, who wishes to get rid of an unwanted lover (whom she knows to be a timid fellow) says to him "you can now come frequently to my house without any fear, for the dog of whom you were afraid has been killed last night by a tiger, who is hovering round this place these days.

The implied meaning (*vyaṅgyārtha* or *dhvani*) of this statement here is 'Do not come here any more'.

The Naiyāyika Mahima Bhaṭṭa tries to reduce the above *vyañjanā anumiti* ( inference ) in this way, "A place that is frequented by a tiger should not be visited by one who is timid like yourself.

This is such a place.

This should not be visited by a timid man ( like yourself ).

But such a reduction is not tenable, because the major premise cannot be established and the minor premise may not be true.

Besides, if the thing is said in so many words, there will be no *dhvani* at all. As a matter of fact, the rules of logic are inapplicable to poetic language. Inference is incapable of communicating *dhvani, rasa* etc.[1]

## 12. *Essential Elements of Poetic Language*

( Views of different schools of thought )

What constitutes the essence of poetry ( *kāvya* ) ? What are its main elements ? What are the characteristic features of poetic language ? Such questions are discussed at great length by the Ācāryas of Indian poetics. The different theories that have been held by them are brought under six schools of thought as mentioned below.

### ( 1 ) *The Rasa School*

According to this school of thought, the essence of poetry lies in *rasa*. Ācārya Viśvanātha in his *Sāhitya*

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[1] **nānumānaṃ rasādīnāṃ**
**vyaṅgyānāṃ bodhane kṣamaṃ.** —SD. ( 5.4 )

*Darpaṇa* defines poetry as that expression which is possessed of *Rasa.*[1]

Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha in his *Rasa Gaṅgādhara* defines it as that beautiful expression which produces charming aesthetic sense.[2]

*Rasa* literally means that which is tasted ( *rasyate iti rasaḥ* ). The quint-essence of poetic *rasa* is *camatkāra*, i.e., a literary charm that causes a delightful thrill.[3] Just as the sweet taste of grapes, honey, milk and sugar-cane juice etc. cannot be described in words,[4] similarly the *rasa* of *kāvya* also is indescribable. The extra-ordinary aesthetic pleasure arising from the beauty of expression in poetry ( *Kāvyānanda* ) is akin to Divine joy ( *Brahmānanda Sahodara* ). This unique ineffable *rasa* can be enjoyed only by those who possess the susceptibility by nature or nurture.[5]

Bharata Muni, the earliest propounder of *Nāṭya Śāstra* ( Dramaturgy ) has analysed the various factors involved in *rasa* in such terms as, *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārī bhāva*.

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1. vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam. —SD. ( 1.3 )
2. ramaṇīyārtha pratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam. —RG. ( 1.1. )
3. rasasya sāraḥ camatkāraḥ. —SD.
4. drākṣā mākṣika kṣīrekṣu prabhṛtiṣu madhurimābhedaḥ na śakyaḥ śabdaiḥ ākhyātum. —BT.
5. lokottara camatkāra prāṇaḥ kaiścit pramatṛbhiḥ svākāra vadabhinanatve nayamāsvādyate rasaḥ. —SD. ( 3.182 )

The producer ( *utpādaka* ) of the chief aesthetic sentiment ( *sthāyī bhāva* ), e.g., love ( *rati* ) aroused by an erotic poem is called *vibhāva*. The basic support of the emotion ( e.g. the heroine ) is known as *ālambana vibhāva*. The exciting or stimulating cause ( e.g. sweet music ) is known as *uddīpana vibhāva*. The external physical expression ( e.g. an affectionate look ) which is an indicator ( *gamaka* ) of the inner feeling is *anubhāva*. The varying, fleeting features ( e.g., blush, tremor etc. ) which accompany and nourish the main emotion are known as *vyabhicārī* or *sañcārī bhāva*. These factors ( *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārī bhāva* ) combined together give rise to *rasa*.[1]

The above elements are blended together in *rasa* just as the various ingredients ( e.g. sugar, fruit, juice, spices etc. ) are mixed up in a delicious drink.[2]

Different theories of *rasa* have been propounded by different Ācāryas, e.g.,

( i ) *Utpattivāda* ( theory of origin of rasa ) of Lollaṭa Bhaṭṭa.

( ii ) *Anumitivāda* ( theory of inferential character of rasa ) of Śrī Śaṅkuka.

( iii ) *Abhivyaktivāda* ( theory of manifestation of rasa ) of Abhinava Gupta.

But it is not necessary to enter into these details here.

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[1] vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicāri saṁyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ.
—NS.

[2] Tataḥ sammilitāḥ sarvaḥ vibhāvādiḥ sacetasām prapānaka rasonyāya carvyamāno raso bhavet. -SP. ( 3.16 )

The different kinds of *rasa* or aesthetic sentiments aroused by poetic literature are ( i ) *śṛṅgāra*, ( ii ) *hāsya* ( humour ), ( iii ) *karuṇa* ( pathos ), ( iv ) *vīra* ( heroic feeling ), ( v ) *bhayānaka* ( fear ), ( vi ) *bībhatsya* ( hatred ), ( vii ) *adbhuta* ( wonder ), and ( ix ) *śānta* ( calm ).

The most important of these is *śṛṅgāra rasa* which pervades most of poetical literature. Bhoja in his Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa regards it as the basic *rasa* in which all other *rasas* are rooted in some way or other. Even the Vedāntic concept of *rasa*[1] has been compared to the aesthetic joy arising from the embrace of the beloved.[2]

*Rasavāda* ( i.e. the view that *rasa* is the *sine qua non* of poetry ) is a most popular theory in Indian Poetics.

### ( 2 ) *The Rīti School*

According to this school of thought the soul of poetry is *rīti*.[3] The chief propounder of this view is Vāmana Ācārya, author of Kavyālaṅkāra Sūtra. By *rīti* he means a specialised mode of composition.[4] The speciality lies in *guṇa*.[5] The qualities that beautify poetry are *guṇas*.[6]

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[1] raso vai saḥ. —TU. ( 2.7 )

[2] yathā priyayā striyā sampariṣvakto nabāhyaṃ kiñcana veda nāntarameva. —BU. ( 4.3.21 )

[3] rītiḥ ātmā kāvyasya. —KS. ( 1.2.6 )

[4] viśiṣṭapada-racanā rītiḥ. –Ibid. ( 1.2.7 )

[5] viśeṣaḥ guṇātmā. –Ibid. ( 1.2.8 )

[6] kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāraḥ dharmāḥ guṇāḥ. –Ibid. ( 3.2.1 )

The *Guṇus* are—

( i ) *Mādhurya* ( sweetness of expression )
( ii ) *Ojas* ( vigour of expression )
( iii ) *Prasāda* ( felicity of expression )

The threefold *rītis* corresponding to the above *guṇas* are known as—

( i ) *Vaidarbhī*, ( ii ) *Gauḍī*, ( iii ) *Pāñcālī*.

Udbhaṭa Ācārya calls it *( guṇa )* by the name of *vṛtti*. The threefold *vṛttis* are—

( i ) *Upanāgarikā*—consisting of soft-sounding expressions appropriate for tender feeling.
( ii ) *Paruṣā*—consisting of harsh-sounding expression appropriate for heroic moods.
( iii ) *Grāmyā*—consisting of easy popular expressions appropriate for peaceful disposition of the common folk.

*Rīti* is called *mārga* by Daṇḍī Ācārya in his *Kavyādarśa*, *Saṅghaṭṭanā* by Ānanda Vardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka* and *Avayava saṁsthāna* by Mammata in his *Kāvya Prakāśa.*

Vāmana Ācārya regards *rīti* as a stable quantity *( sthira dharma )* and *alaṅkāra* as a variable quality *( asthira dharma )* which only sets off the beauty of poetry and does not constitute it.[1] Ornaments of speech are of no avail, if the poetry lacks *rīti*, i.e., the appropriate style of composition.

### ( 3 ) *The Vakrokti School*

According to this school of thought the essential feature of poetic expression is *vakrokti*. The main exponent of this view is Kuntaka Ācārya, author of *Vakrokti jīvita.* He defines *vakrokti* as that kind of artistic expression which suggests something in an ingenious way.[1]

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[1] tadātiśayya-hetavaḥ tu alaṅkārāḥ. —KS. ( 3.1.2 )

Daṇḍī Ācārya in his *Kāvyādarśa* distinguishes between two ways of expression.[2]

( i ) *Svabhāvokti* ( direct way of saying something ).

( ii ) *Vakrokti* ( indirect way of saying something ).

Anything that is said in an ironical, satirical, sarcastic or witty manner comes under the category of *vakrokti.*

An example of *vakrokti* is given here.

Can a leopard change its spots ?

Here the tone of the question implies that it cannot, such an utterance as implies a negative answer to an affirmative question and vice versa is called *kāku vakrokti.*

The word 'spot' is ambiguous ( meaning 'mark' as well as 'place' ).

If some one witly takes the other meaning ( i.e. place ) and replies. "Yes, the leopard can change its spots, when it goes from one spot to another." It will be a case of *śleṣa vakrokti* ( i.e. a crooked pun ). According to some these two ( i.e. *kāku* and *śleṣa* ) are the main types of *vakrokti.*[3]

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[1] vakroktireva vaidagdhya bhaṅgī bhaṇitirucyate.
—VJ. ( 1.10 )

[2] svabhavoktir vakroktiśceti
vāṅmayaṃ dvidhā. —K. ( 2.3.63 )

[3] anyasyānyarthakaṃ vākyaṃ,
anythā yojyate yadi
anyaḥ śleṣeṇa kāvyā vā
sā vakroktiḥ ( dvidha matā ). —SD. ( 10.9 )

*Vakrokti* is regarded as one of the *alaṅkāras* by most poeticians. But Kuntaka Ācārya gives it an independent status as something that underlies all poetic expressions. Ācārya Bhāmaha also emphasises the importance of *vakrokti* in his *Kāvyālaṅkāra Sūtra* and says : "What *alaṅkāra* is of any significance without *vakrokti* ?"[1]

## ( 4 ) *The Dhvani School*

According to this school of thought the soul of poetry is *dhvani*.[2] The chief propounder of this theory is Ānanda Vardhana, author of *Dhvanyāloka*. *Dhvani* is defined as that in which the *vyaṅgyārtha* ( implied meaning ) far excels the *vācyārtha* ( literal meaning ). It is the excellence of *vyañjanā* that determines the excellence of poetry. It is *Dhvani Kāvya* which is deemed as good poetry.[3]

If the *vyaṅgya* is not secondary *( guṇībhūta )* but the chief *( mukhya )* meaning, the expression is deemed as of greater merit.[4]

Ānanda Vardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka* characterises *dhvani* as that which generates pleasures in the mind of one who is possessed of aesthetic sensibility[5].

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[1] saiṣā sarvatra vakroktiḥ
anayārtho vibhāvyate.
yatno'syāṃ kavinā kāryaḥ
ko'laṅkāro'nayā vinā. —KS. ( 2.85 )

[2] kāvyasya ātmā dhvaniḥ. —D. ( 1.1 )

[3] vācyātiśāyini-vyaṅgye dhvanistat kāvyamuttamam. –Ibid.

[4] idamuttamatiśāyini-vyaṅgye
vācyāddhvanirbudhaiḥ kathitaḥ. —KP. ( 1.4 )

[5] sahṛdayamanaḥprītaye tatsvarūpam. —D.

*Dhvani* is related to poetry as posture ( *mudrā* ) is related to beauty. It is appreciable by those who are susceptible ( *sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-saṁvedya* ).

The importance of *dhvani* in poetry has been recognised by such Ācāryas an Abhinava Gupta in his *Dhvanyāloka Locana*, by Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* and by Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya Prakāśa*.

The *Dhvanivādins* have made subtle distinctions between *dhvanis* of different types. Dhvani is classified undeı three heads, viz.,

( i ) arising from the force of word ( *śabda-śaktyuttha* ).
( ii ) arising from the force of meaning ( *artha-śaktyuttha* ).
( iii ) arising from the force of both ( *ubhaya-śaktyuttha* ).

Again, it is subdivided into
( i ) *Vastudhvani*
( ii ) *Alaṅkāra dhvani*
( iii ) *Rasadhvani*

It is further distinguished as
( i ) *Saṁlakṣyakrama*
and ( ii ) *Asaṁlakṣyakrama*

Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya Prakāśa* has described 51 varieties of *Dhvani* and calculated their combinations and permutations numbering above ten thousand. It is not necessary to enter into such details here.[1]

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[1] bhedastadekapañcāśat, teṣām anyonyayojane.
vedo svābdhi viyaccandraḥ
śareṣu yugasvendavaḥ. —KP. ( 10.455 )

### ( 5 ) *The Aucitya School*

According to this school of thought it is *aucitya* ( propriety or fitness ) that constitutes the life of poetry.[1]

The chief exponent of this view is Ācārya Kṣemendra, author of *Aucitya Vicāra Carcā*. It is *Anaucitya* ( impropriety or discord of one thing with another ) that gives rise to *rasabhaṅga* ( breach of aesthetic joy ).[2]

A good poetry is that which is free from defect ( *doṣa* ) of any kind. Hemachandra in his *Kāvyānuśāsana* defines poetry as that which is flawless ( *adoṣa* ), possessed of quality ( *saguṇa* ) and decorated by figures of speech ( *sālaṅkāra* ).[3]

If the body of the poetry is word and meaning ( *śabdārthau* ), its soul is *rasa* and its ornament is *alaṅkāra*, the sustaining life-force is *aucitya* or fitness. This view is upheld by some great masters of Indian Poetics, who have defined poetry ( *kāvya* ) in terms of *adoṣau śabdārthau*, i.e., flawless words and meanings.

Mammaṭa, Viśvanātna and other Ācāryas also have enumerated the various defects ( *doṣas* ) that vitiate poetry. A defect whether of a sentence ( *vākya* ) or term ( *pada* ) or of a part thereof ( *padāṁśa* )

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1. aucityaṁ rasa siddhasya sthiram
   kāvyasya-jīvitaṃ. —AVC. ( 1.5 )
2. anaucityādṛte nānyat rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam. —D. ( 3.15 )
3. adoṣau saguṇau sālaṅkārau ca sabdārthau kāvyam. —KA.

detracts from the *rasa*[1]. They are multifarious and incapable of exhaustive enumeration. Nevertheless some types of defects are mentioned below. The poetic language should be free from such defects as—

( i ) *Duḥśravatva* ( or *Śrutikaṭutva* ) ( harshness of words causing unpleasantness to the ear ).
( ii ) *Āślīlatā* ( obscenity of expression ).
( iii ) *Anaucitārthatā* ( impropriety of meaning ).
( iv ) *Aprayuktatā* ( obsoleteness of expression ).
( v ) *Grāmyatā* ( vulgarity of expression ).
( vi ) *Apratīti* ( unfamiliarity of expression ).
( vii ) *Sandigdhatā* ( doubtfulness of meaning ).
( viii ) *Neyārthatā* ( farfetchedness of meaning ).
( ix ) *Nihatārthatā* ( stultification of meaning ).
( x ) *Avācakatā* ( unintelligibility ).
( xi ) *Kliṣṭatā* ( obscurity of expression ).
( xii ) *Viruddhamati Kāritva* ( conveying opposite meaning ).
( xiii ) *Avimṛṣṭa vidheyatva* ( in-aptitude of predicate in the sentence ).
( xiv ) *Nirarthakatva* (meaninglessness of expression).
( xv ) *Cyuta Saṁskāratva* ( grammatical or idiomatic error due to disuse ).
( xvii ) *Punaruktatva* ( repetition of the same thing ).

Kṣemendra in his *Aucitya Vicāra Carcā* has described 28 kinds of *aucitya* (fitness) with regard to *Rasa*, *Alaṅkāra*, *Guṇa*, *Pada*, *Vākya* etc. and has tried to show elaborately how defects should be avoided in poetry.[2]

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4. rasāpakarṣaḥ doṣaḥ. —SD. ( 7.1 )

2. For fuller details, see *Kāvya Prakāśa* and *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* ( chapter VII of each ).

### ( 6 ) *The Alaṅkāra School*

According to this school of thought, poetry is ornamentation of expression, i.e., decoration of language with help of *alaṅkāras*. *Alaṅkāra* literally means 'that which adorns'.[1] The *alaṅkāras* are ornaments of speech that beautify poetry.[2] Figures of speech, e.g. *anuprāsa* ( alliteration ), *upamā* ( simile ) etc. are like such ornaments as the necklace etc.[3]

They embellish *rasa* etc. in the same way as an armlet adorns the arm.[4] As Bhāmaha puts it, *kāvya* without *alaṅkāra* is like a lady without ornament.

Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya Prakāśa* admits the possibility of *kāvya* without *alaṅkāra*.[5] But Jayadeva in his *Candrāloka* retorts by saying that *kāvya* without *alaṅkāra* is as fire without heat.[6]

Alaṅkāras are of two kinds, viz.

( 1 ) Śabdālaṅkāra ( ornamental word ).
( 2 ) Arthālaṅkāra ( ornamental meaning ).

In the former, the beauty of expression is caused by some specific word or words. If they are replaced by other words, the charm will be gone. In the latter, the beauty depends on the meaning of the sentence as a whole and the charm will continue even if the words are substituted by their synonyms. In short, while the latter is tolerant of change ( *parivartana sahiṣṇu* ) the farmer is not so.

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[1] alaṃ karoti iti alaṅkāraḥ.

[2] kāvya-śobhākarān dharmān alaṅkārān pracakṣate.

[3] hārādivadalaṅkārāḥ anuprāsopamādayaḥ. —KP. (8.67)

[4] rasādīnupakurvante'laṅkārāste'ngadādivat. —SD, ( 10.1 )

[5] *analaṅkṛtī kvāpi.* —KP. ( 1.4 )

[6] aṅgīkaroti yaḥ kāvyaṃ śabdārthau analaṅkṛtau
asau na manyate kasmāt anuṣṇamanalaṁkṛtī. —C.

Some examples of both types are given below.

( 1 ) *Śabdālaṅkāra*

( a ) *Anuprāsa* ( alliteration )

Where the effect arises from the phonetic resemblance *( dhvani sāmya )*[1], e.g.

King Kong is playing *ping pong.*

Here, the pleasing effect is due to the rhyming words. If the italicized word is replaced by *table tennis,* the effect will be gone.

There are many varieties of *anuprāṣa.* The constant repetition of the same initial letters in the following verse is an example of *vṛtti-anuprāsa.*

"Begot by butcher, by Bishop bred.
How high, His Highness holds his haughty head. !"

( b ) *Yamaka* ( the repetition of the same word-sound in the same order but in different meanings )[2].

E.g. : Duty and *due tea* go together.

If the italicized words are replaced by "proper refreshment", the charming effect will disappear.

( c ) *Śleṣa* ( pun ), where the charm is caused by the equivocal nature of a word[3], e.g.

Whether life is worth living depends on the *liver.*

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[1] varṇa-sāmyam anuprāsaḥ. —KP. ( 9.104 )

[2] krameṇa tenaiva vṛttiḥ yasyām vinigadyate. –SD. (10.8)

[3] śleṣaḥ sa vākye ekasmāt yatrānekāntatā bhavet. —SD. ( 10.96 )

Here the beauty lies in the italicized word which is pregnant with a double meaning. If it is substituted by some such word as 'the digestive organ', the charm will vanish.

(d) *Virodhābhāsa* (paradox) where the apparent contradiction has a puzzling effect,[1] e.g.

"If you keep to the left, you are sure to be *right*."

If the underlined word here is substituted by 'correct' the charming effect will be gone.

(2) *Arthālaṅkāra*

Let us have an example.

"She is beautiful."

This idea can be expressed in different ways with the help of different figures of speech, e.g.

(a) She is as lovely as a rose.

(b) She is an angel.

(c) Is she a woman or a fairy ?

(d) She is not an earthly creature, but a goddess alighted on the earth.

(e) The moon blushes to see her.

(f) She is like herself.

(g) When she comes, it appears as if Venus has come back to life.

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[1] virodhaḥ so'virodhe'pi
virodhatvena yadvacaḥ. —KP. (10.164)

( h ) When she goes out in a dark night, it turns into a full-moon night.

Let us analyse the figures of speech that are present in the above expressions.

In ( a ) the person who is compared ( *upameya* ), i.e., 'She' and the object to which it is compared ( *upamāna* ) is rose. The point of resemblance ( *sādharmya* ) is loveliness. Such a simile is called *upamā alaṅkāra.*[1]

In ( b ) the *upameya* ( she ) has been identified with the *upamāna* ( angel ), such metaphorical identification of the one with the other is known as *rūpaka alaṅkāra.*[2]

In ( c ) the interrogation serves to emphasise the indistinguishability of the *upameya* ( she ) from the *upamāna* ( fairy ).

Such a rhetorical doubt is known as *sandeha alaṅkāra.*[3]

In ( d ) the *upameya* ( she ) has been denied and the *upamāna* ( goddess ) has been pointed in her place. Such a rhetoric denial of that which is present in favour of something else that is not there is *apahnuti alaṅkāra.*[1]

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[1] **sāmyaṃ vācyamavaidharmyaṃ**
**vākyaikyaṃ upamā dvayaḥ. —SD. ( 10.14 )**

[2] **tadrūpakamabhedo 'yamupameyopamānayoḥ.**
**—KP. ( 10.39 )**

[3] **sandehaḥ prakṛtenyasya saṁśayaḥ pratibhotthitaḥ.**
**—SD. ( 10.35 )**

In ( e ) the *upamāna* ( moon ) has been shown to be inferior to the *upameya* ( lady ). Such an insult to the *upamāna* in order to show off the excellence of *upameya* is known as *pratīpa alaṅkāra.*[2]

In ( f ) the *upameya* ( she ) has been compared to herself, because there is no parallel to her. Such a rhetoric self-comparison is called *ananvaya alaṅkāra.*[3]

In ( g ) the *upameya* has been conceived with the help of an image that has been projected by a poetic fancy. Such imagination of possibility ( indicated by 'as if' ) is a case of *utprekṣā alaṅkāra.*[4]

In ( h ) the difference *( bheda )* between the *upameya* and *upamāna* has been swallowed up to such an extent that the function of the latter has been attributed to the former. Such fantastic exaggeration or hyperbolic expression is called *atiśayokti alaṅkāra.*[5]

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[1] yatkṛtam yan niṣidhya'nyat sādhyat sā tvapahnutiḥ.
—KP. ( 10.146 )

[2] ākṣepaḥ upamānasya pratīpam. –KP. ( 10.133 )

[3] upamanopameyatvamekasyaiva tvananvyaḥ.
—SD. ( 10.26 )

[4] bhāvāt saṁbhāvanotprekṣā prakṛtasya parātmanā.
–Ibid. ( 10.40 )

[5] siddhatve' dhyavasānasyātiśayoktir nigadyate.
–Ibid. ( 10.46 )

There is a large variety of *alaṅkāras* and their subdivision, the distinctions of which have been discussed in meticulous details by the great Ācāryas. The number of *alaṅkāras* vary in different treatises on poetics. It is 37 in the *Kāvyādarśa* of Daṇḍī Ācārya, 39 in the *Kāvyālaṅkāra* of Bhāmah, 62 in the *Alaṅkāra Kaustubha* of Viśveśvara, 68 in the *Kāvya Prakāśa* of Mammaṭa, 70 in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, 86 in the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* of Viśvanātha, 109 in the *Candrāloka* of Jayadeva and 125 in the *Kuvalayānanda* of Appaya Dīkṣita.

The elaborate distinctions and subdistinctions of *alaṅkāra*, *dhvani* etc. undoubtedly constitute a most valuable contribution in the field of poetic analysis and eminently deserve the attention of modern analysts.

## CHAPTER FIVE

# THE NAVYA NYĀYA ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION

### 1. *The Navya Nyāya Technique of Analysis*

The Navya Nyāya way of analysing a proposition consists in splitting the contents ( *viṣayatā* ) of the knowledge embodied therein into substantivity ( *viśeṣyatā* ), adjectivity *(prakāratā)* and relation *(saṁsargatā)*. The purpose of such analysis is to bring out the meaning of the sentence ( *vākyārtha* ) in a clear and precise manner.

In order to understand the Navya Nyāya technique of analysis it is necessary to know first what is meant by *viṣayatā*.

Let us take a simple proposition :

*Ayaṃ Ghaṭaḥ*

( This is a pot. )

The above propositition, like every other proposition, is the verbal expression of a knowledge ( *jñāna* ), which has some content ( *viṣaya* ).

A knowledge is described in terms of its contents. So the above proposition may be described as pot-knowledge ( *ghaṭa-jñāna* ) or knowledge relating to pot ( *ghaṭa-viṣayaka jñāna* ) or knowledge of the form : it is a pot ( *ghaṭa ityākāraka jñāna* ).

In the above proposition, the contentness *(viṣayatā)* lies in the pot ( i.e. it is *ghaṭaniṣṭha* ). Thus the above knowledge can be described as 'that knowledge which possesses contentness lying in the pot' ( *ghaṭaniṣṭha viṣayatā sā jñānam* ).

A knowledge in relation to its content ( *viṣaya* ) is called *viṣayī*, i.e., possessor of content. No determinate knowledge is contentless ( *nirviṣayaka* ). It is always with some content ( *saviṣayaka* ). A *viṣaya* ( content ) is always related to knowledge ( i.e. is *jñānīya* ). So *viṣayatā* ( contentness ) and *viṣayitā* ( content-possessionness ) are interdependent ( *anyonyāśrita* ) and mutually determined ( *paraspara nirūpita* ).[1]

Thus a pot-knowledge can be described as a knowledge that determines or describes a contentness lying in the pot ( *ghaṭaniṣṭha viṣayatā nirūpaka jñāna* ).

A knowledge ( *jñāna* ) implies a knower ( *jñātā* ) to whom it belongs ( i.e. in whom it resides ). It is related on the one hand to the knower and on the other hand to the known ( *viṣaya* ) and thus occupies an intermediary position between the two. It qualifies the former by whom it is possessed and is qualified by the latter which is possessed by it.

When I know a pot, for instance, the knowledge has two-fold aspects, viz.

( i ) The pot is ( *ghaṭaḥ asti* ).

( ii ) I know the pot ( *ahaṁ ghaṭaṁ jānāmi* ).

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[1] **viṣayatānirupyā hi viṣayitā**
**viṣayitānirupyā hi viṣayatā. –TC.**

The first knowledge which is object-oriented ( *bahirmukhī* ) is called *vyavasāya*; the second knowledge which is self-oriented ( *antarmukhī* ) is called *anuvyavasāya*.

The entire knowledge embodied in ( i ) is incorporated in ( ii ) which is knowledge about knowledge or meta-knowledge ( *jñāna viṣayaka jñāna* ).

Thus though the grammatical subject in ( i ) is the pot (*ghaṭaḥ*), the ultimate subject of the knowledge as expressed in ( ii ) is I ( *Aham*, i.e., the knower ). So the above knowledge can be analysed as "I am the locus of that knowledge which has a possessiveness as determined by the contentness lying in the pot" ( *ghaṭaniṣṭha viṣayatā nirūpita viṣayitāśāli yat jñānaṁ tadāśrayībhūto'haṃ* ).

## 2. *Analysis of Viṣayatā*

A *viṣaya* ( content ) is so called because it binds the knowledge in a specific way.[1]

*Viṣayatā* ( contentness ) involves threefold elements, viz. :

( i ) *Viśeṣyatā* ( substantivity )

( ii ) *Viśeṣaṇatā* or Prakāratā ( adjectivity )

( iii ) *Saṁsargatā* ( relationship )

A *viśeṣya* is a qualificand, i.e., that which is the base or substratum of some qualification or distinction.[2]

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[1] viśeṣeṇa sinoti iti viṣayaḥ. —NK.

[2] viśeṣeṇa śiṣyate iti viśeṣyam. –Ibid.

A *viśeṣaṇa* or *prakāra* is a qualifier, i.e., that which qualifies or distinguishes a *viśeṣa* in some way.[1]

It may be noted in this connection that *viśeṣaṇa* here is not exactly equivalent to what is usually meant by the word 'adjective' in grammar. It is used in a wider sense. It includes anything ( be it a noun or verb or any other part of speech ) that is used attributively or predicatively. For example, in the expression :

*Daṇḍī puruṣaḥ.*

( The man possessing a stick ), it is the stick *(daṇḍa)* which qualifies or distinguishes the man and thus serves as a *viśeṣaṇa* or *prakāra.*

A *viśeṣana* functions as *vyāvartaka* ( distinctive ). For example, in the expression,

*Nīlaḥ Ghaṭaḥ*

( Blue Pot )

'*Nīlaḥ*' ( blue ) distinguishes the pot from all other pots which are of non-blue ( *anīla* or *nīletara* ) colours, e.g., red, yellow, etc.

*Viśeṣaṇa* ( qualifier ) and *viśeṣya* ( qualificand ) are not divided into water-tight compartments. The same term may be a *viśeṣya* in one relation and as *viśeṣaṇa* in another. For example, in the expression 'blue pot', the pot serves as *viśeṣya* (substantive) which is qualified by the adjective 'blue'.

But in the sentence,

This is a pot

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[1] viśeṣeṇa śiṣyate anena iti viśeṣyam. –Ibid.

the term 'pot' is a predicate *( vidheya )* and thus functions as a *viśeṣaṇa* ( qualifier ) in relation to 'this' which is the subject *( uddeśya )* and a substantive *( viśeṣya )*.

In the sentence,

This is a blue pot,

the same 'Pot' which serves as a qualificand in relation to 'blue' serves as a qualifier in relation to 'this'.

The substantive-adjective relation *( viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa bhāva )* is a characteristic of all determinate knowledge. To know a thing is to know it as distinguished by some attribute. When we know a pot for instance, we know it as possessing a certain property, i.e., potness *( ghaṭatva )* which is a distinguishing feature of the pot *( ghaṭa )*. Thus the analysis of pot-knowledge reveals twofold factors, viz. :

( i ) the element of substantivity in the pot *( ghaṭa-niṣṭha viśeṣyatā )*

( ii ) the element of adjectivity in potness *( ghaṭatva-niṣṭha prakāratā* ).

Thus the pot-knowledge can be described as :

*Ghaṭatvaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpita ghaṭaniṣṭha viśeṣyatāśāli jñānam.*

i.e., a knowledge which possesses as its content a substantivity lying in the 'pot' as determined by an adjectivity lying in potness.

Thus even a simple knowledge ( like a pot-knowledge ) can be analysed in terms of *viśeṣaṇa* ( qualifier ) and *viśeṣya* ( qualificand ).

Hence knowledge is defined as an apprehension of substantive-adjective relation.[1]

A complex knowledge, e.g., a beautiful blue pot lying on the ground is nothing but a penetration into qualified qualification.[2]

The relationship ( *saṁsargatā* ) in which a *viśeṣaṇa* may stand to a *viśeṣya* is of different kinds, e.g. : *saṁyoga* ( contact ), *samavāya* ( inherence ) etc.

"The pot is blue."

Here the relation between 'blue' and 'pot' is that of inherence ( *samavāya* ), i.e., blueness is inherent in the pot.

The pot is on the ground.

Here the relation between the pot and the ground is that of contact ( *saṁyoga* ).

### 3. *Analysis of the Proposition* :*This is a pot*

Let us take the proposition

This is a pot.

( *ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ* )

Let us see how it can be analysed in terms of

( i ) *Viśeṣyatā* ( substantivity )

( ii ) *Prakāratā* ( adjectivity ) and

(iii) *Saṁsargatā* ( relationship ).

The main constituents of the above knowledge are

( i ) the thing referred to by 'this' which is a qualificand.

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[1] viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyāvagāhi jñānaṃ.

[2] viśiṣṭa vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānaṃ.

( ii ) the pot which serves as a predicate and thus serves as a qualifier.
( iii ) the relation of identity ( *tādātmya* ) between 'this' and 'pot'.

In other words, the ingredients of the knowledge are—

( i ) a substantivity lying in the object referred to by 'this' ( *idamartha niṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ).
( ii ) an adjectivity lying in the 'pot' ( *ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā* ).
( iii ) a relational element lying in identity ( *tādātmyaniṣṭha saṁsargatā* ).

The above knowledge can thus be described as
( i ) that which has 'this' as a qualificand ( *idaṃ viśeṣyaka* ).
( ii ) that which has 'pot' as a qualifier ( *ghaṭa prakāraka* ).
( iii ) that wich has identity as relation ( *tādātmya saṁsargaka* ).

*Viseṣyatā* and *prakāratā* are correlated ( *parasparākāṅkṣa* ) terms which are determined ( *nirūpita* ) by each other. The *prakāra* ( qualifier ) always stands in some relation to the *viśeṣya* ( qualificand ). Every *parkāratā* ( adjectivity ) is determined by some relationship (*saṁsargatā*). Thus *viśeṣyatā* ( substantivity ), *prakāratā* ( adjectivity ) and *saṁsargatā* ( relationship ) go together and are related by way of mutual detemination ( *nirūpya-nirūpaka bhāva* ).

Thus the proposition

*ayaṃ ghataḥ*
( This is a pot )

can be described as

tādātmyaniṣṭha-saṁsargatā-nirūpita-ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā-nirūpita-idamniṣṭhaviśeṣyatāśāli jñānaṃ, i.e., a knowledge having a substantive element lying in the object referred to by 'this' determined by the relation of identity.

Such a clarification of meaning ( *pariṣkāra* ) is done to avoid a possible confusion or misunderstanding. For example,

*ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*

may mean either:

(i) 'This is a pot', i.e., a 'this' qualified by 'pot', or
(ii) 'This pot', i.e., a 'pot' qualified by 'this'.

The mere syntactical position of the words in the expression

*ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*

does not indicate clearly which of the above two meanings is intended here. Hence a *pariṣkāra* ( clarification ) is needed.

( 1 ) The first meaning i.e., This is a pot, is clarified as *ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpita idamniṣṭha viśeṣyatā* as described earlier.

( 2 ) The second meaning is clarified as *idamniṣṭha prakāratā-nirūpita ghaṭa-niṣṭha viśeṣyatā.*

i.e., a substantivity lying in the pot as determined by an adjectivity lying in 'this'.

Why are such lengthy expressions as *ghaṭaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ( i.e. substantivity lying in the pot ) used in place of the simple word '*ghaṭa* ( pot ) ?

The answer is this. If one uses merely the word '*ghaṭa*' or 'pot', it is not clear whether it is used in the capacity of a substantive or adjective. Hence such expressions as *ghaṭaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ( substantivity lying in the pot ) and *ghaṭaniṣṭhaprakāratā* ( adjectivity lying in the pot ) are used to indicate clearly the specific role performed by the *ghaṭa* ( pot ) as a qualificand or as a qualifier in a particular context. Thus we find that such expressions, though apparently prolix, serve a useful purpose and should not be treated as mere verbosities.

It may be noted that the sequence of such terms in Sanskrit is usually like this :

> *saṁsargatā-prakāratā-viśeṣyatā*, i.e., ( relation ) ( adjectivity ) ( substantivity ).

Now each of these can be clarified further with the help of *avacchedakatā*. So this leads us to the question, what is meant by *avaacchedakatā*.

### 4. *The Meaning of Avacchedakatā*

The word *avacchedaka* ( derived from the root *chid* which means to split into two parts ) may roughly be translated as a 'limitor'. It serves as a distinguisher ( *vyāvartaka* ), determiner ( *nirūpaka* ), particulariser ( *viśeṣaka* ). It is an instrument of specification of meaning.

An *avacchedaka* is either in the form of

( i ) some distinguishing property ( *avacchedaka dharma* ), e.g., potness ( *ghaṭatva* ) or

( ii ) some distinguishing relation ( *avacchedaka saṁbandha* ), e.g., contact-relation ( *saṁyoga saṁbandha* ).

The word *avacchedaka* ( limitor ) is a relative *( sāpekṣa )* term which implies some *avacchedya* or *avacchinna* ( i.e. that which is limited. )

Thus *avacchedya-avacchedaka bhāva* ( limited-limitor relation ) like *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa bhāva* ( substantive-adjective relation ) or *nirūpya-nirūpaka bhāva* ( determined-determiner relation ) is a correlative expression that goes in pairs. Just as the word *'viśeṣaka'* ( qualifier ) gives rise to the question; 'qualifier of what' ? . and the word *'nirūpaka'* gives rise to the question, 'determiner of what' ?, similarly the word *avacchedaka* ( limitor ) gives rise to a question : 'limitor of what' ? Sometimes, it may be a limitor of some, substantivity *( viśeṣyatāvacchedaka );* sometimes it may be a limitor of some adjectivity *( prakāratāvacchedaka ),* sometimes it may be a limitor of some relation *( saṁsargatāvacchedaka ).*

The word that ends in *'avacchinna'* means 'limited by……', e.g., *'vahnitvāvacchinna'* means 'limited or specified by fireness', *'saṁyoga saṁbandhāvacchinna'* means 'limited or specified by contactness'.

### 5. *The Function of Avacchedakatā*

The most convenient way to understand the function of *avacchedakatā* will be to see its application. Let us see how it is applied in the case of

*ayaṃ ghaṭah*
( This is a pot. )

Here

( i ) the substantivity lying in 'this' *( idamniṣṭha viśeṣyatā )* is distinguished by 'thisness', ( i.e., *idamtvāvacccinna ).*

( ii ) the adjectivity lying in the pot ( *ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā* ) is distinguished by potness, ( i.e. *ghaṭatvācchinna* ).

( iii ) the relation between 'this' and 'pot' is distinguished by identityness, ( i.e., *tādātmya saṁbandhāvacchinna* ).

Thus the knowledge

*ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*

( This is a pot. )

can be analysed in terms of *avacchedakatā* as follows : *tādātmya saṁbandhāvacchinna ghaṭatvāvacchinna ghaṭatvāvacchinna ( ghaṭaniṣṭha ) prakāratā nirūpita idamtvāvacchinna ( idamniṣṭha ) viśeṣyatā śāli jñānaṃ* ), ( i.e., a knowledge containing substantivity ( lying in 'this' ) distinguished by 'thisness', determined by an adjectivity ( lying in the pot ) distinguished by potness, which is limited by the relation of identity ).

## 6. *The use of Avacchedakata*

A question may arise here. What is the use of making such further specification with the help of *avacchedakatā* ? For example, why should *ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā*, ( i.e., adjectivity lying in the pot ) be specified as *ghaṭatvāvacchinna*, ( i.e., as distinguished by potness ) ? Is not the former enough to carry the sense ? Then why should the specifying clause be added ? Is it not redundant ?

Let us try to understand the point clearly. What is meant by *ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā* ( adjectivity lying in the pot ) ? A pot possesses manifold properties, e.g., substanceness *( dravyatva ),* earthness *( pṛthvītva )* etc. All these attributes lying in the pot are co-existent in the same locus (i.e. *samānādhikaraṇa*). But substanceness though residing in the pot is wider in extent *( atirikta-vṛttika ),* as it resides in other loci, e.g., cloth etc. also. Similarly, earthness is narrower in extent *(nyūna vṛttika)* as it does not reside in all loci of pots, e.g. in gold pots. An *avacchedaka dharma* is that distinguishing property which is neither too narrow nor too wide *( anyūnanātirikta vṛttika ).* It is co-extensive *( saṁvyāptika )* with the *avacchedya*, ( i.e., that which is specified ). Thus the distinguishing feature of the adjectivity lying in the pot is not substanceness or earthness which are variable *( vyabhicārī )* but 'potness' *( ghaṭatva )* which resides in all loci of the pot and in no other loci.

Thus the specifying clause *ghaṭatvāvacchinna* ( or *ghaṭatvaniṣṭha avaccehdakatā nirūpita )* means that the adjectivity lying in the pot is specified or distinguished by the property, ( 'potness' ), i.e., the pot has been taken in its capacity as a pot, pure and simple, and in no other capacity. This kind of specification by means of *avacchecakatā* is made in order to safeguard against a possible error. The same thing may sometimes appear in one capacity and sometimes in another capacity. The same pot may appear at one time in the capacity of a pot *( ghaṭatvena )* and at another time in the capacity of a substance *( dravyatvena )* and at yet another time in the capacity of an earthen object *( pṛthvītvena ).* Just as the same person may appear in different capacities as a relation or as an officer in different situations.

The point may be illustrated with the help of a story from the Mahābhārata. Once Karṇa, when approached by a poor man for fuel, gave away his wooden door for the purpose. The door then was not looked upon in the capacity of a door ( *dvāratvena* ) but in the capacity of mere wood ( *kāṣṭhatvena* ).[1] Thus a change in perspective brings about a difference in the manifested property ( *bhāsamāna dharma* ) of an object.

Thus the adjectivity lying in the pot may sometimes be viewed in the capacity of a substance ( *dravyatvena* ) also. It will then be called *dravyatvāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā*. The expression *ghatatvāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā* thus means that the adjective element lying in the pot is taken in its capacity as a pot and not in its capacity as a substance or in any other capacity.

Thus it can be seen that the *ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā* ( adjectivity lying in the pot ) is not always *ghatatvāvacchinna*, ( i.e., distinguished by potness ) and hence the need of such a specification arsises.

Similarly, it can be said that what is *ghaṭatvāvacchinna* ( distinguished by potness ) is not always *ghaṭaniṣṭha* ( lying in the pot ). For sometimes another object, e.g , a cloth may be mistaken for a pot. In such a case of wrong cognition ( *apramā* ) what is taken as *ghaṭatvāvacchinna* ( distinguished by potness ) is not *ghaṭaniṣṭha* ( lying in the pot ) but *paṭaniṣṭha* ( lying in the cloth ).

Thus to avoid such an error the *prakāratā* is specified with the help of *avacchedakatā*. The expression '*ghaṭatvāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā*' signifies that the particular adjective element actually lies in the pot and is also cognised as such. Sometimes the expression is abbreviated as *ghaṭatvāvacchinna prakāratā* in which case the word *ghaṭaniṣṭha* is implied.

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[1] This example is taken from A.V.

### 6. *Avacchedaka Dharma*

*Avacchedakatā* is used to specify the nature of different relational abstracts in various contexts. Let us take the proposition—

*parvataḥ vahnimān*

( The mountain is fiery. )

Here fire ( *vahni* ) serves

( i ) as a qualifier ( *prakāra* ) in relation to mountain ( *parvata* ) which is the qualificand ( *viśeṣya* ),

( ii ) as a predicate ( *vidheya* ) in relation to the mountain which is the subject ( *uddeśya* ),

( iii ) as something located ( *ādheya* ) in relation to the mountain which is the locus ( *ādhāra* or *adhikaraṇa* ).

So the same property fireness ( *vahnitva* ) assumes the respective roles of :

( i ) *Prakāratāvacchedaka Dharma* ( Adjectivity-specifying property )

( ii ) *Vidheyatāvacchedaka Dharma* ( Predicateness )

( iii ) *Ādheyatāvacchaka Dharma* ( locatedness specifying property ).

Similarly, the property mountainness ( *parvatatva* ) assumes the respective roles of

( i ) *Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka Dharma* ( Substantivity-specifying property )

(ii) *Uddeśyatāvacchedaka Dharma* (Subject-ness-specifying property)

(ii) *Ādhāratāvacchedaka Dharma* (Locusness specifying property)

The relation between locus and located ( *ādhārādhya saṁbandha* is of two kinds:

(1) *Vyāpyavṛtti* in which the located ( *ādheya* ) pervades every part of the locus ( *ādhāra* ). "There is oil in sesamum seeds". Here the oil pervades every part of the sesamum seeds ( *tileṣu sarvānavayavān vyāpya tailaṃ vidyate.* )

(2) *Avyāpyavṛtti* in which the located does not pervade every part of the locus, e.g., There is a pot on the ground ( *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ* )

Here the pot does not pervade every part of the ground.

### 7. *Analysis of the Proposition*

*The mountain is fiery.*

When we analyse the proposition.

"The mountain is fiery", it gives rise to a question. "Is the mountain fiery in all parts *(Sarvadeśāvacchedena)* or only in relation to some particular part ? If the fire is present only in 'this' part of the mountain, we say—

*"etaddeśāvacchena parvataḥ vahnimān"*.

Here the function of the *avacchedaka* is to specify the spatial measure ( *daiśika Iyattā* ).

Again the question may arise:

"Is the mountain fiery all times *( sarvakālāvacchedena )* or only at a particular point of time *( ekakālāvacchedena )* ?" If the mountain is fiery at this time only, we say *etatkālāvacchedena parvataḥ vahnimān.*

Here the function of the *avacchedaka* is to specify the temporal measure *( kālika iyattā ).*

Again, the question may arise

"Does the fire exist in the mountain by relation of contact *( saṁyoga )* or inherence *( samavāya )* ? Hence an *avacchedaka* is required to specify the nature of relation *( saṁsargatā ).*

If the meaning here is that fire exists in the mountain by relation of contact, it will be expressed clearly by saying :

*saṁyoga saṁbandhāvacchedena parvataḥ vahnimān.*

Thus the meaning of the above proposition, ( i.e., 'The mountain is fiery ) can be clarified with the help of such specifying clauses as

( i ) *etaddeśāvacchinna,*

( ii ) *etatkālāvacchinna,*

( iii ) *Saṁyoga saṁbandhāvacchinna.*

Every clause ending in *avacchinna* is a further step in the direction of pin-pointing the meaning.

### *The Applications of Avacchedakatā*

The function of *avacchedakatā* as stated earlier is to specify or clarify the meaning. It serves to distinguish the essential property *( vastudharma )* from an accessary adjunct ( *upādhi* ). Take for instance the relation of *vyāpti* ( universal concomitance ) between smoke and fire.

"Wherever there is smoke, there is fire."

But the converse is not true. Smoke is not invariably present in all cases of fire. It is present in fire only if fire is accompanied by wet fuel. Thus the relation is conditional and not categorical. The wet fuel is not a necessary companion of fire. Sometimes it accompanies fire, sometimes it does not. When it is present, smoke arises. When it is not present, for example, in a red-hot iron ball, there is no smoke.

Suppose, some one tries to establish smoke on the ground of fire, here fire becomes a hetu ( middle ) and smoke becomes *sādhya* ( major ). But the relation of *vyāpti* here is vitiated by an *upādhi* ( i.e. wet fuel ) which is sādhya here ) and and not present in all cases of fire ( that is *sādhana* here ). Hence an *upādhi* is defined as that which pervades the major and not the middle.[1] The distinguishing property of the *sādhana* or *hetu* ( *hetutvāvacchedaka dharma* ) here is fireness, i.e., fire is taken here in its capacity as pure fire and not as fire accompanied by any *upādhi*. But smoke is not always present in the locus of all fire. So the argument is invalid and the fallacy can be pointed out with the help of *avacchedakatā*.

It may be noted here that the same property, i.e., *vahnitva* ( fireness ) can function differently in different contexts. For example, if fire ( pure and simple ) is sought to be established on the mountain on the ground of smoke, 'fireness' serves as *sādhyatāvacchedakadharma*. If the fire is used as a ground to establish heat on the mountain, fireness functions as *hetutvāvacchedaka dharma* If 'fire' is used as a in a syllogism, 'fireness' assumes the role of *pakṣatāvacchedaka dharma.*

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[1] sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhana-vyāpakatvaṃ upādhitvaṃ. —TC.

The concept of *avacchedakatā* is also applied to bring out the essential nature of a cause ( *kāraṇa* ) or effect ( *kārya* ) in a caused relation ( *kārya-kāraṇa bhāva* ). The cause of cloth ( *paṭa* ) is fibre ( *tantu* ). But there are many attributes in fibre, such as coarseness, fineness, whiteness, blackness, etc. which are not indispensably necessary for the production of cloth. What is necessary for the production of cloth is fibre. Hence the distinguishing property of the cause ( *kāraṇatvācchedaka dharma* ) is fibreness ( *tantutva* ). Similarly, the effect, ( i.e., cloth ) may possess many properties such as smoothness, roughness etc. but they are not the necessary effects of fibre. It is clothness alone ( *paṭatva* ), which can be regarded as the distinguishing property of the effect ( *kāryatāvacchedaka dharma* ). The concept of *avacchedakatā* is used in a large variety of contexts. Some more applications are given here.

*Avacchedakatā* is very frequently used in connection with *abhāva* ( negation ). Take the proposition.

"There is no pot on the ground" ( *ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalaṃ* ). The locus of the non-existence is called *anuyogi* and the counterpart of the non-existence is called *pratiyogi*. The absence lies in the ground. So the pot ( *ghaṭa* ) is *pratiyogī*. In other words, the absential counterpositiveness ( *abhāvīyapratiyogitā* ) lies in the pot, ( i.e., is *ghaṭaniṣṭha* ). The distinguishing property of the counterpositiveness is potness (*ghaṭatva*). Hence the above non-existence is described as *ghatavāvacchinna pratiyogitāka abhāva*.[1] When two things are related by way of determination, ( i.e. *nirūpya-nirūpaka bhava* ), that which determines is called *nirūpaka* and that which is determined is called *nirūpya*. In the case of the non-existence of the pot ( *ghaṭābhāva* ) as described above, the counterpotiveness ( *pratiyogitā* ) which lies in the pot is determined ( *nirūpita* ) by non-existence ( *abhāva* ) which is the determinant (*nirūpaka*). In other words, the distinguishing property of the determinantness ( *nirūpakatvāvacchedaka* ) is absenceness ( *abhāvatva* ) and the distinguishing feature of the determined ( *nirūpyatāvacchedaka* ) is counterpositiveness ( *pratiyogitātva* ). When one knowledge ( *jñāna* ), e.g., there is a pot (*ghaṭaḥ asti*) is contradicted by a definite knowledge ( *niścita jñāna* ), there is no pot ( *ghaṭaḥ na asti* ), the relation between the two propositions is called *pratibadhya-pratibandhaka* or *niṣedhya niṣedhaka bhāva*. The first proposition is *pratibadhya* or *niṣedhya*, the second proposition is *pratibandhaka* or *niṣedhaka*.

Here the distinguishing property of negated ( *pratibadhyatāvacchedaka* ) is pot-knowledgeness ( *ghaṭa-jñānatva* ) and the distinguishing property of the negator ( *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* ) is definite knowledgeness of non-existencc of pot ( *ghaṭābhāvaniścayatva*).

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[1] This subject will be treated in detail in the next Chapter "Analyis of Negation".

The concept of *avacchedekatā* can be applied even with regard to *avacchedaka* itself.

For example, take the proposition,

*Dharmivān Deśaḥ*

( The country possesses virtuous people )

Here the virtuous *( dharmī )* serves as a qualifier *( prakāra )*. The distinguishing property of that qualifierness *( prakāratvācchedaka dharma )* is virtue *(dharma)*. The distinguishing property of that *avacchedaka* ( virtue or *dharma* ) is virtueness *( dharmatva )*. This is an instance of *avacchedakatāvacchedaka*, ( i.e., limitor of the specifying feature ).[1]

### 9. *Origin of the Concept of Avacchedakatā*

The concept of avacchedakatā was first introduced in Indian Logic by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā about seven centuries ago in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which is the pioneer work of Navya Nyāya.

The author while discussing various definitions of *vyāpti* ( relation of universal concomitance ) rejects as many as seven of them, on the ground that they are too narrow. He then proceeds to suggest a further definition, i.e , *vyāpti* is the invariable co-existence of the major *( sādhya )* in the locus of the middle.[2] For example, the invariable co-presence of fire in the locus of smoke, e.g., in the kitchen.

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[1] For further details, see MSN and NNL.

[2] avyabhicarita sādhyasāmānadhikaraṇyam vyāptiḥ.

—TC.

But here again an objection is anticipated. Though there is smoke on the mountain, there is non-existence of kitchen-fire there. How can the relation of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be established then ? In order to ward off such an objection, the author introduces the concept of *avacchedaka dharma* of the *sādhya*, ( i.e., the specifying feature of the major ). The fire which is sought to be established on the mountain is one which is characterised by the general property 'fireness' ( *vahnitva* ) and not by any accessory feature ( *upādhi* ) such as kitchen-fireness ( *mahānasīya vahnitva* ). Thus the *avacchedaka dharma* serves to bring out the real character of the *sādhya* and distinguishes it from *upādhī* or unnecessary adjuncts. As a result of such analysis, the definition of *vyāpti* is further modified as that relation of co-presence of the *vyāpaka*, i.e., pervader, ( e.g., fire ) in the locus of the *vyāpya*, i.e., pervaded, ( e.g., smoke ) which is free from adjunct ( *upādhirahita* ).[1]

Thus the concept of *avacchedakatā* was introduced as a footnote to the discussion on *vyāpti*. But the concept proved so useful that it transcended the scope of its original use and was extended to the other contexts in later literature.

The Navya Nyāya technique of analysis in terms of *avacchedakatā*, *prakāratā* etc. was developed and perfected by such great commentators as Pakṣadhara Miśra, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Mathurā Nātha, Jagadīśa and

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[1] vyāpakasya vyāpyādhikaraṇe
upādhyabhāva viśiṣṭaḥ saṁbandhaḥ. –Ibid.

Gadādhara. The neo-logical style became so popular that it soon spread from Mithilā and Bengal to the whole of India. It was adopted not only in Nyāya Philosophy but in the philosophical literature of the other schools of thought as well. Even today it is recognised as the standard language of logical discussion in higher academic circles.

### 10. *Analysis of some Propositions in Navya Nyāya Style*

Let us take some propositions and see how they are analysed in the Navya Nyāya style.

( 1 ) The pot is blue.

*( Nīlo Ghaṭaḥ. )*

Here the substantive is pot *( ghaṭa )*. The substantivity is distinguished by potness *( ghaṭatva )*. The potness is inherent in the pot. So the meaning of the pot is analysed as the substantivity lying in the pot distinguished by potness as limited by the relation of inherence *( samvāya saṁbandhāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā )*.

This substantivity lying the pot *(ghaṭaniṣṭhaviśeṣyatā)* is determined *( nirūpita )* by the adjectivity lying in blue *( nīlaniṣṭha prakāratā )*.

Now, what is the meaning of blue *( nīla )*? It means that which is distinguished by blueness that is inherent in it. So, the adjectivity lying in blue can be analysed as *samavāya saṁbandhāvacchinna nīlatvāvacchinna ( nīlaniṣṭha prakāratā )*.

It may be noted that *'blue'* which is qualifier in relation to *'pot'* is also a qualificand in relation to *'blueness'* which qualifies it. Such a substantivity-cum-adjectivity is known as *viśeṣyatvāvacchinna prakāratā*.

Now the blue *( nīla )* thing which is the locus of blue colour *( nīla rūpa )* bears a relation of identity with the blue pot.

So, the knowledge,

The pot is blue,

can be analysed as :

*Samavāya sambandhāvacchinna nīlatvāvacchinna tādātmya sambandhāvacchinna viśeṣyatvāvacchinna nīlaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpita samavāya sambandhāaacchinna ghaṭatvaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpita ghaṭaniṣṭha viśeṣyatāśāli jñānaṃ.*

( 2 ) The ground possesses a pot.

*( Ghaṭavad Bhūtalaṃ. )*

Here the substantive *( viśeṣya )* is ground *(bhūtala);* the adjective is pot *( ghaṭa ).* How is the adjective, ( i.e., the pot ) related to the substantive ? ( i.e., the ground ) ? It is related by way of external contact *( saṁyoga ).* In other words, the substantivity lying in the ground *( bhūtalaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā )* is determined *( nirūpita )* by an adjectivity lying in the pot *( ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā )* which is limited by a relation of contact, ( i.e., *saṁyoga sambandhāvacchinna ).*

The distinguishing feature of the substantive, ( i.e., the ground ) is groundness *( bhūtalatva )* and the distinguishing feature of the adjective, ( i.e., the pot ) is potness *( ghaṭatva ).* The suffix *vat* after the word *ghaṭa* ( pot ) indicates a relation of possession *( saṁ-*

*bandhatva ).* It is qualified by the pot and it qualifies the ground. So, the meaning of the above proposition can be analysed as :

*Saṁyoga saṁbandhāvacchinna ghaṭatvāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpita saṁbandhitvāvacchinna ( viśeṣyatvāvacchinna ) prakāratānirūpita bhūtalatvāvacchinna bhūtalaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā śālī jñānaṃ.*

( 3 ) *The Ground possesses a blue pot.*

*( Nīlaghaṭavad Bhūtalaṃ )*

An analysis of the above proposition reveals an intermixture of various elements which may be enumerated as below.

( i ) A substantvity lying in the ground ( bhūtalaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā ).

( ii ) A distinguishing property of that substantivity i.e., groundness *(bhūtalatvaniṣṭha avacchedakatā)*

( iii ) An adjeetivity lying in the pot. *( Ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā ).*

( iv ) A distinguishing property of that adjectivity i.e., potness *( ghaṭatvaniṣṭha avacchedakatā ).*

( v ) A substantivity lying in pot in relation to blue which qualifies it.

*( ghaṭaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā )*

( vi ) An adjectivity lying in blue.

*( nīlaniṣṭha prakāratā )*

(vii) A distinguishing property of that adjectivity, i.e., blueness.

*( nīlatvaniṣṭha avacchedakatā )*

(viii) A distinguishing feature lying in the relation of possessiveness as indicated by the suffix *vat* after *ghaṭa ( saṁbadhitvaniṣṭha avacchedakatā )*

(ix) A distinguishing feature lying in the relation of contact between the pot and the ground *( saṁyoganiṣṭha avacchedakatā )*

(x) A distinguishing feature lying in the relation of inherence of blueness in the blue *( samavāyaniṣṭha avacchedakatā )*

(xi) A distinguishing feature lying in the relation of identity between the blue and the blue pot *( tādātmyaniṣṭha avacchedakatā )*.

Thus the above proposition can be analysed as:

*Tādātmya Saṁbandhāvacchinna Nilatvāvacchinna prakāratā-nirūpita ghaṭatvāvacchinna viśeṣyatvāvacchinna saṁyoga saṁbandhāvacchinna prakāratānirūpita saṁbandhitvāvacchinna viśeṣyatvāvacchinna prakārata nirūpita bhūtalatvāvacchinna bhūtalaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā śāli jñanaṃ.*

## 11. *Application of the Navya Nyāya technique of Analysis to the Proposition*

"Scott wrote Waverley"

Betrand Russell in his '*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*' has analysed the proposition,

Scott is the author of *Waverley*.

into the following three sentences :

( 1 ) At least, one man wrote *Waverley*.

( 2 ) At most, one man wrote *Waverley*.

( 3 ) Whoever wrote *Waverley* was Scott.

Let us see how the proposition "Scott wrote the book *Waverley*" can be analysed in the Navya Nyāya style.

It can be translated into Sanskrit as :

Scoṭṭaḥ Waverley granthaṃ kṛtavān.

The above may be expanded as :

( '*Waverley*' grantha niṣṭha viṣayatā nirūpaka bhūtakālika kṛtimān ekatva viśiṣṭaḥ Scottaḥ )

i.e., Scott who is qualified by oneness is the doer of a past act which is the determinant of the contents lying in the book that is *Waverley*.

The Navya Nyāya formula of analysis is that the word in the nominative case is the main substantive.

Accordingly, the subject of the proposition, viz., Scott is the chief qualificand ( *mukhya viśeṣya* ), and the chief qualifier ( *mukhya prakāra* ) is the predicate *kṛti* ( act ). In between the two, there are other qualifiers and qualificands. For example, the *kṛti* (act) which serves as a qualifier in relation to Scott is itself qualified by past tense ( *bhūtakāla* ). Again, the act is qualified by determinatness ( *nirūpaktva* ) of the content ( *viṣaya* ) which, in its turn is qualified by the book, which, again, is qualified by the name, 'Waverley'. Thus there is a series of substantivities and adjectivities, some of them functioning in a double capacity, i.e., substantivity-cum-adjectivity ( *viśeṣyatvāvacchinna prakāratā* ).

The above proposition may be analysed into its constituent elements as follows :

( i ) A substantivity lying in Scott ( *Scottaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ),

( ii ) Which is distinguished by Scottness ( *Scottatvāvacchinna* ),

( iii ) and determined by an adjectivity lying in one ( *ekaniṣṭha prakāratānirūpita* ),

( iv ) Which is distinguished by oneness ( *ekatvāvacchinna* ),

( v ) Which oneness is limited by the relation of inherence ( *samavāya saṁbandhāvacchinna* ),

( vi ) An adjectivity lying in act ( *kṛtiniṣṭha prakāratā* ),

( vii ) Which ( act ) is distinguished by actness ( *kṛtitvāvacchinna* ),

( viii ) As limited by the relation of inherence ( *samavāya saṁbandhāvacchinna* ),

( ix ) And determined by an adjectivity lying in past tense ( *bhūtakālaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpita* ),

( x ) Which is limited by pastness ( *bhūtakālatvāvacchinna* ),

( xi ) As limited by relation of limitorness ( *paricchedakatva saṁbandhāvacchinna* ),

( xii ) A substantivity lying in the act ( *kṛitiniṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ),

( xiii ) which is distinguished by qualificandness ( *viśeṣyatvācchinna* ),

( xiv ) in relation to a qualifierness lying in the contents ( *viṣayaniṣṭha prakāratā* ),

( xv ) which is distinguished by contentness ( *viṣayatvāvacchinna* ),

( xvi ) as limited by the relation of determinantness ( *nirūpakatva saṁbandhāvacchinna* ),

( xvii ) a substantivity lying in the content ( *viṣayaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ),

( xviii ) as distinguished by qualificandness ( *viśeṣyatvāvacchinna* ),

( xix ) in relation to qualifierness lying in the book ( *granthaniṣṭha prakāratā* ),

( xx ) distinguished by bookness ( *granthatvācchinna* ),

( xxi ) as limited by the relation of inclusion ( *niṣṭhatvasaṁbandhāvacchinna* ),

( xxii ) a substantivity lying in the book ( *grantha niṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ),

) xxiii ) distinguished by qualificandness ( *viśeṣyatvāvacchinna* ),

( xxiv ) in relation to a qualifierness lying in Waverley ( *Waverleyniṣṭha prakāratā* ),

( xv ) which is distinguished by Waverleyness (*Waverleytvāvacchinna* ),

( xvi ) as limited by the relation of identity (*tādātmya saṁbandhāvacchinna* ).

Thus the proposition
Scott wrote Waverley

can be analysed as

“tādātmya saṁbandhāvacchinna Waverleytvāvacchinna ( Waverleyniṣṭha ) prakāratā nirūpita granthatvā vacchinna niṣṭha sambandhāvacchinna granthtvā vacchinna ( granthaniṣṭha ) prakāratānirūpita viṣayatvā vacchinna viśeṣyatvā vacchinna ( viṣayaniṣṭha ) prakāratānirūpita ( bhūtakālatvācchinna bhūtakālaniṣṭha ) prakāratā nirūpitā kṛtitvāvacchinna viśeṣyatā ( tadavacchinna ) samavāya saṁbandhāvacchinna kṛtitvāvacchinna ( kṛtiniṣṭha ) prakāratā nirūpitā, saṁbandhāvacchinna ekatvā-vacchinna ( ekaniṣṭha ) prakāratā nirūpitā ca yā Scottatvāvacchinna ( Scottaniṣṭha ) viśeṣyatā tādṛśa viśeṣyatāśāli jñānam.[1]

It may be paraphrased as :

tādātmya saṁbandhāvacchinnā Waverleytvāvacchinnā Waverleyniṣṭhā yā prakāratā, tādṛśī prakāratayā nirūpitā yā granthatvāvacchinnā granthaniṣṭhā viśeṣyatā tadavacchinnā yā granthaniṣṭhā prakāratā tayā nirūpitā ca yā viṣayatvāvacchinnā viśeṣyatā tadavacchinnā nirūpakatva-saṁbandhāvacchinnā yā viśeṣyaniṣṭhā prakāratā tayā prakāratayā nirūpitā yā kṛtitvāvacchinnā viśeṣyatā tadavacchinnā paricchedakasaṁbandhāvacchinnā bhūtakālatvāvacchinnā kṛtitvāvacchinnā yā prakāratā tayā prakāratayā nirūpitā, samavāyasaṁbandhāvacchinnā ekatvāvacchinnā ekaniṣṭhā yā prakāratā tayā nirūpitā ca yā, Scottatvāvacchinnā Scottaniṣṭhā viśeṣyatā tādṛśa viśeṣyatāśālī śābdabodhaḥ.”

Those who may like to see further subtlities of *Pariṣkāra* in Navya Nyāya may consult such special treatises as Tritalāvacchedakatāvāda ( of Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍita Śaśi Nātha Jhā ( Mithilā Research Institute, Darbhanga ) which abounds with hair-splitting distinction and analyses the contents of a simple proposition like 'The pot is blue' into as many as 92 elements.[1]

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[1] The above Pariṣkāra has been done in consultation with Pandit Madana Mohana Jha, Principal, Govt. Sanskrit College, Patna.

Such niceties and refinements of Navya Nyāya analysis deserve special attention of modern analytic philosophers. It would be a most valuable contribution to knowledge if the vast precious literature of Navya Nyāya were rendered into English and the precious elements were incorporated in the linguistic analysis of today.

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[1] **sarvāḥ militvā dvinavatir viṣayatā nīlo ghaṭaḥ iti śābda bodhanirūpitā. —TV. ( page 25 )**

## CHAPTER IV

# ANALYSIS OF NEGATION

### 1. *The Concept of Non-existence ( Abhāva )*

The concept of non-existence ( *abhāva* ) has been subjected to a thoroughgoing analysis in Indian Logic, particularly in Navya Nyāya Logic.

Non-existence ( *abhāva* ) has been given the status of a category ( *padārtha* ) like existence ( *bhāva* ). "The negation of *bhāva* is *abhāva* and vice versa. The two are correlatives and can be expressed in terms of each other.

The same idea can be expressed in a positive or in a negative way.

e.g. :

( 1 ) *Ghaṭaḥ asti*

( The pot is ) is equivalent to

*Ghaṭābhāvaha na asti*

( There is no non-existence of pot ).

( 2 ) *Ghaṭaḥ na asti*

( There is no pot )

is equivalent to

*Ghaṭābhāvāḥ asti*

There is non-existence of pot.

It is this equivalence which is the underlying principle of obversion in Aristotalian Logic.

*Abhāva* ( absence ) is defined as that category, the knowledge of which cannot be had without the knowledge of its opposite ( *pratiyogī* ).[1]

We cannot know the non-existence or absence of a pot ( *ghaṭābhāva* ) unless we know what is a pot (*ghaṭa*). The knowledge of non-existence ( *abhāva jñāna* ) is always dependent on knowledge of existence ( *bhāva jñāna* ).

The existence of a thing is known by itself. But non-existence is never known by itself, ( i.e., without reference to the thing of which there is non-existence ). This is the special characteristic of *abhāva padārtha.*

The knowledge of conjunction ( *saṁyoga* ) or inherence ( *samavāya* ) is also relative ( *sāpekṣa* ). We cannot know a conjunction without knowing the conjoined ( *saṁyukta* ) objects. To understand inherence, we must know what is inherent ( *samaveta* ) in what.

Thus we cannot understand a relation ( *saṁbandha* ) without knowing the related ( *saṁbandhī* ) terms. But there is a difference between such relation and *abhāva.* While the knowledge of conjunction or inherence is dependent on positive entities ( *bhāva padārthas* ) which are *present* there, the knowledge of *abhāva* is dependent on the knowledge of a positive entity that is *absent.* In other words, in the knowledge of non-existence of a pot ( *ghaṭābhāva* ), the pot ( *ghaṭa* ) is not only a determinant ( *nirūpaka* ), but also a counterpart or opposite ( *pratiyogī* ).

What is meant by *pratiyogī* ? Whenever there is a non-existence or absence ( *abhāva* ), two question arise.

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[1] pratiyogitā jñānādhīna viṣayatvaṃ abhāvatvaṃ. —SP.

(i) absence what ?
(ii) absence in what ?

The former, i.e., the thing of which the non-existence is, is known as *pratiyogī*.[1] The latter, i.e., the thing in which the non-existence lies is known as *anuyogī*.[2]

Thus the *anuyogī* is the locus, ( i.e., *ādhāra* or *adhikaraṇa* ) of the non-existence. *Pratiyogī* is the opposite, counterpart or counter-positive of the non-existence. For example,

There is no pot on the ground
( *Bhūtale ghaṭaḥ na asti* ).

Here the *pratiyogī* of the non-existence is the pot ( *ghaṭa* ) and the *anuyogī* of the non-existence is ground ( *bhūtala* ).

## 2. *The different factors involved in Negation*

In order to understand a non-existence clearly, it is necessary to have a knowledge of the following factors :

( i ) *Anuyogitā* ( locusness of the non-existence ),
( ii ) *Pratiyogitā* ( Counter-positiveness of the non-existence ),
( iii ) *Anuyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ( distinguishing feature of the locusness of non-existence. )
( iv ) *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ( distinguishing feature of the counterpositiveness of non-existence ),
( v ) *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka saṁbandha* ( the specific relation in which the counterpositive ( *prati-*

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1. yasyābhāvaḥ saḥ pratiyogī. —TS.
2. yasmin abhāvaḥ saḥ anuyogī. -Ibid.

*yogī* ) stands to the locus ( *anuyogī* ) of the non-existence.

Let us take a negative proposition,

There is no pot on the ground.
( *Bhūtale ghaṭaḥ na asti* ).

Now, let us try to understand the fivefold factors with regard to the above proposition.

( 1 ) *Pratiyogitā* ( counterpositiveness )

The counterpositive of the non-existence here is 'pot'. That is to say, the counterpositiveness of the non-existence lies in the pot. Thus the non-existence can be described as a non-existence in which the counterpositiveness lies in the pot ( *ghaṭaniṣṭha pratiyogitāka abhāva* ).

( 2 ) *Anuyogitā* ( Locusness )

There is no pot on the ground.

The locus or substratum of the non-existence here is the ground ( *bhūtala* ). That is to say, the locusness of the non-existence lies in the ground. Thus the non-existence can be described as a non-existence in which the locusness of the non-existence lies in the ground ( *bhūtalaniṣṭha anuyogitāka abhāva* ).

( 3 ) *Anuyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ( distinguishing property of the locusness of non-existence ).

There is no pot in the ground.

Here the locus of the non-existence is the ground. But it is not clear whether the locus is this ground or ground-in-general. So it has to be specified clearly. The specification can be made with the help of an *avacchedaka*, ( i.e. a distinguishing feature which limits the locusness. This is known as *anuyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ( Let us abbreviate it as a.d. ). If it be meant that the absence of the pot lies in ground in general, the a.d. will be groundness ( *bhūtalatva* ). If it is meant that the absence of the pot lies in this ground, the a.d. will be groundness ( *bhūtalatva* ). If it is meant that the absence of the pot lies in this ground, the a.d. will be 'this-groundness' ( *etadbhūtalatva* ).

( 4 ) *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharma*

( i.e. the distinguishing property of the counter-positiveness )

There is no pot on the ground.

Here, it is not clear whether the pot denied is pot-in-general ( *ghaṭa sāmānya* ) or a particular pot ( *ghaṭa viśeṣa* ). Hence a specification has to be made to show whether it is a case of general non-existence ( *sāmānya abhāva* ) or a particular non-existence ( *viśeṣa abhāva* ). This is done with the help of a specifying clause which is known as *pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ( p.d. ). In the non-existence of the former type, the p.d. is potness ( *ghaṭatva* ). If the non-existence is of the latter type, the p.d. is this potness ( *etadghaṭatva* ).

( 5 ) *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka Saṁbandha*

( the specific relation of the counter-positiveness )

There is no pot on the ground.

This proposition can be interpreted in two ways. It may mean

( i ) that the pot does not exist on the ground by way of external contact ( *saṁyoga saṁbandhena ghaṭaḥ na asti* ) or ( ii ) that the pot does not exist by relation of inherence ( *samavāya sambandhena ghaṭaḥ na asti* ).

Hence a specification has to be made here with the help of an *avacchedaka* which is known as *pratiyogitavacchedaka sambandha* ( p.s. ).

In ( i ) the p.s. is the relation of contact ( *samyoga sambandha* ),

In ( ii ) the p.s. is the relation of inherence ( *samavāya sambandha* ),

3. *Reconciliation of Opposite Propostions*

Generally speaking

S is P

and

S is not P

are taken as opposite and incompatible. But they can be reconciled together with the help of *avacchedakaṭā.*[1]

For example,

( 1 ) There is a pot on the ground.

( 2 ) There is no pot on the ground.

Here both the propositions can be regarded as true and compatible with each other, if the specifying character of the relation ( *avacchedaka sambandha* ) is different in each ease.

( 1 ) is true, if it is taken in the sense that the pot is on the ground by relation of contact ( *samyogena* )

( 2 ) is true if it is taken in the sense that the pot is not in the ground by relation of inherence ( *samavāyena* ).

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[1] bhavābhāvayoḥ ekatra samāveśārthaṃ avacchedakatā svīkāraḥ. –AN.

Similarly, take the propositions,

( 1 ) The monkey is on the tree.
( 2 ) The monkey is not on the tree.

Here also, both propositions can be regarded as compatible and true from different standpoints.

( 1 ) may mean that the monkey is on the tree in relation to the branch *( śākhāvacchedena )*.

( 2 ) may mean that the monkey is not on the tree in relation to the root *( mulāvacchedena )*.

Thus there is no real oppostioin between the two propositions.

Similarly,

( 1 ) The fire is on the mountain.
( 2 ) The fire is not on the mountain.

can both be true, if the *avacchedaka dharma* of the counterpositive ( i.e. fire ) be diflerent in each case.

( 1 ) may mean that the fire exists ( on the mountain ) in its capacity of pure fire *(śuddha vahnitvena )*.

( 2 ) may mean that the fire does not exist ( on the mountain ) in the capacity of this particular fire *( etadvanitvena )*.

Thus the relation of contradiction or opposition *( niṣedhya-niṣedhaka bhāva )* can hold good between two propositions only when the one affirms and the other denies something in the same *avacchedaku*. If the *avacchedaka dharma* ( distinguishing property ) or *avacchedaka saṁbandha* ( specific relation ) is different, there is no real opposition between them.

Let us try to understand this point with the help of more examples.

( 1 ) There is a pot on the ground
*( ghaṭavad bhūtalaṃ )*

cannot be negated by

( 2 ) There is no blue pot on the ground *( nīlaghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalaṃ )*.

For while the *avacchedaka dharma* in ( 1 ) is potness *( ghaṭatva )*, that in ( 2 ) is blueness *( nīlatva )* and potness *( ghaṭatva )*. Thus there is no relation of contradiction between the two.

A general existence *( sāmānya bhāva )* can be contradicted only by a general non-existence *( sāmānya abhāva )* and not by a specific non-existence *( viśiṣṭa abhāva )*.

In the same way, the proposition

( 1 ) The ground possesses non-existence of pot *( ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam )* cannot be negated by the proposition.

( 2 ) The ground possesses a substance *( dravyavad bhūtalam )*

For the non-existence of the pot *( ghaṭābhāva )* in ( 1 ) is in the capacity of a pot *( ghaṭatvena )* and not in the capacity of a substance *( dvavyatvena )*. So, the proposition ( 1 ) can be negated only by the proposition–

( 3 ) The ground possesses a pot *( ghaṭavad bhūtalaṃ )*.

Because ( 3 ) affirms the counterpart *( pratiyogī )* of the above non-existence in the same locus in the same capacity, i.e., in the capacity of a pot *(ghaṭatvena)* in the same specific relation, i.e., by way of contact *( saṁyoga saṁbandhena )*.

It may be contended by some that the ground possesses a substance

*( dravyavad bhūtalaṃ )*,

means a substantivity lying in the ground determined by an adjectivity being in substance ( *dravyaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpita bhūtalaniṣṭha viśeṣyatā* ) and as substance includes a pot also, it will also apply to an adjectivity lying in the substance in the form of a pot ( *ghaṭarūpadravyaniṣṭha prakāratā* ).

But such a contention would be untenable, for the non-existence of the pot is in the capacity of a pot ( *ghaṭatvāvacchedena* ) and not in the capacity of substance ( *dravyatvāvacchedena* ).

That is to say the proposition ( 1 ) can be contradicted only by proposition ( 3 ) which affirms the existence of the counterpart ( *pratiyogī* ) in the same *avacchedaka* ( i.e. in the capacity of a pot. )

( 1 ) The ground possesses non-existence of pot (*ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalaṃ*) cannot be negated by.

( 2 ) The ground possesses a substance ( *dravya bhūtalaṃ* ) for although the knowledge of ground as qualified by substance ( *dravya viśiṣṭa bhūtala viṣayaka jñāna* ) is a determinant of adjectivity lying in the pot (*ghaṭaniṣṭha prakāratā nirūpaka*) that adjectivity is not determined by a specifying property lying in potness ( i.e. is not *ghaṭatvaniṣṭha avacchedakatā nirūpita* ).

Thus we find that the relation of contradiction ( *pratibadhya-pratibandhaka bhāva* ) can be determined only with the help of *avacchedaka dharma* ( specifying feature and *avacchedaka sambandha* ( specifying relation ).

### 4. *Analysis of Negative Propositions*

The pot is not on the ground.
Eight different meanings.

The above proposition can bend itself to different ways of interpretation.

( 1 ) There is no pot on any ground by contact.

( 2 ) There is no pot on this ground by contact.

( 3 ) There is not this pot on any ground by contact.

( 4 ) There is not this pot on this ground by contact.

( 5 ) There is no pot on any ground by inherence.

( 6 ) There is no pot on this ground by inherence.

( 7 ) There is not this pot any ground by inherence.

( 8 ) There is not this pot on this ground by inherence.

The first of these can be described as a non-existence the locusness of which is distinguished by groundness in general, the counterpositiveness of which is distinguished by potness in general and the relation of which is limited by contact.[1]

Similarly, the last of these (i.e. 8) can be described as a non-existence, the locusness of which is distinguished by this-groundness, the counterpositiveness of which is distinguished by 'this-potness' and the relation of which is limited by inherence.[1]

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[1] bhūtalatvadharmāvacchinna
bhūtalaniṣṭha anuyogitānirūpaka
saṁyoga saṁbandhāvacchinna
ghaṭatvadharmāvacchinna
pratiyogitākaḥ abhāvaḥ.

The other propositions indicating non-existence of different types can be construed in similar ways.

### 5. *Distinctions of Non-Existence*

Indian Logicians have recognised many distinctions of non-existence ( *abhāva* ), e.g.

( 1 ) Prior non-existence ( *prāgabhāva* )
( 2 ) Posterior non-existence ( *pradhvaṁsābhāva* )
( 3 ) Absolute non-existence ( *atyantābhāva* )
( 4 ) Reciprocal non non-existence ( *anyonyābhāva* ).

Let us try to understand each of these in some detail.

( 1 ) *Prāgabhāva* is that non-existence which is prior to the production of an effect[2], e.g., the non-existence of a pot before it is produced. When it is expected that the pot will be made here[3], that state is a case of *prāgabhāva* of the pot.

The production of the pot brings that non-existence to an end. Hence an effect is called a destroyer of that non-existence ( *prāgabhāva pradhvaṁsaka* )[4]. It cannot be said when that non-existence originated, but it can be said that it ended at a particular point of time. Hence it is characterised as beginningless but having an end.[1]

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[1] etadbhūtalatva dharmāvacchinna bhūtalaniṣṭha anuyogitānirūpaka samavāya saṁbandhāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha pratiyogitākaḥ abhāvaḥ.

[2] utpatteḥ pūrvaṃ kāryasya. —TS.

[3] atra ghaṭaḥ bhaviṣyati. —TD.

[4] prāgabhāva pratidhvaṁsi kāryaṃ. —TS.

( 2 ) *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* ( posterior non-existence ) is that which occurs after an effect is destroyed.[2] For example, when a pot is broken, we say the pot is destroyed ( *ghataḥ dhvastaḥ* ). This means that the existence of a pot has come to an end and its non-existence has begun from a particular point of time ( i.e. from the moment when the pot is destroyed ). So the non-existence has a beginning, but it has no end, because the pot that has been destroyed, will never come into being again. Hence posterior non-existence has been characterised as that which has a beginning, but no end.[3]

( 3 ) *Atyantābhāva* ( absolute non-existence ) is that non-existence which is found at all times ( past, present and future ).[4]

For example,

There is no colour in air.

This non-existence of colour in air is not temporary but eternal ( *nitya* ).

Prior non-existence ( *prāgabhāva* ) has an end ( *anta* ). Posterior non-existence ( *prāgabhāva* ) has a beginning ( *ādi* ). But absolute non-existence ( *atyantā-*

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[1] anādiḥ sāntaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ. –Ibid.

[2] vināśānantaraṃ kāryasya. –Ibid.

[3] sādiranantaḥ pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ. —TS.

[4] traikālika saṁsargābhāvaḥ atyantābhāvaḥ. –Ibid.

*bhāva* ) has neither a beginning nor an end it is beginnigless ( *anādi* ) and endless ( *ananta* ).[1]

( 4 ) *Anyonyābhāva* ( reciprocal non-existence ) consists in a denial of identity ( *tādātmya niṣedha* )[2] and consequent affirmation of a difference ( *bheda* ) between two things.

For example,

The pot is not cloth

( *Ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ na asti* ).

The pot is not the cloth and the cloth is not the pot. The difference is mutual ( *pārasparika* ). This kind of *abhāva* is also eternal ( *nitya* ).

### 6. *Saṁsargābhāva and Anyonyābhāva*

What is the difference between absolute non-existence ( *atyantābhāva* ) and reciprocal non-existence ( *anyonyābhāva* ) ?

Let us take an example of each

( 1 ) The pot is not cloth

( *Ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ na asti* ).

( 2 ) There is no clothness in the pot.

( *Ghaṭe paṭatvaṁ na asti* ).

The first is an instance of *anyonyābhāva*, the second is an instance of *atyantābhāva*. The first denies identity ( *tādātmya* ), the second denies a relation ( *saṁsarga* ).

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[1] anādiranantaḥ atyantābhāvaḥ. –Ibid.

[2] tādātmyaniṣedhaḥ atyantābhāvaḥ. —TD.

The opposite of ( 1 ) will be
The pot is cloth.
( *Ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ asti* )
The opposite of ( 2 ) will be
There is clothness in the pot.
( *Ghaṭe paṭatvaṁ asti* ).

In other words, in(1) the counterpositiveness ( *pratiyogitā* ) is distinguished by identity (*tādātmya*)[1], in (2) it is distinguished by relation ( *saṁsarga* )[2].

In *anyonyābhāva*, both the terms are in the first case-ending ( i.e. in the nominative case ), e.g.

A is not B.

In *atyantābhāva* one term is in the seventh case-eding ( i.e. in the locative case ), e.g.

A is not in B.

Some try to reduce *anyonyābhāva* also into *atyantābhāva* by putting a term in the locative case, e.g.

Kāśi is not Mathurā
( *Kāśī Mathurā na asti* )

is interpreted as

( i ) There is no Mathurā in Kāśi (*Kāśyāṁ Mathurā na asti* ) and
( ii ) There is no Kāśi in Mathurā ( *Mathurāyāṁ Kāśī na asti* ).

But such an interpretation would annul the very distinction between *anyonyābhāva* and *saṁsargābhāva*.

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[1] tādātmya saṁbandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitākaḥ anyonyābhāvaḥ.

[2] saṁsarga saṁbandhāvacchinna pratiyogitākaḥ atyantābhāvaḥ.

( 1 ) The pot is not cloth means something quite different from

( 2 ) The pot is not in the cloth.

The ( 2 ) denies the relation of contact ( *saṁyoga* ) between the pot and the cloth and is thus a case of *saṁsargābhāva*.

What is meant by *saṁsargābhāva* ?

*Saṁsarga* means the relation by which one thing may reside in another.

There is honey in the pot.

Here the honey resides in the pot by relation of contact ( *saṁyoga* ).

There is sweetness in the honey.

Here the sweetness resides in the honey by relation of inherence ( *samavāya* ).

Hence it can be said that

( 1 ) The honey does not reside in the pot by relation of inherence ( *samavāya saṁbandhena ghaṭe madhu na asti* ) and

( 2 ) The sweetnees does not lie in the honey by relation of contact ( *saṁyoga saṁbandhena madhuni mādḥuryaṃ na asti* ).

When there is *atyantābhāva*, it is predicated of the locus ( *anuyogī* ) by some particular relation ( such as *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* ). Hence *atyantābhāva* comes under the category of *saṁsargābhāva* ( Relational non-existence ), while *anyonyābhāva* is a negation of identity ( *tādātmyābhava* ).

*Saṁsargābhāva* or relational non-existence can be cognised only when its connterpart ( *pratiyogī* ) is perceptible (*pratyakṣasādhya*). Hence we can know the absence of a pot on the ground. But we cannot cognise the absence of God on the ground because the former ( i.e. God ) is not perceptible.

*Anyonyābhāva* can be cognised only when the locus ( *anuyogī* ) is perceptible. For example,

The pot is not cloth.

Here the *anuyogī* ( i.e. the pot ) is perceptible. Hence the difference is seen clearly. But when we say

God is not ākāśa ( sky ).

The difference is not seen, because the *anuyogī* ( i.e. God ) is not perceptible.

### 6. *Sāmayika Abhāva*

Some logicians add a fifth kind of non-existence, viz: *sāmayika abhāva* ( i.e. temporary non-existence ), e.g

The pot is not in the house now ( *idānīṃ gṛhe ghāṭaḥ na asti* ).

The pot that was kept in the house is taken away from the house for some time. Such kind of non-existence is called *sāmayika ābhāva*.

But such a kind of non-existence is not recognised as an independent kind of *abhāva* by many Naiyāyikas.

They sub-name it under the category of *atyantābhāva*. Viśvanātha Pañcānana in his Nyāya-siddhānta Muktāvalī treats it as a case of *atyantābhāva*. He illustrates it with the help of the example

*Bhūtale ghaṭaḥ na asti.*

( There is no pot on the ground ).

The opinion of such Naiyāyikas is that there is eternal absence of potness in the earth. The temporary placing of a pot on the ground does not annul that absence, but only hides it for the time being. When the pot is removed, the eternal non-existence ( *atyantābhāva* ) is manifested clearly.

### 7. *The Concept of Apoha*

Buddhist Logicians ( particularly Vijñānavādins ) have propounded a theory which is known as *apohavāda*. Ratnakīrti in his *Apohasiddhi* has expounded the concept of *apoha* in an elaborate manner.

According to the principle of *apoha* ( which is also called *atadvyāvṛiti* ) every thing is the negation of the negation of that thing.

For example, blue ( nīla ) is the negation of non-blue ( anīla ). It is different from everything that is other than blue ( *nīletara* ). Thus *nīla* ( blue ) and *anīla* ( non-blue ) are not only mutually exclusive but also exhaustive. They divide between themselves all things of the world by a process of dichotomy ( *dvaidhīkaraṇa* ). There is no other possibility ( *anyathāgati* ). This is the Law of Excluded Middle.

The formula of *Apohavāda* may be symbolically expressed as

$$P \equiv \sim\sim P \text{ ( not-not P ).}$$

But this formula of double negation ( *atadvyāvṛtti* ) though applicable in contradictory relation, is not always applicable in cases of contrary relation. For example, not-not-poor is not necessarily equivalent to poor, it may mean non-rich and may apply to persons of average means.

The Naiyāyikas do not uphold the Buddhist theory of *apoha* that negation of negation necessarily implies the affirmation of that thing. They hold that when a term is negated by a negative prefix *a* ( i.e. non ), e.g. *a-Brāhmaṇa* ( i. e. non-brāhmaṇa ) then Brāhmaṇa and non-Brāhmaṇa do not exhaust all things of the world. The meaning intended by the term non-brāhmaṇa is restricted within the range of caste. That is to say non-brāhmaṇa includes men belonging to other castes such as kṣatriya, vaiśya, etc, but it does not include such things as a buffalo, tree, pot, cloth or stone.

### 8. *Paryudāsa and Prasajya Pratiṣedha.*

It will not be out of place in this connection to refer to a distinction made between two functions of negation-prefixes, viz.

( i ) *Paryudāsa* and
( ii ) *Prasajya Pratiṣedha*

Take an imperative sentence

Feed the non-Brāhmaṇas.

Here the implication of the above proposition is

Feed the *Kṣatriyas* etc.

The emphasis here is on feeding, ( persons of other castes ) and not on non-feeding (the Brāhmaṇas). This is a case of *Paryudāsa*.[1]

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[1] **prādhānyaṁ hi vidheryatra
pratiṣedhe' pradhānatā
paryudāsa sa vijñeyaḥ
yatrottara padena nañ.**

In *Prasajya Pratiṣedha,* the emphasis is on prohibition (*niṣedha*) of something that might have been supposed to be an injunction (*vidhi*).[1]

For example, "Do not eat an onion."

While the former (i. e. *paryudāsa*) may be brought under the fold of *anyonyābhāva,* the latter (i.e. *prasajya pratiṣedha*) may be brought under the fold of *atyantābḥāva* which comes under the category of *saṁsargabḥāva*).

## 9. *Cognition of Non-Existence* (*Abḥāvajñāna*)

The Naiyāyikas regard non-existence (*abḥāva*) as an independent category (*svatantra padārtḥa*). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁasakas also admit it. They say that every thing has twofold aspects:

(i) *Bḥāvātmaka* (positive) and

(ii) *Abhāvātmaka* (negative).

Things possess some qualities and not others. Certain qualities are present in them, others are absent. Hence both of them are equally real. *Abhāva* (non-existence) therefore should be treated as a natural property of things (*vastudharmabhāva*) like *bhāva* (existence).

The Mīmāṁsakas of the Prabhākara School do not recognise *abhāva* as independent category. When we say—

"There is no pot on the ground", what we actually see is not non-existence of a pot, but only empty ground

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[1] prasajya vidhāya vihitasya pratiṣedhaḥ.

( *rikta bhūtala mātra* ). Thus *abhāva* is nothing but mere emptiness ( *śūnyatā* ) of the locus ( *anuyogī* ).

The Naiyāyikas reply to this by saying that if *abhāva* be equated with mere voidness ( *śūnyatā* or *riktatā* ), then how does the perception of empty ground give rise to a knowledge that a specific object, e.g. a pot, is not located there ? There can be no knowledge of any *pratiyogī* ( e.g. a pot ) from mere emptiness or voidness ( *śūnyatā* ). Had it been so, then the bare ground would have at once reverted the absence of all things (e.g; tigers, elephants, horses, buffaloes etc.) that are not located there. But it is not so. We do not cognise all the absences simultaneously.

The question arises: How do we have knowledge of non-existence ( *abhāva jñāna* ) ? For example, how do we know that there is pot on the ground ?

The knowledge cannot be brought under *pratyakṣa* which depends on the contact of a sense-organ with the object ( *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* ) because the object ( i.e. the pot ) is not present then. How can there be a contact with something which is not present ?

Hence the Bhaṭṭas and the Vedāntins postulate a special kind of knowledge, viz. *anupalabdhi* ( i.e. non-apprehension ) to include such cognition of existence.

But the Naiyāyikas treat such knowledge ( *abhāva jñāna* ) as a special kind of *pratyakṣa.* They do not regard *anupalabdhi* as an independent kind of knowledge but take it as an auxiliary to *pratyakṣa.* They call it *yogyānupalabdhi* ( i.e. non-cognition of the perceptible ). Had there been a pot on the ground, it would have been visible there, but it is not seen there. Thus non-existence, i.e., the ground possessing non-existence of the pot ( i.e. *ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam* ).

Here the ground ( *bhūtala* ) is a substantive ( *viśeṣya* ) and the non-existence of the pot ( *ghaṭābhāva* ) is an adjective ( *viśeṣaṇa* ) which qualifies the ground.

In other words, what we see is the ground qualified by the non-existence of the pot ( *ghaṭābhāva viśiṣṭa bhūtala* ).

The contact between the sense and the object here is of a special kind known as *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya bhāva* ( adjective-substantive relation ).

What is the relation between the ground and non-existence of a pot ( *ghaṭābhāva* ) ? It cannot be *saṁyoga* ( contact ) for that can exist only between two positive entities ( *bhāva padārthas* ). For similar reason, it cannot be *samavāya* ( inherence )- Hence the Naiyāyikās treat it as a special type of relation which they call by the name of *svarūpa sambandha.*

10. *Negation of Negatian ( Abhāvābhāva )*

There can be an *abhāva* of *abhāva* ( non-existence of non-existence ) also. The Mīmāṁsakas find fault with this idea. They say that this will lead to an infinite regress ( *anavasthā doṣa* ).

But the Naiyāyikas reply that this will not lead to an infinite regress as the negation of a negation is equal to affirmation. It may be put symbolically as

$$\sim(\sim \mathrm{P}) \equiv P$$

Some Naiyāyikas do not accept the above, but they also admit that the third non-existence in the series is equal to the first.[3]

Symbolically speaking

$$--P \equiv P$$

therefore, there is no infinite regress.

## Analysis of *Abhāvābhāvābhāva*

The concept of *abhāva* ( non-existence ) or *niṣedha* ( negation ) has been subjected to a thread-bare analysis by the Navya Naiyāyikas.

How they make hair-splitting distinctions can be exemplified by seeing how they analyse the concept of *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* ( i.e. the non-existence of the non-exisrence of a pot ).

First, take *ghaṭābhāva* ( non-existence of pot ). Here the counterpositive ( *pratiyogī* ) of the non-existence is ( *ghaṭa* or *pot* ). The specifying property of the counterpositiveness ( *pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ) is analysed as a non-existence, the counterpositiveness to which is determined by a specifying property lying in potness *ghaṭatvaniṣṭha avacchedakatānirūpita pratiyogitāka abhāva* ).

Now take *ghatābhāvābhāva* ( i.e. non-existence of non-existence of a pot ). Here the counterpositive (*pratiyogī*) is *ghaṭābhāva* ( non-existence of a pot ).

The specifying property of the counterpositiveness ( *pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharma* ) is *ghaṭatvaniṣṭha*

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**19. tṛtīyābhāvaśca prathamābhāva-rūpaḥ.**

*avacchedakatā niṣṭha avacchedakaṭā.* Now take *ghaṭābhāvabhāvābhāva* ( non-existence of non-existence of non-existence of a pot ). The counter-positive to this non-existence is non-existence of non-existence of a pot (i.e. *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* ). The distinguishing character of the counterpositiveness is *ghaṭatvaniṣṭha pratiyogitāniṣṭha avacchedakatā* as distinguished by *ghaṭatvaniṣṭha avacchedakatāniṣṭha avacchebakatā.* Thus *ghaṭābhāvābhāvābhāva* can be described as :

*ghaṭatvaniṣṭhāvacchedakaṭāniṣṭhāvacchedakatā niṣṭhāvacchedakatā nirūpita pratiyogitvaniṣṭhā vacchedakatā niṣṭhā vacchedakatā nirūpita pratiyogitāka abhāva.*[1]

### 11. *Vyadhikaraṇa Dharmāvacchinna Ābhāva.*

Some logicians like, Saundaḍa Upādhyāya recognise another kind of *abhāva* characterised by the relation of *vyadhikaraṇa.*

Let us try to understand the concept clearly.

Any two things can be related together in either of two ways—

( i ) co-existence in the same locus.
( ii ) non-co-existence in the same locus.

The first relation is called *samānādhikaraṇa sambandha* ( or *sāmānādhikaraṇya* ).

The second is called *vyadhikaraṇa sambandha* ( or *vaiyadhikaraṇya* ).

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[1] This piece of analysis was got from a descendant of Late Paṇḍita Baccā Jhā, a renowned Navya Naiyāyika of Mithilā and author of *Gūḍhārtha Tattvāloka*, an erudite work on Navya Nyāya

Potness and substanceness co-exist in the same locus and are therefore *samānādhikaraṇa.* Manness ( *mānavatva* ) and cowness ( *gotva* ) do not co-exist in the same locus ( i.e. in the same individual ) and are therefore *vyadhikaraṇa.* Some logicians ( like the Jainas ) hold that the relation of *vyadhikaraṇa* can also serve as a determinant of negation. For example,

As Devadatta is a man, he is not a cow.
( *manuṣyatvena gauḥ na asti* ).

Here the knowledge of *abhāva* ( i.e. non-existence of cowness in Devadatta ) is based on *vyadhikaraṇa dharma* which serves as an *avacchedaka.* Hence such kind of non-existence is called *vyadhikaraṇa dharmāvacchinna abhāva.*

But the Navya Naiyāyikas ( like Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya ) do not accept this view. According to them, as Gadādhara observes, only *samānādhikaraṇa dharma* can function as an *avacchedaka.*[1] One who does not possess knowledge of P, cannot understand non-P. Knowledge of non-existence ( *abhāvajñāna* ) depends upon the knowledge of the *pratiyogī* ( i.e. the counter-positive ) of that non-existence specified by a *pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharma* (i.e. distinguishing property of the absential counter-positiveness ) which is *samānādhikaraṇa* ( co-existent of ) that *pratiyogī.*

Hence the proposition
*manuṣyatvena gauḥ na asti*
( Being a man, he is not a cow )

---

[1] Gaṅgeśopādhyāyastu tādṛśābhāvaṁ nāṅgīcakruḥ. vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinna dharmo na pratiyogitāvacchedaka bhavati. —GT.

on ultimate analysis is equivalent to

*gotvābhāvena gauḥ na asti*

( As he is devoid of cowness, he is not a cow ).

Thus the Naiyāyikas do not recognise such non-existence as a special kind of *abhāva* other than *anyoanyābhāva*.

They would bring the above inference under *kevalānvayī anumāṇa*.

### 12. *Sāmānya and Viśeṣa Abhāva*

When we say,

There is a pot,

it is a case of generic existence ( *sāmānya sattā* ).

When we say,

There is a blue pot.

It is a case of specific existence ( *viśeṣa sattā* ).

Similarly,

There is no pot

is a case of *sāmānya abhāva*

( generic non-existence ).

There is no blue pot

is a case of *viśeṣa abhāva*

( specific non-existence ).

There may be both existence and non-existence of a thing from different perspectives. For example,

"There is a pot on the ground"

Here, the existence of the pot is by relation of contact (*saṁyoga*) and the non-existence of it is by relation of inherence (*samavāya*). In other words, the determinant ( *niyāmaka* ) of pot-existence ( *ghaṭa sattā* ) is pot-contact ( *ghaṭa-saṁyoga* ).

When we say

> "The pot is not on the ground by relation of inherence,"

The determinant of the non-existence of the pot ( *ghaṭāsattā* ) is non-existence of pot-inherence ( *ghaṭa-samavāya* ).

Now take the following propositions,

( 1 ) There is a pot on the ground.
(*bhutale ghaṭaḥ asti*).

( 2 ) There is no blue pot on the ground.
(*bhūtale nīla ghaṭaḥ na asti*).

Here,

( 1 ) means that there is existence of the pot in the capacity of a pot in general ( *ghaṭatvena* ).

( 2 ) means that there is non-existence of the pot in the capacity of a blue pot ( *nīlaghaṭatvena* ).

In other words, the pot exists on the ground in a general way, but not in a specific way.

It exists as a pot ( *ghaṭa* ), it does not exist as a blue pot ( *nīlaghaṭa* ).

Suppose, there is a pot on the ground, but no cloth. Then although the pot ( *ghaṭa* ) exists as a pot ( *ghaṭatvena* ), it does not exist as a member of the conjunct, pot and cloth ( *ghaṭapaṭobhayatvena* ).

Thus though one counterpositive ( *pratiyogī* ) of the non-existence is existent, it is non-existent as the counterpart of double non-existence ( *ubhayābhāva* ).

A counterpositiveness ( *pratiyogitā* ) is thus differentiated or distinguished by some attribute ( *dharma* ) or relation ( *sambandha* ).

> The pot does not exist by inherence
> ( *samavāyena ghaṭaḥ na asti* ).

Here the counterpositiveness ( *pratiyogitā* ) is distinguished ( *avacchinna* ) by potness ( *ghaṭatva* ) and relation of inherence ( *samavāya sambandha* ).

In other words, the distinguishing property ( *avacchedakībhūta dharma* ) of the counterpositive is *ghaṭatva* ( potness ) and the limiting relation ( *avacchedaka sambandha* ) is *samavāya* ( inherence ).

There is no absolute existence or absolute non-existence of anything in all relation. Whenever an existence ( *bhāva* ) or non-existence ( *abhāva* ) is pointed out, it is in some particular relation ( *sambandha viśeṣa* ). Such specification is possible only by means of some limiting relation ( *avacchedaka sambandha* ). If the pot does not exist ( on the ground ) by contact, the non-existence is describable as *samyoga sambandhāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭhapratiyogitāka abhāva*. If the pot does not exist by inherence, the non-existence is describable as *samavāya sambandhāvacchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha pratiyogitāka abhāva*.

Thus the limiting relation ( *avacchedaka sambandha* ) serves to distinguish one type of non-existence from another. Similarly, the limiting property ( *avacchedaka dharma* ) serves to specify the character of the counter-positivity ( *pratiyogitā* ). A non-existence ( *abhāva* ) cannot be understood clearly without the help of these two factors.

The counter-positiveness to the non-existence of pot ( *ghaṭābhāva-pratiyogitā* ) lies in every pot ( *ghaṭa* ). That is to say, it lies in every locus of potness. Thus it is potness ( *ghaṭatva* ) which determines the *pratiyogitā* ( counterpositiveness ) of *ghaṭāhhāva* ( non-existence of pot ). It is the controller ( *niyāmaka* ), determiner ( *nirūpaka* ) or limitor ( *avacchedaka* ) of that absential counterpositiveness (*abhāvīya pratiyogitā* ).

Now when we say

There is no blue pot on the ground.

The counterpositive of the non-existence is not a pot general ( *ghaṭa sāmānya* ) but 'a pot as qualified by blueness ( *nīlatvaviśiṣṭa ghaṭa* ). In other words, the *pratiyogitāvacchedakadharma* is not potness (*ghaṭatva*) but blueness and potness ( *nīlatva and ghaṭatva* ). It is a qualified absence ( *viśiṣṭa abhāva* ).

### 13. *Ubhayābhāva*

What is denied in the above proposition ( i.e. there is no blue pot on the ground ) is the conjunct of potness and blueness taken together.

The absence of a blue pot ( *nīla-ghaṭābhāva* ) resides in all the loci where

( 1 ) there is potness, but no blueness
( e.g. : a red pot )
( 2 ) there is blueness, but no potness
( e.g. : a blue cloth )
( 3 ) there is neither potness nor blueness
( e.g. : a white flower ).

This kind of non-existence is called *ubhayābhāva*. It is conditioned by the absence of any of the two terms or of both.

As Dr. H. H. Ingalls observes (in M.S.N.) the Naiyāyikas seem to hold that the negation of conjunction is equivalent to the denial of the alternatives. Though they do not formulate the principle inso many words, they tacitly apply it.

The range of a blue pot is more limited than that of a pot or that of blue taken separately. But when we take the non-existence of a blue pot (B.P.), we find that its range is wider than that of B or P taken separately.

### 14. *Anyatarābhāva*

Now let us take a proposition,

The pot is either blue or red
(*nīla raktayoḥ anyataraḥ ghaṭaḥ*)

The above is an alternative proposition,

It is true if one alternative is true, it is false if none of the alternatives is true. The negation of both alternatives is called *anyatarābhāva.*

The Naiyāyikas define *anyatara* as that which possesses a mutual absence of which the counterpositiveness is limited by two mutual absences.[1]

Thus the proposition,

The pot is either blue or red

will mean that the pot possesses that which is different from that which is different from both blueness and redness. In short, either blueness resides in the pot, or redness resides in the pot.

---

[1] bhedadvayāvacchinnapratiyogitāka bhedavat.

The negation of such an alternative proposition amounts to denial of both the alternatives, i.e.,

The pot is neither blue nor red

As Dr. Ingalls puts it, the Naiyāyikas tactily apply the principle that the contradictory of an alternative proposition is a conjunctive proposition, i.e., the denial of alternation is equivalent to a conjunction of denials.

In this way, comparative studies of Navya Nyāya and Symbolic Logic ( on the lines indicated above ) can bring out the essential similarity underlying the fundamental principles of linguistic analysis in Indian and Western Philosophy.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
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| A. | *Atharvaveda.* |
| ABTP. | *Ādhunika Bhāratīya Tarkaśāstra kā Paricaya*<br>S. L. Pāṇḍeya, Darshan Peeth,<br>Allahabad, 1969. |
| AN. | *Avacchedakatva Nirukti*<br>of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra. |
| AS. | *Āpastamba Sūtra.* |
| AV. | *Avacchedakatvādi Vimarśa*<br>by Rājeśvara Śāstrī ( Varanasi ). |
| AVC. | *Aucitya Vicāra Carcā*<br>of Kṣemendra Ācārya. |
| BC. | *Bhāṭṭa Cintāmaṇi*<br>of Gāgā Bhaṭṭa. |
| BP. | *Bhāṣā Pariccheda*<br>( Kārikāvalī ) of Viśvanātha Pañcānana. |
| BS. | *Brahma Sūtra*<br>of Vyāsa. |
| BT. | *Bhāmati Ṭīkā* ( on B.S. )<br>of Vācaspati Miśra. |
| BU. | *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.* |
| C. | *Candrāloka*<br>of Jayadeva. |
| D. | *Dhvanyāloka*<br>of Ānanda Vardhana. |
| DT. | *Dinakarī Ṭīkā*<br>( on T.S. ) |
| GSV. | *Gautama Sūtra Vṛtti*<br>of Viśvanātha Pañcānana. |

| | |
|---|---|
| GT. | *Gādādharī Ṭīkā*<br>( on T.C. ) |
| GT. | *Gūḍhārtha Tattvāloka*<br>of Paṇḍita Baccā Jhā<br>( Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi ). |
| HYP. | *Haṭha yoga Pradīpikā*<br>of Svāmī Rāmācārī. |
| JS. | *Jaimini Sūtra* |
| K. | *Kāvyādarśa*<br>of Daṇḍī Ācārya. |
| KA. | *Kāvyānuśāsana*<br>of Hemacandra Ācārya. |
| KP. | *Kāvya Prakāśa*<br>of Mammaṭa Ācārya. |
| KS. | *Kāvyālaṅkāra Sūtra*<br>of Bhāmaha Ācārya. |
| KT. | *Kiraṇāvalī Ṭīkā*<br>( on S.M. ) by Kṛṣṇa Vallabhācārya. |
| LM. | *Laghu Mañjūṣā*<br>of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. |
| MB. | *Mahā Bhārata*<br>( of Vyāsa ). |
| MIL. | *Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*<br>by Dr. S. S. Barlingay. |
| MP. | *Mahābhāṣya Pradīpa*<br>( Vārttika on P.M. ) by Kaiyaṭa |
| MSN. | *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya*<br>by Dr. H. H. Ingalls<br>( published by Harvard University Press ). |
| N. | *Nīlakaṇṭhī*<br>of Ācārya Nīlakaṇṭha |

| | |
|---|---|
| NB. | *Nyāya Bodhinī*<br>of Govardhana Ācārya |
| ND. | *Nyāya Darśana*<br>by Prof. Hari Mohan Jha ( published by Pustak Bhandar, Patna ). |
| NK. | *Nyāya Kaumudī*<br>of Vināyaka Bhaṭṭa. |
| NK. | *Nyāya Kusumañjali*<br>of Udayana Ācārya. |
| NL. | *Nyāya Līlāvatī*<br>of Vallabha Ācārya. |
| NM. | *Nyāya ( Siddhānta ) Mañjarī*<br>of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. |
| NNL. | *Navya Nyāya Logic*<br>by Dr. D. C. Guha, published by Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśana, Vārāṇasī |
| NRM. | *Nyāya Ratna Mālā*<br>of Pārtha Sārathi Miśra. |
| NS. | *Nyāya Sūtra*<br>of Gautama. |
| NS. | *Nāṭya Śāstra*<br>of Bharata. |
| PC. | *Padārtha Candrikā*<br>( Ṭīkā on S.P. ) by Śeṣānanta. |
| PLM. | *Parama Laghu Mañjuṣā*<br>of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. |
| PM. | *Pātañjala Mahābhāṣya*<br>( on P.S. ) |
| PP. | *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*<br>of Śālika Nātha Miśra. |

| | |
|---|---|
| PS. | *Pāṇini Sūtra.* |
| PS. | *Pāṇini Śikṣā* |
| PWM. | *Philosophy of Word and Meaning*<br>by Dr. Gaurī Nātha Śāstrī<br>(published by Sanskrit College, Calcutta). |
| RG. | *Rasa Gaṅgādhara*<br>of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha. |
| SBh. | *Śābara Bhāṣya*<br>( on J. S. ) |
| SBr. | *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* |
| SBV. | *Śābda Bodha Vimarśa*<br>by B.N.Sinha ( Varanasi ) |
| SC. | *Siddhānta Candrikā*<br>by Rāmacandra Ācārya |
| SCN. | *Ṣatcakra Nirūpaṇa*<br>of Pūrṇānanda Svāmī. |
| SD. | *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*<br>of Ācārya Viśvanātha. |
| ŚD. | *Śāstra Dīpikā*<br>of Pārtha Sārathi Miśra. |
| SDS. | *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha*<br>of Mādhavācārya. |
| SM. | *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*<br>of Viśvanātha Pañcānana. |
| SP. | *Sapta Padārthī*<br>of Śivāditya |
| SR. | *Śabdārtha Ratnākara* |
| SS. | *Sphoṭa Siddhi*<br>of Maṇḍana Miśra. |

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|---|---|
| SSP. | *Śabda Śakti Prakāśikā*<br>of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra. |
| ST. | *Subodhinī Ṭīkā* ( on S.V. )<br>by Kṛṣṇam Ācārya |
| STN. | *Sphoṭa Tattva Nirṇaya*<br>of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa |
| SV. | *Sphoṭa Vāda*<br>of Nageśa Bhaṭṭa. |
| ŚV. | *Śaktivāda*<br>of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. |
| SWK. | *Six Ways of Knowing*<br>by Dr. D. M. Datta,<br>( published by Calcutta University ). |
| TB. | *Tarka Bhāṣā*<br>of Keśava Miśra. |
| TBr. | *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* |
| TC. | *Tattva Cintāmaṇi*<br>of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. |
| TD. | *Tarka Dīpikā*<br>of Annam Bhaṭṭa,<br>( Ṭīkā on T.S. ) |
| TK. | *Tarka Kaumudī*<br>of Laugākṣi Bhāskara. |
| TP. | *Tarka Prakāśa*<br>of Śrīkaṇṭha Dīkṣita. |
| TR. | *Tārkika Rakṣā*<br>of Varada Rāja Ācārya. |
| TS. | *Tarka Saṅgraha*<br>of Annam Bhaṭṭa. |

| | |
|---|---|
| TSP. | *The Serpent Power*<br>by Sir John Woodroffe,<br>( published by Ganesa and Co., Madras ). |
| TU. | *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* |
| TV. | *Tṛtalāvacchedakatā Vāda*<br>by M. M. Śaśi Nātha Jhā<br>( published by Mithilā Research Institute, Darbhanga ) |
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| VB. | *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya*<br>( on N.S ) |
| VBS. | *Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa Sāra*<br>of Ācārya Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa |
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| VJ. | *Vakrokti Jīvita*<br>of Kuntaka Ācārya |
| VP. | *Vākya Padīyam*<br>of Ācārya Bhartṛhari |
| VS. | *Vyāḍi Saṅgraha*<br>( of Ācārya Vyāḍi ) |
| VV. | *Vākya Vṛtti*<br>of Laugākṣi Bhāskara |
| VU. | *Vaiśeṣika Upaskāra*<br>of Śaṅkara Miśra |
| YN. | *Yāska-Nirukta* |
| YV. | *Yajurveda.* |

# Transliteration Marks of Sanskrit Alphabet

**Vowels :**

अ ( a )   आ ( ā )   इ ( i )   ई ( ī )   उ ( u )   ऊ ( ū )
ऋ ( ṛ )   ओ ( o )   औ (au)   ं ( ṁ )   : ( ḥ )

**Consonants :**

क् ( k )   ख् ( kh )   ग् ( g )   घ् ( gh )   ङ् ( ṅ )
च् ( c )   छ् ( ch )   ज् ( j )   झ् ( jh )   ञ् ( ñ )
ट् ( ṭ )   ठ् ( ṭh )   ड् ( ḍ )   ढ् ( ḍh )   ण् ( ṇ )
त् ( t )   थ् ( th )   द् ( d )   घ् ( dh )   न् ( n )
प् ( p )   फ् ( ph )   ब् ( b )   भ् ( bh )   म् ( m )
य् ( y )   र् ( r )   ल् ( l )   व् ( v )
श् ( ś )   ष् ( ṣ )   स् ( s )   ह ( h )
क्ष् ( kṣ )   त्र् ( tr )   ज्ञ् ( jñ )

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